EH.Net Mailing List Archive: EH.Net-Review

Benneworth on Stitt, _Joint Industrial Councils in British History: Inception, Adoption and Utilization, 1917-1939_

eh.net-review at eh.net (eh.net-review at eh.net)

Wed Nov 22 04:24:17 EST 2006

Published by EH.NET (November 2006)  
  
James W. Stitt, _Joint Industrial Councils in British History:   
Inception, Adoption and Utilization, 1917-1939_. Westport, CT:   
Praeger, 2006. iii + 219 pp. $120 (hardcover), ISBN: 0-313-32461-1.  
  
Reviewed for EH.NET by Paul Benneworth, Institute for Policy and   
Practise, Newcastle University.  
  
  
In this book, James Stitt (Professor of History at High Point   
University in North Carolina) deals with an attempt by the British   
Government to deal with industrial unrest and falling productivity in   
the war industries by creating an institutional innovation.  Those   
innovations were Joint Industrial Councils (JIC), organized at the   
level of the industrial sector, in which owners and workers'   
representatives came together to manage various aspects of industrial   
relations.  However, the Joint Industrial Councils, never forced onto   
industrial sectors by the British Government, were never really very   
successful as voluntary arrangements.  Although a large number of   
councils were created in the inter-war period, the innovation ground   
to a halt in the mid 1920s, and disappeared by the start of World War   
II.  
  
The book explores why an apparently promising and timely   
institutional innovation failed to transform the landscape of UK   
industrial relations.  The book presents a very detailed piece of   
research which traces the evolution of the idea, to its emergence as   
a political proposal, the uptake of the proposal, and then its slow   
disappearance.  The last chapter presents four examples of JICs which   
did operate during the period 1917-1939.  The most telling example is   
the Pottery JIC, which was managed by Fred Hand, the only full-time   
employee of any of the councils.  The author quotes evidence which   
suggests that it was more the force of Hand's personal obsession with   
JICs that kept the organizations, and the representative Association   
of JICs, active after the mid 1920s.  
  
The author summarizes the book's overall points, including the   
reference to the obsession of Hand, in the opening chapter, which   
operates as a kind of abstract for the whole book.  The book then   
sets up in elaborate detail the industrial conditions which   
necessitated the introduction of an institutional fix, out of which   
came the JIC proposal.  The issue ultimately related to the pre-war   
York Agreement between the main skilled engineers trade union, the   
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE), and employers.  
  
The engineering sector had suffered considerable industrial unrest   
because of owner/worker conflict around the introduction of new   
working practices whose costs were borne by workers but which   
profited the owners.  The York Agreement was a ceasefire in this   
industrial struggle, a very detailed prescription which ultimately   
sought to protect ASE members by limiting employers' capacities to   
reorganize work and hence destroy members' jobs.  
  
The York Agreement did, however, create a problem with the onset of   
World War I -- that the UK industrial base was very unresponsive to   
the UK Government's demand for war materials, particular after 1914   
and the transition to a fully mobilized war economy.  The Agreement   
appeared to stand in the way of increasing production in war   
industries.  Trade Unions were willing to suspend the agreement for   
the duration of hostilities, but wanted to make sure that this did   
not prejudice members' rights won in the York Agreement after the   
return to peacetime.  The Treasury Agreement established this   
principle between industry and workers, giving a de facto Government   
guarantee without stipulating the details of how it would be achieved.  
  
 From 1916, Asquith's government began planning the 'reconstruction   
effort' for this transition back to the pre-1914 laissez-faire   
economy.  The Reconstruction Committee accepted that this transition   
could revitalize British industry if it could institutionalize the   
Treasury Agreement in which workers would sacrifice their permanent   
rights to jobs in return for sharing in profits increasing from   
innovation and productivity growth.  There was consensus of the value   
of institutionalizing this idea, both by owners who saw the   
opportunities for increasing productivity levels and from left-wing   
industrial idealists who saw such collaborations as the first step   
towards a wider workers' takeover of industry. JICs emerged as a   
concrete proposal implementing this 'profits for productivity' deal.  
  
The story so far is perfectly rational, but from late 1916 party   
politics entered the scene, and the consensus for rebuilding British   
industry through collective owner/worker agreement collapsed into   
sectional fighting, which ultimately left the JIC proposals with no   
chance of success.  Firstly, Lloyd George replaced Asquith as Prime   
Minister through a parliamentary coup, and immediately appointed new   
members to the Reconstruction Committee, delaying the publication of   
their report.  An engineers' strike in 1917 led Lloyd George to   
promise that the Reconstruction Committee report would meet their   
demands in full when it was published in the autumn.  The JIC   
proposals within this Report became a means to meet union demands,   
despite a very scathing minority opinion from one Committee member.  
  
Neither the details of the JIC proposals nor the general idea to   
politically modernize British industry featured in Lloyd George's   
1918 election campaign, fought around the dual issues of punishing   
the Germans and "homes fit for heroes."  The Committee became the   
Ministry of Reconstruction, whose activities were subsumed in 1919   
into four new departments, leaving JICs the responsibility of firstly   
the Board of Trade then finally the (very weak) Ministry of Labour. A   
few JICs were, indeed, formed and Hand, the head of the Pottery JIC,   
became responsible for the collective association, AJIC.  It was the   
force of his personality which sustained any kind of profile at all   
for the idea. Even in the 1930s, there was a serious discussion --   
driven by Hand -- about making JICs compulsory for eligible firms.   
This move -- and the underlying JIC ideal -- was successfully   
repelled by the increasingly powerful Trade Unions Congress, who   
would come to dominate industrial relations in a manner inconceivable   
to the weak JICs.  
  
In writing the pr=E9cis of the content and the arguments of the book, I   
have disguised the great difficulties I had in reading this book. The   
opening abstract is too dense to really make much sense, and would   
work much better as a concluding summary.  Indeed, the whole book   
assumes an incredibly detailed knowledge by the reader, and often   
explains the significance of events several pages after they are   
first mentioned. The pace of the book is dilatory; although the   
book's title covers JICs from 1917-1939, it is only three-quarters of   
the way through the book that the author reaches 1917, and then has   
two chapters to cover the twenty-two years of their operations.   
Thus, the reader is never sure if an argument the author makes will   
turn out to be the last word on the situation.  
  
The book is also peculiarly lacking in contextual detail,   
establishing why the JICs might or could have been significant in the   
industrial relations landscape of the UK, which further hinders   
reading the book. The book is therefore uncomfortably positioned   
between being a review of primary evidence sources and using that   
evidence to develop a strong narrative of the author's opinions of   
the development of events. Although this book is undoubtedly the   
product of serious scholarship, and its findings strengthen our   
understanding of this interesting time, I am not sure that this work   
is destined, or indeed deserves, to reach an audience much beyond the   
extent of the seriously committed researcher.  
  
  
Dr. Paul Benneworth is a Research Councils UK Academic Fellow in   
Territorial Governance at the Institute for Policy and Practise at   
Newcastle University.  He contributed entries on the decline of   
British manufacturing and changing female unemployment to the   
_Reader's Guide to British History_, and has recently published the   
book _The Rise of the English Regions?_ in the Routledge Cities and   
Regions series.  
  
Copyright (c) 2006 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be   
copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to   
the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the   
EH.Net Administrator (administrator at eh.net; Telephone: 513-529-2229).   
Published by EH.Net (November 2006). All EH.Net reviews are archived   
at http://www.eh.net/BookReview.