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Greif, A. Institutions and Organizations in Historical Perspective
Stanford University Office: Econ. Rm. 261. Department of Economics Office hours: Mon. 11:00 - 12:00 and by appointment 5-8936 228/294: Institutions and Organizations in Historical Perspective Avner Greif Fall 1995 Topics I. The Neo-Classical Approach. II. Is Something Missing? III. Toward Integration: The Study of Economic Institutions through Economic History a. Institutions that Governed the Early Trade. b. The State: From Anarchy to the Leviathan and Back Again. c. Institutions that Governed the Late Trade. d. The Organization of Production. Reading List I. Neo-Classical Economics and Institutions. Institutions as responses to Market Failures: Coase, R.H. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44. * D. N. McCloskey. 1976. English Open Fields as Behavior Towards Risk. Research in Economics, 1: 124-170. II. New Institutional Economics * Williamson, Oliver E. 1989. Transaction Cost Economics. In the Handbook of Industrial Organization, edited by Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig. New York: North Holland. (chapter 3.) * S. Fenoaltea. 1976. Risk, Transaction Costs, and the Organization of Medieval Agriculture. Exploration in Economic History, 13: 129-51. * P. Fishback. 1992. The Economics of Company Housing: Historical Perspectives from the Coal Fields. JLEO vol. 8 (no. 2). * North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton. Selected chapters. * S. Kantor. 1990. Razorback, Ticky Cows, and the Closing of the Georgia Open Range: The Dynamic of Institutional Change Uncovered. MS. California Institute of Technology. IIa. (Optional): Rent-seeking and Collective Actions. Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Jan De Vries. 1983. Review of The Rise and Decline of Nations in Historical Perspective. In International Studies Quarterly: 27: 11-16. Allen, Robert. 1982. The Efficiency and Distributional Consequences of Eighteenth Century Enclosures. Economic Journal, 92: 937-53. Ekelund, Robert B., and Robert D. Tollison. 1980. Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society. In Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society. Edited by James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, pp. 235-68. II. Is Something Missing? * Sugden, Robert. 1989. Spontaneous Order. Journal of Economic Perspective, 3(4): 85-97 Hollander, Heinz. 1990. A Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation. American Economic Review, 80(5): 1157-67. * Dawes, R. M., and Thaler, R. H. 1988. Anomalies: Cooperation. Economic Perspectives 2:187-97. Bowls, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 1993. The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy. Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (no. 1, Winter): 83- 102. III. Toward Integration * North, Douglass C., "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991, 5, 97-112. North, C. Douglass. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. CUP. A. Institutions that Governed the Early Trade: Trade was at first a shapeless, chaotic mass with the spirits of many economists brooding over the water. (Exchange in the absences of Law.) Background: R. De Roover. 1965. The Organization of Trade. In Cambridge Economic History of Europe. Vol. III, pp. 42-118. Analysis: * Jeffrey M. Lacher and John A. Weinberg. 1989. Optimal Contracts Under Costly State Falsification. Journal of Political Economy 97(6): 1345-63. * Bruce L. Benson. 1989. The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law. Southern Economic Journal 55(3): 644-61. Kandori, Michihiro, "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, 1992, 59, 63-80. * P.R. Milgrom, D.C. North and B.R. Weingast. 1991. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Chamagne Fairs. Economics & Politics 2(19): 1-23. * Greif, A. Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition. American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 3 (June, 1993). Greif, A. Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies. 1994. The Journal of Political Economy vol. 102, No. 5 (October). B.The B. State: From Anarchy to the Leviathan and Back Again: (The Creation of Law.) * Greif, A., Paul Milgrom, and Barry Weingast. 1994. Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Gild." The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 102, No. 4 (August). * Green, Edward J. 1993. On the Emergence of Parliamentary Government. The Role of Private Information. Quarterly Review: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Winter: 2-16. * North D.C., and B. R. Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice. Journal of Economic History XLIX (December) pp. 803-32. * Szakaly, Kristin. 1992. The Political Economy of Government Debt in England (1693-1800). California Institute of Technology working paper no. 793. C. Institutions that Governed the Late Trade (Exchange in the Shadow of the Law.) Background: Coornaert, E.L.J. 1967. European Economic Institutions and the New World: the Chartered Companies. In Cambridge Economic History of Europe Vol. IV, pp. 221-74 Analysis: * Irwin, Douglas, A. 1991. Mercantilism as Strategic Trade Policy: The Anglo-Dutch Rivalry for the East India Trade. Journal of Political Economy, 99(6): 1296-1314. * Anderson, Gary M., Robert E. McCormick, and Robert D. Tollison. 1983. The Economic Organization of the English East India Company. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 4: 221-38. * Carlos, Ann M. and Stephen Nicholas. 1990. Agency Problems in Early Chartered Companies: The Case of the Hudson's Bay Company. The Journal of Economic History. Vol. L. (no. 4, Dec.): 853-75. R.L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman. 1983. Agency problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence. Journal of Law and Economics October. Adam Smith. 1937 ed. The Wealth of Nations pp. 690-716. (On the Public Works and Institutions which are necessary for facilitating particular Branches of Commerce). D. The Organization of Production. Background: Mendels, F.F. 1972. Proto-industrialization: The First Phase of the Industrialization Process. Journal of Economic History 32(4): 241-61. Analysis: * Marglin. S. 1976. What Do Bosses Do? in AndrÈ Gorz. ed. The Division of Labour: The Labour Process and the Class Struggle ... pp. 13-54. * Williamson. O.S. 1980. The Organization of Work. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1(1): 5-38. * Jones. S.R.H. 1982. The Organization of Work. A Historical Dimension. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3: 117- 37. Rick Szostak .1989. The Organization of Work, The Emergence of the Factory Revisited. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 11: 343- 58. Landes. D.S. 1986. What Do Bosses Really Do? Journal of Economic History September. Clark, Gregory. 1994. Factory Discipline. Journal of Economic History 54 (no. 1): 128-63