Lindert on Goldin and Katz, _The Race between Education and Technology_
Book Reviews in Economic and Business History
eh.net-review at eh.net
Sat Nov 29 14:24:33 EST 2008
Published by EH.NET (November 2008)
Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz, _The Race between Education and
Technology_. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. vii + 488
pp. $40 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-0-674-02867-8.
Reviewed for EH.NET by Peter H. Lindert, Department of Economics,
University of California -- Davis.
Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz have produced a definitive economic
history of American education. This reviewer’s high hopes for their
book project have not been disappointed. The final product is tightly
reasoned and easy to grasp by anyone who cares about the country’s
educational history. Even those who are shy of mathematics can simply
slip past the occasional show of regressions and equations, guided by
the authors’ trouble-free prose. Those of you who have seen several
Goldin-Katz papers from this project are assured that the whole is
greater than the sum of those parts.
Two featured insights tie the whole book together, with the first of
these leading logically to the second. The first insight: It’s home
grown education that has mattered, not technology or immigration. That
is, contrasting historical movements in American wage inequality are
explained mainly by revolutions in education, not by shifts in
technology or by waves of immigration. Goldin and Katz make this
argument persuasive by wisely choosing to focus on the task of
explaining contrasts in wage movements between long periods. Wage
inequality, by occupation or by educational level, rose in the late
nineteenth century, fell dramatically in the first half of the
twentieth, and then rose in most decades of the second half (though not
in the 1970s). In any one period, all three of those forces -- home
grown education, technology, and immigration -- shared in determining
the width of the pay gaps. Similarly, trends in all three shared in the
task of explaining trends in the pay gaps. Yet the key insight emerges
from contrasting those long trends, a temporal contrast analogous to
economists’ “differences in differences” analysis. What made periods of
rising inequality different from periods of falling inequality is that
the rate of advance in education was stronger in the latter periods. In
the title roles, technology has been the steady tortoise, while
education has raced like the erratic hare. At times it ran ahead, at
times it fell asleep, and now it races to catch up.
The first featured insight introduces their search for the second. How
did America achieve those revolutions in education, and what explains
their timing? The second insight is that American education had a unique
set of egalitarian virtues, which weakened or were subverted later. The
six original virtues were public funding, public provision, the
separation of church and state, fiscal decentralization, forgiveness of
youthful errors, and gender neutrality. Some of these virtues waxed and
waned, though not because of any unifying dynamic. Three of them --
public funding, public provision, and secularization -- rose across the
middle and late nineteenth century and never retreated, for better and
for worse. Two others - forgiveness and gender equality -- have been
permanent American strengths, with a couple of wrinkles in the
mid-twentieth century. Fiscal decentralization has the most complicated
dynamic of all.
The opening part of the book (Introduction and Chapters 1-3) previews
everything, especially the first key insight about the
technology-education race. Its factual summaries deserve to be worked
into our reading lists and lectures. For an overview of the distinctive
history of American educational progress across the data-rich twentieth
century, see Chapter 1. Chapter 2 fixes our attention on earnings
inequality, the dependent variable that dominates the book. Reading
lists could well combine this chapter’s summary of wage inequality in
the twentieth century with the Piketty-Saez overview of what happened up
at the very top of the distribution. Chapter 3 on skill-biased
technological change debunks the notion that the computer era is a
radical departure, and drives home the point that skills bias has
advanced more evenly over the decades than most people think. It ends
with the key pivot point that “It’s not technology,” which turns us
toward the second key insight, namely that fluctuations in educational
progress play the leading role in explaining inequality movements.
The second part of the book dwells on the unevenness of that progress.
This country went through three great waves. In the nineteenth century
America’s (and Canada’s) public primary schooling became the envy of the
world. Chapter 4 on the “origins of the virtues” sketches this wave,
with definitive coverage of the six egalitarian virtues. Chapters 5 and
6 explain the second great wave, in which America became the world
pioneer in public high schools with its own egalitarian emphasis on a
wide menu of courses for all. Goldin and Katz show that several
economic forces explain why the timing of this grass-roots movement
differed across regions. Their quantitative accounting downplays
compulsory school laws and child labor laws, which they find had only
small, though statistically significant, effects. Rather, the analysis
hints at a political economy in which some regions developed high
schools faster than others because their political structures were more
egalitarian. In the high school wave, as in the earlier primary school
wave, the willingness to raise taxes for school unquestionably raised
total schooling, and did not just crowd out private schooling.
Chapter 7 on the evolution and current state of America’s private and
public colleges and universities is jam-packed with useful information.
It belongs on everybody’s reading list in education economics. The
main theme here is triumph: The Americans did a better job than any
other country at financing higher education, and at making its
institutions compete against each other. Only at the end of the
twentieth century have other countries caught up in high-education
enrollments, though the United States continues to dominate in research.
Two subplots in the twentieth-century advance of higher education relate
to gender and to regions. The gender story exposes one of the main
wrinkles in the triumph of gender equality in American education. With
higher education, as with careers in teaching, women lost ground at one
point in the twentieth century, though they overtook males later. Their
college education fell behind a bit in the Great Depression of the
1930s, and especially in the postwar quarter-century when the GI Bill
did so much for males’ higher education. This wrinkle was ironed out in
the 1970s, when male graduation rates stagnated and females soon became
the majority of college graduates, as they continue to be in this and
several other countries.
The regional story includes some reverse crowding out: The Northeast has
remained behind in its tax support for higher education because it has
always been so well endowed with private universities. That might not
have been so remarkable if the overall attendance rate had been higher
in the Northeast. Yet Goldin and Katz show us the opposite: Overall
attendance remains higher in the vast North and West from Minnesota to
the Pacific. In other words, something about the presence of excellent
private universities actually lowered college attendance in the
Northeast, other things equal. Might this quantity difference have
outweighed the quality advantage of private institutions in the
Northeast? Did influential ivy alums in northeastern states suppress
public higher education enough to hold back regional growth?
In the final part of the book Goldin and Katz return to the race between
technology and education in explaining twentieth-century movements in
earnings inequality, this time with Chapter 8’s tidy quantitative
analysis. The early wage compression and the later wage widening were
driven by the supply and demand for the skills tied to educational
attainment, with a little help from institutional movements in the power
of unions and wartime wage controls. As we were warned in Part 1’s
preview, the wage movements were dominated more by swings in the supply
of education-related skills than in the demand for them. And on that
supply side, the swings in home grown educational attainment were more
important than the swings in immigration.
In Chapter 9’s finale on “How American Can Win the Race for Tomorrow,”
the authors tread warily in the minefields of current policy debates.
They do not take clear sides in the war over whether extra money will
improve education, despite citing Krueger’s evidence that paying for
smaller class sizes does seem to help. They also refrain from judging
No Child Left Behind, though they note that testing and accountability
is an important issue. On local school choice mechanisms, such as
vouchers and charter schools, they take a cautious position shared by
this reviewer: the evidence is mixed, but school choice “could improve
the situation” for low-income families. The idea of school choice is
also supported, of course, by its success in raising the productivity of
higher education, covered back in Chapter 7. They also seem to accept
the evidence that the country has underinvested in infant education.
Where next for research in the economic history of American education?
This is the perfect time to ask, now that Goldin and Katz have achieved
closure on so many questions. The view from their shoulders reveals two
key areas to explore.
First, who was it that under-invested in education? Did private
individuals pass up money lying on the sidewalk, or was it the political
process failing to realize high social rates of return that took into
account both fiscal effects and knowledge externalities? For the
purposes of their book, Goldin and Katz are able to finesse these tough
questions. By focusing on contrasts between American epochs, they
successfully explain the contrasts in “returns” in terms of movements in
wage ratios that were dramatic enough to drive movements in all
definitions of the rate of return on education. Yet we still need to
explore the separate levels of the private versus “social” (private and
fiscal only) versus overall rates of return, the last being the one that
draws on the recent literature on externalities. Only then can we
distinguish private irrationality, or private capital constraints, from
a failure of policymakers to capture high societal returns to extra
years of education. The new research will have to proceed on different
levels for different time periods. For the present day debate, scholars
will have to jump the higher econometric hurdles imposed by Heckman,
Lochner, and Todd in their rejection of the convenient Mincer return
analysis. For earlier periods, it should suffice to make rougher
contrasts between the likely private and fiscal returns for different
eras and different places.
A related frontier is the political economy of education finance. Who
voted for or against taxes for schools, in which states, and why?
Goldin and Katz have advanced the political economy agenda with
econometric evidence on the determinants of high school and college
attendance, and the funding for public state universities. Yet there is
much more to be done.
On both these research frontiers, our progress will be accelerated
because Goldin and Katz have paved the way.
Peter H. Lindert is Research Professor of Economics at the University of
California - Davis. His latest book is _Growing Public: Social Spending
and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century_, two volumes,
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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