Barnett on Ilic, ed., _Stalin's Terror Revisited_

[eh.net-review at eh.net]

Published by EH.NET (January 2007)  
  
Melanie Ilic, editor, _Stalin's Terror Revisited_. Houndmills, UK:   
Palgrave, 2006. xviii + 263 pp. =A345 (hardcover), ISBN: 1-4039-4705-8.  
  
Reviewed for EH.NET by Vincent Barnett, Creative Arts, Technology and   
Science, Bedfordshire University.  
  
  
Melanie Ilic is an experienced scholar, having previously edited   
_Women in the Stalin Era_ and _Women in the Khrushchev Era_. She has   
also published a monograph entitled _Women Workers in the Soviet   
Inter-War Economy_. This latest volume focuses on the Soviet terror   
between 1936 and 1938, and presents a number of detailed examinations   
of specific aspects of this phenomenon by both well-known historians   
of the USSR and newcomers to the field alike. Ilic provides a general   
introduction in which she states that "the terror of 1936 to 1938 was   
a multifaceted and complex event that defies simple interpretation"   
(p. 1). R.W. Davies then leads the collection with a chapter called   
"The Soviet Economy and the Launching of the Great Terror," followed   
by Oleg Khlevnyuk on "Economic Officials in the Great Terror." Indeed   
the economic aspect of the terror is the focus of special attention   
throughout the volume. Other chapters include Christopher Joyce on   
the Soviet penal system, Valerii Vasiliev on the terror in the   
Ukraine, and Junbae Jo on trade unions and the terror. Ilic herself   
discusses the effects of the terror on women.  
  
All the contributors provide minute and newly-discovered detail as to   
the nature and progress of the Soviet terror in its empirical   
manifestation. Perhaps the most engaging chapter is by Joyce, who   
shows how the terror had a devastating impact upon the Soviet penal   
system, leading to serious overcrowding and health problems, and also   
to strains on the system of forced labor. Much archival study is on   
display throughout the volume, as is a thorough knowledge of the   
relevant published materials. If one desires a painstaking factual   
account of those elements of the topic outlined above, then this book   
provides it quite generously. However, here is where the limitations   
of the volume begin to present themselves.  
  
Davies begins his chapter with the bold statement that "the terror of   
1936-38 was substantially different from previous repressive   
measures, and requires special explanation" (p. 11). Unfortunately   
this statement remains unsubstantiated or even clearly defined in the   
book. How exactly was it different? It could be maintained that the   
1936-38 terror was different in scale to previous Soviet repressions,   
but the underlying goal was very similar -- to destroy perceived or   
actual indigenous enemy forces through state-sponsored violence.   
Davies does present a clear argument in his chapter: that the terror   
itself was unconnected with any apparent or real crisis or downturn   
in the Soviet economy in the first half of 1936, and hence was not   
caused by domestic economic factors. Davies demonstrates with   
detailed evidence how Stalin was not unduly worried about the   
industrial or agricultural sectors of the Soviet economy in this   
period. On this particular point Davies is convincing, and musters   
good support for his case. However, the reader might expect that,   
following this, Davies and the rest of the contributors would then   
provide an account of the actual cause(s) of the terror. This is   
where the volume falls down in a major way.  
  
Davies himself mentions in passing that "the main criterion for the   
purge was political" (p. 25). Khlevnyuk also relates that the cadre   
purges were based on political factors, stating that Stalin and his   
colleagues were guided by a principle of politically justified losses   
which were seen as being required in order to strengthen the regime   
(p. 58). However, these brief statements are not substantiated in any   
way with reliable forms of evidence, and exactly why Soviet leaders   
thought in this way (if they did) is not discussed at all.   
Intellectual factors are simply ignored throughout the volume, as if   
only empirical circumstances had any role in generating historical   
events. As a consequence the reader is left none the wiser as to the   
nature of the political factors involved, or the reason(s) for them.   
Another point to consider is that Davies neglects the international   
element in the terror equation. The Soviet economy may not have been   
in crisis in the first half of 1936, but Stalin was concerned with   
overtaking the West in terms of industrial development, not just with   
standing still. Davies fails to consider sufficiently whether the   
USSR was seen as falling behind in relative terms.  
  
Perhaps the root of the problem with the volume is as follows. Ilic   
confuses two separate but very significant issues. In empirical   
terms, the Soviet terror was undoubtedly very complex and had many   
component parts, which are well documented in the book. However this   
does not necessarily mean that the actual explanation for the terror   
has to be "complex" or has to "defy simple interpretation." Simple   
causes can sometimes generate quite complex events. But the   
methodology employed in the volume mistakes empirical complexity for   
theoretical rigor, yielding a frustrating book for readers to engage   
with. This problem is heightened by the fact that there is no   
concluding chapter in the book where all the threads of the research   
are brought together, and where any general results could be   
discussed or analyzed. Thus the reader is left hanging in the air as   
to the underlying cause(s) of the terror, which is disappointing for   
a book entitled _Stalin's Terror Revisited_. In general the volume   
can be characterized as offering original scholarship of a high   
caliber that is at least partially misdirected towards failing to   
answer the most significant questions which the topic naturally   
generates.  
  
  
Vincent Barnett is the author of _A History of Russian Economic   
Thought_ (London: Routledge, 2005).  
  
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