Keeling on Hatton and Williamson,
_Global Migration and the World Economy: Two Centuries of Policy
and Performance_
eh.net-review at eh.net
eh.net-review at eh.net
Wed Jun 13 09:00:13 EDT 2007
Published by EH.NET (June 2007)
Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, _Global Migration and
the World Economy: Two Centuries of Policy and Performance_.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. xi + 471 pp. $50 (cloth), ISBN:
0-262-08342-6.
Reviewed for EH.NET by Drew Keeling, Department of History,
University of Zurich.
For decades, scholars of modern cross-border migration and its
history have noted the desirability of broad comparative
perspectives, as frameworks for more numerous studies of particular
locales and ethnicities. In recent years, economists have led
development of a "big picture" approach to the history of
international migration, and Jeffrey Williamson and Timothy Hatton
have been at the forefront of those economists.
_Global Migration and the World Economy_, the latest and most
exhaustive joint study of this duo, builds on their prior work
together and independently, but also breaks important new ground. For
instance, most of this new book is not duplicated either in their
_Age of Mass Migration_ (1998) or in Williamson and Kevin O'Rourke's
collaboration, _Globalization and History_ (1999).
The book is divided into four sections by time period: the nineteenth
century rise of global migration, the early twentieth century fall,
the late twentieth century "rise again," and a final section
examining contemporary migration trends and future alternatives. Ten
of eighteen chapters concern the period since 1914, and among the
book's strengths are its many insightful comparisons between the post
World War II period and the "first global century" that ended with
World War I.
Using an impressive combination of original theory, statistics, and
logic, and incorporating a broad array of findings from other
scholars, the authors dissect the economic fundamentals underlying
international mass migration. They deploy their multi-pronged
analysis across the vicissitudes of the modern migratory age: through
shifts in origin countries, the transformation from industry to
services in destination country economies, the growing importance of
asylum-seeking and illegal migration, and the emergence of policy
regimes that have become more restrictive, more sophisticated, and
more difficult to effectively administer. A solid historical
perspective informs a thorough examination of contemporary issues:
from the importance and limitations of immigration regulations in
shaping the magnitudes and character of migration, to democratic
disconnections between public opinion and public policies on
migration, to the complex offsets and feedbacks between education and
mobility, skilled and unskilled labor, and the "brain drain" and
remittances. _Global Migration and the World Economy_ is chock full
of precise and salient questions, and takes at least a stab at most
of them, although it is often a challenge for the reader to keep
track of which among a shifting multitude of open issues is being
addressed, or where it has already been addressed.
A tour de force summation of economic history literature on migration
will make this an excellent reference source for future researchers.
The coverage is particularly thorough on recent publications, through
about 2004, which lends this volume an impressive "cutting edge"
character, but also makes its conclusions tentative in a number of
places. This suggests the possibility of an eventual second edition,
which would also provide an opportunity to correct ambiguities in a
few of the otherwise generally helpful "supply and demand" graphs or
"box diagrams" and to redress overstatements such as "the labor
market effect of immigration has always been the key focus in debate
over immigration policy." That remark, on page 289, is difficult to
reconcile with the finding, on page 359, that "prejudice against
those of a different race and culture is the most important influence
on attitudes towards immigrants."
The topical coverage is very wide, although less so than the title
might suggest. Migration's overlaps with international trade are
treated more extensively, for instance, than its impacts on economic
growth or its interactions with demographic and environmental
factors. A more functionally descriptive title might be "the economic
causes and consequences of global migration since 1815," and in that
important category this significant book has few peers, if any.
While an impressive work overall, some parts of _Global Migration_
are problematic. The authors appropriately stress the importance of
labor markets, which have been underappreciated in most of the
migration historiography, but apply an incomplete corrective. They
say little about labor demand, stressing labor supply instead, and
attributing even more significance to factors exogenous to labor
markets (such as travel costs, famines, wars, and government
policies). At the core of their historical explanation for "what
drove migration" is a model in which potential migrants in poorer
countries are stuck in a "poverty trap" until they can find a way to
"escape" it, with the help of higher wages, government subsidies,
foreign remittances or lower ticket prices. Undoubtedly, relocation
costs have always been a consideration in long-distance cross-border
migration decisions, and were, in general, a more serious constraint
the further back in time one looks, but the Hatton and Williamson
model imputes to them a centrality beyond that established by their
data. Rising wages across the nineteenth-century Atlantic basin
lowered the real costs of travel, new travel technologies reduced
travel times, the sources of Europe's overseas emigrants shifted
southward and eastward to regions more remote from New World
destinations, and there was a long term secular shift towards lower
average labor market "skills" amongst transatlantic migrants. All of
this is consistent with a declining cost barrier to migration. But
how big a role did that barrier play to begin with, at the outset of
the "first global century," e. g. circa 1830? The truth is, no one
seems to really know for sure yet, including Hatton and Williamson.
There is no model here explicitly assessing the relative importance
of factors, including travel affordability, which distinguished
stayers from leavers, there is no clear distinction between wanting
to migrate and being able to migrate, and the cost data presented are
quite incomplete.
The authors' claim that "during the great transition from trickle to
flood, it was the decline in steerage rates and in the time in
passage that mattered most," but there are at least two problems with
this theory as they present it. Firstly, most nineteenth century
overseas migrants left from Europe, most of those European emigrants
moved to the United States, and the all-time peak in U.S. immigration
relative to population was in the early 1850s, a time when very few
migrants yet reached America on the steamships which cut oceanic
travel times by two thirds or more. Steamships did not take more
steerage passengers to the U.S. than sailing ships until 1865.
Secondly, the supporting passage cost data presented in _Global
Migration_ do not include most available sources of such figures,
such as the fares compiled by Kristian Hvidt (1971) or Arnold Kludas
(1986) showing an increase in North Atlantic transit fares after 1900
that coincides with an even sharper rise to the second highest
all-time peak in the U.S. immigration rate.
Hatton and Williamson deal authoritatively with the expected net
benefits of migration, but have little to say about how the variance
and uncertainties of such net benefits also have been important to
voluntary international migrants. Uncertainties and fears -- of mass
amnesty, or of millions forced to live outside the law -- have played
a role in recent U.S. immigration policy debates. Long-distance
transnational migration itself has long and rightly been regarded as
a great gamble. Smuggled migrants crossing Arizona's deserts or the
waters between Africa and Europe clearly confront substantial risks.
Risk considerations have been convincingly suggested as contributing
factors to past mass migration trends, such as the record high rate
of Irish emigration in the early 1850s, for example, or the strong
and persistent drop in German emigration after 1890. The causal role
of pitfalls and anxieties, about leaving or staying or both, receive
little attention in this book, however.
The discussion on pre-World War I economic "convergence" between
immigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving countries is not entirely
clear-cut. Williamson's path-breaking international real wage
comparison data set, gathered in the early 1990s and focused on
1870-1913, apparently still lacks coverage of two immigrant source
countries which were major contributors to the massive migration
"peak" of 1900-1913, Russia and Austria-Hungary. Many of the
convergence examples actually cited, moreover, are comparisons within
Europe rather than between Europe and the New World. This important
distinction is often blurred.
The authors nonetheless do make a persuasive case (for the nineteenth
century and today) that chain migration, demographic transitions,
travel costs relative to source incomes, and government policies are
more significant than wage gaps in "driving" migration, but that
international labor market migration, if sufficiently massive, has
generally reduced global economic inequality between poor and rich
countries. This migration-induced convergence has tended to come at
the cost of rising inequality within richer destination countries,
however. Subject to some notable distinctions and qualifications, the
authors also reach similar conclusions regarding "south-to-south"
migration, e.g. movement between less-developed countries.
The chapter on the early twentieth century "backlash" against
immigration suffers from a conflation of attitudes and intentions (on
the one hand) with effective policies (on the other). Based on a
model quantifying "policy stance" rather than "policy impact,"
_Global Migration_ plausibly indicates that "labor market
fundamentals," e.g. the negative effect of immigration on wages of
the native-born were, after all, more important than xenophobia or
racism in producing a gradual shift in favor of restricting European
migration to the New World by the early twentieth century. Contrary
to the assertions in this chapter, however, (although not the
immediately following chapter on the impacts of the" backlash") the
decade 1915-24 saw dramatic changes in the policies actually adopted
in the U.S., the destination of most transatlantic migrants in the
century before World War I.
On the eve of that war, gradually increasing exclusion of limited
categories of arriving Europeans had raised the debarment rate at
U.S. entry ports to a still near negligible 2%. During the war, in
contrast, U.S. immigration dropped by over 75%. The 1920s quota laws
which soon followed were explicitly and successfully designed to
eliminate most of the influx from Southern and Eastern Europe which
had accounted for a large majority of the 15 million American
immigrants of 1894-1914. As the authors rightly observe, American
immigration quotas were largely redundant during the Great Depression
and World War II, but nonetheless did have major restrictive effects
in the 1920s and 1950s. The shifting constellations of political
party strategies and interest groups which enabled significant
fulfillment of growing popular sentiment against immigration to the
U.S. by the 1920s, but not before, was chronicled in John Higham's
_Strangers in the Land_ half a century ago. It remains a useful study
still today, but is not mentioned in _Global Migration_. The
counterfactual question of whether -- absent the world wars, the
1930s depression, and the U.S. quotas -- immigration from Europe
might have dwindled anyway after 1920, is one of many examples of
provocative and interesting issues raised by the book, but not
resolved, due to unavoidable space limitations.
Hatton and Williamson do not, however, duck complicated and
controversial concerns about labor migration negatively affecting
native employment and wage levels. In several different historical
contexts, they unravel the often indirect ways this occurs (such as
inflows of foreigners helping to stimulate regional relocations of
natives). Nonetheless, the authors also make a convincing case that
the net overall effect of cross-border migration has tended to be
economically beneficial: not just for migrants but also for the
countries they move out of and into.
The potential receptivity of contemporary policymakers and
opinion-shapers to these judicious conclusions is another matter. The
authors' stated desire to reach that set of audiences might have been
more effectively served had there been a bit more attention devoted
to how labor migrants import language, culture, ideas, and so forth,
along with their job skills. Migrants come for work, but then often
also become neighbors, taxpayers, users of public services, parents
of school children, citizens and voters, and these developments, in
turn, have economic impacts well beyond the fiscal impacts (which are
treated authoritatively here). The cogent final section, on
contemporary policy issues, has much to recommend it, but it is
questionable how much of the preceding 340 pages policy formulators
might read en route to it. Complex historical insights and practical
politics do not mix easily in any case, however.
A more avoidable shortcoming is the relative absence of questions
addressed by migration historians. This book is loaded with material
casting doubt upon non-economic historians' often implicit
assumptions that narrow slices of the migration picture suffice to
illuminate the whole. But, the argument for the big picture rather
than the narrow case study is never quite engaged.
Scholarship from outside of economic history but addressing migration
history broadly is also given little weight. One cannot expect a book
of this scope to cover all bases, but not mentioning Markus Hansen,
Philip Taylor or Daniel Tichenor, for example, somewhere in four
hundred pages suggests a lost opportunity. Dirk Hoerder's nine
hundred page _Cultures in Contact_, published in 2002, has several
references to Wallerstein, but none to Williamson, or Hatton. _Global
Migration and the World Economy_ talks at some length about
Heckscher, but makes no mention of Hoerder. This divergence of
History and Economics is undoubtedly yielding gains from
specialization, but also implies unrealized potential gains from
trade. A better appreciation of the inherently interdisciplinary and
historical nature of this deeply personal and interpersonal,
psychological, cultural, and even biological phenomenon would enrich
models and analyses built around economic aggregates. A firmer and
more nuanced understanding of migration's economic fundamentals, and
a greater awareness of their central role, would enhance historians'
investigations of international human relocation.
Historians should read _Global Migration and the World Economy_,
because sooner or later, they are likely to be called upon to more
directly confront some of the crucial issues it raises. An
interconnected world of demographic challenges, resource limitations
and increasing climate disruptions, for example, is going to be a
world where cross-border mass migration will be about much more than
ethnic identities, culturally diffusing diasporas, or even elegantly
contingent narratives. Even if -- as Hatton and Williamson
realistically conclude -- the historical record offers no "easy
solutions to the world migration problems" of the near future, it
seems a reasonably safe bet that coming global migration challenges,
whatever else they do, will also stoke desires for geographically
broad historical insights.
Notwithstanding its unevenness, and sometimes overstated conclusions,
the sweep and incisive power of this book make it likely to remain a
point of reference for years to come. It will probably receive more
attention within the fields of economics and economic history than
outside of them, but the long run prospects for interdisciplinary
"convergence" on the causes and effects of global migration are
improved by this ambitious and far-reaching scholarly contribution.
Drew Keeling received his Ph.D. in History from the University of
California, Berkeley in 2005, and is now an instructor in the History
Department at the University of Zurich. His dissertation, "The
Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the USA,
1900-1914" was awarded the 2005 Gerschenkron Prize of the Economic
History Association. Two related publications are forthcoming later
this year: "Costs, Risks, and Migration Networks between Europe and
the United States, 1900-1914," in _Research in Maritime History_, and
"Transport Capacity Management and Transatlantic Migration,
1900-1914," in _Research in Economic History_.
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