Published by EH.NET (May 2002)
Heinz-Peter Spahn, From Gold to Euro: On Monetary Theory and the History of
Currency Systems. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2001. ix + 220
pp. $59.95 (cloth), ISBN: 3-540-41605-6.
Reviewed for EH.NET by Catherine R. Schenk, Department of Economic and Social
History, University of Glasgow.
Peter Spahn, Professor at Hohenheim University, Stuttgart, has produced a
succinct, indeed sometimes breathless, overview both of the evolution of
monetary theory and the experience of fixed or stable exchange rate systems
from the Gold Standard to the Euro. The pace is rapid. The theoretical chapters
set up the role of money in the economy in seventy tightly argued pages. The
empirical review of the gold standard, the Bretton Woods system, the European
Monetary System and the European Monetary Union, each of which has generated
many books on their own, altogether take only ninety pages. Its very brevity,
however, is perhaps the book’s strength since it provides the reader with a
broad conceptual framework within which to assess the strengths and weaknesses
of stable exchange rate regimes. The general argument of the book is that
exchange rate regimes since 1870 can be seen as part of a process culminating
in the single currency EMU in a bipolar Euro-dollar world. The lesson of
history is that fixed exchange rate regimes fail because of the ultimate
primacy of internal over external stability. When these two policy goals
diverge, the foreign exchange rate is abandoned and the system collapses. Only
by eliminating exchange rates as policy targets (through currency union or
floating rates) can this dichotomy be resolved.
There is some effort to make up for conceptual shortcuts by providing ‘Boxes’
focused on key definitions and theories, which may help the usefulness and
accessibility of the book for advanced undergraduates and postgraduates. There
are also helpful summaries of each section of the book, although no concluding
chapter to pull the ideas finally together. Readers should also be warned that
they will find almost no discussion of the experience of floating exchange
rates.
Part I of the book provides a critique of both neo-classical and Keynesian
theories of money, and emphasizes the social and political role of money in
low-trust societies such as Europe. Part II introduces the development of
monetary policy through the establishment of the Bank of England and surveys
the Currency and Banking School controversy. Spahn here introduces the
importance of reputation and credible redemption that will be major themes of
his analysis of exchange rate standards. Spahn views the return to gold
convertibility in 1821 as an unnecessary and serious mistake that destabilized
the English monetary system. Likewise, he argues later that the continued use
of gold as an anchor in the gold standard and the Bretton Woods system
contributed to their weakness.
Having established the evolution of the money in England, the book turns a
sharp corner, and the second half is devoted to analyzing exchange rate
standards. The link between the first and second halves of the book might have
benefited from being more explicit to provide a more cohesive argument. Part
III is the most innovative and detailed section. Spahn applies game theory to
provide a stylized view of the operation of the pre-war Gold Standard. He
departs from Eichengreen by using a model in which the actors have different
policy priorities with respect to internal versus external equilibrium. In this
case England, as the key currency country where maintaining internal
equilibrium was less important than in other countries, emerges as a
Stackelberg follower rather than the leader.
By the end of the nineteenth century, these policy preferences were changing
and the twentieth century witnessed the increased importance of internal
stability, especially price stability and employment as primary targets — what
Spahn terms the move from the Gold Standard to the Wage Standard. For him, it
is this new balance of priorities that undermines the credibility and therefore
the stability of future efforts to sustain stable exchange rate regimes. The
familiar tale of the failed structure of the Bretton Woods system is detailed
in Chapter 6. For Spahn a major error was the continued use of gold in the US
dollar exchange system that fatally undermined it. Spahn notes that during the
Bretton Woods era “political considerations began more and more to dominate
attitudes towards currency matters” (p. 143). There is, however, very little
account of the practical politics of the 1940s and 1960s that prevented a
pragmatic solution to the role of gold in these decades. The drawn out and
acrimonious discussions aimed at identifying and resolving the flaws in the
system hardly get a mention beyond reference to France’s disruptive
accumulation of gold in the 1960s. The Bretton Woods era was a highly complex
period of international negotiation and conflict on a variety of strategic,
political, economic and monetary fronts that complicated the process of
managing the global exchange rate regime. As Spahn hints, this was a ‘golden
age’ in terms of the impressive growth experience of many countries, in spite
of rather than because of the operation of the international monetary system.
The important role of politics is again stressed in the following chapter on
the reasons behind the development of the European Monetary System. In terms of
the economic evolution of the system, Spahn models the way that the Deutsche
Mark became the key currency of the EMS because Germany was the most
stability-oriented country. He is then critical of the anti-inflationary policy
pursued by the Bundesbank that eventually drove the system apart, again because
of the ultimate supremacy of national over international policy goals. These
conclusions are not very original, but they are expressed using more formal
modeling and game theory than in usual narrative accounts.
The final chapter deals with the European attempt to eliminate the flaws of a
key currency system that plagued the gold standard, Bretton Woods and the EMS.
Like the EMS, European Monetary Union was prompted mainly for political rather
than economic purposes. Economically, Spahn predicts that the adoption of price
stability as the primary goal of the European Central Bank may deliver poor
prospects for growth and employment, especially for particular regions. The
benefits of currency union in terms of the ‘de-politicization’ of monetary
policy and the efficiency gained by no longer targeting exchange rates may be
undone by the transfers necessary to soften the impact on regional ‘losers.’
His final lesson of the experience of exchange rate standards is that they
cannot provide a shortcut to internal equilibrium by forcing countries to
converge with sounder economies. In his words, “monetary stability has to be
built at home,” it cannot be achieved through exchange rate targets (p. 189).
‘Home’ has just become a much bigger space for Europeans. It remains to be seen
whether it is too big and the rooms too distinct to allow the European Central
Bank to ‘build’ stability.
Dr. Catherine R. Schenk is Senior Lecturer in Economic History at the
University of Glasgow. Her most recent book is Hong Kong as an International
Financial Centre (Routledge, 2001). She is currently working on the reform
of the international monetary system in the 1960s and on British management of
the decline of sterling in that decade.