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Wahl on Einhorn, _American Taxation, American Slavery_

eh.net-review at eh.net (eh.net-review at eh.net)

Wed Aug 9 10:22:46 EDT 2006

Published by EH.NET (August 2006)  
  
Robin Einhorn, _American Taxation, American Slavery_. Chicago:   
University of Chicago Press, 2006. xii + 337 pp. $35 (cloth), ISBN:   
0-226-19487-6.  
  
Reviewed for EH.NET by Jenny Wahl, Department of Economics, Carleton College.  
  
  
In June 2006, a group of 203 wealthy citizens in my state took out a   
full-page ad asking for bigger taxes on high earners to raise money   
for education, health, and public infrastructure. Most responses to   
the ad -- including Governor Tim Pawlenty's -- have been negative,   
sarcastic, and full of ridicule. Robin Einhorn, a history professor   
at UC-Berkeley, would argue that these reactions are a legacy of   
slavery.  
  
While this might sound far-fetched, I think this is the main point of   
Einhorn's book _American Taxation, American Slavery_. I say "I think"   
because, frankly, this is a dense, difficult book that suffers from   
repetition, a lack of structure, and a disconnect between evidence   
and conclusions.  
  
Einhorn claims that the antigovernment rhetoric we hear today,   
particularly a clamoring for low taxes on the "elite," comes straight   
from "the slaveholding elites who had no experience with democratic   
governments" (p. 8). The last part of her book (chapter 6) asserts   
that the uniformity clauses appearing in most state constitutions --   
which prohibit preferential tax treatment -- are direct descendants   
of slave-state law. What is more, these clauses are actually tools to   
protect the wealthy rather than the instruments of equality intended   
by constitutional conveners. As she puts it, the "mistake was very   
significant. Misreading a defense of slavery as a defense of   
equality, the constitution writers of the antebellum Northwest did   
not even suspect that they were establishing privileges for their   
homegrown elites. ... The[se] men ... simply did not understand" (pp.   
204-05).  
  
Whew. Were those guys dumb or what? But they weren't the only dumb   
ones in Einhorn's story. So were their forebears who wrote and   
ratified the U.S. Constitution: "Nobody knew what 'direct taxes'   
were, how Congress would levy them, or who would benefit from the   
apportionment rule" (p. 183). "Nobody seemed to realize that   
apportioned direct taxes would be very difficult for Congress to   
levy" (p. 173). And there's more: "Nobody ever knew exactly who paid   
the tariff" (p. 155). "[N]obody knew exactly how its [the impost's]   
burden would be shifted" (p. 148). "Nobody could know ... how the tax   
[impost] would be shifted through the economy" (p. 163).  
  
Oddly enough, earlier ancestors -- at least in New England -- seemed   
to be pretty savvy. According to Part I (chapters 1-3), colonial   
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania had an engaged populace with   
democratically elected officials who created sophisticated schemes to   
assess the value of property and tax it. In contrast, Virginia and   
South Carolina were hotbeds of corrupt, appointed officials who   
implemented primitive, flat-rate taxes that could "only be attributed   
to the preferences of the 'masters'" (p. 93). Despite Einhorn's   
reassurance that her book "does not try to catalog every colonial or   
state-level tax measure" (p. 8), Part I seems to do exactly that. The   
thesis for this section is largely appropriated from a report made by   
Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott, Jr., in 1796: "Northern states   
taxed larger ranges of objects in more sophisticated ways ... [due   
to] the difference [in] the local government regimes" (p. 105).  
  
Part II (chapters 4-5) is intended to bridge the colonial years and   
the postbellum years. Here Einhorn spends a great deal of time   
discussing the relatively minor differences between a tariff on all   
imported goods (an "impost") and a tariff on some imported goods. She   
claims that the tariff was adopted so people would not have to talk   
about slavery. Yet, almost in the same breath, she notes that a   
tariff is fairly easy to administer and collect. Could this be a more   
salient reason the tariff came about? As to the reasonable point that   
masters worried about the non-slaveowning majority imposing a tax on   
their property, I would have liked Einhorn to use her own appendix on   
tax incidence to explore why a tax on slaves would not simply have   
been passed on to cotton consumers.  
  
Einhorn would also have benefited from a glance at John Wallis's   
thoughtful account of fiscal federalism (_Journal of Economic   
Perspectives_, Winter 2000) if she wanted a logical frame for U.S.   
tax history. Or she might have looked over Doug North's work on   
transactions costs if she wanted to understand why some tax policies   
pass and others don't.  
  
But let's return to Einhorn's final arguments. Why would newly   
established states in the Northwest look to Southern slave states for   
guidance and, in their ignorance, adopt clauses at odds with their   
goals? Well, maybe the attendees of constitutional conventions really   
were dumb. Or perhaps judges were the evil ones, as she seems to   
suggest on page 204 and pages 247-49. Or Tiebout's classic work on   
local taxation could provide some useful insights: given the ability   
of Americans to migrate freely, what we see across jurisdictions just   
might reflect what constituents want.  
  
Or possibly things are not quite as monolithic as Einhorn presents.   
Ohio interprets its uniformity clause as permitting higher taxes on   
resort property, for example, and Minnesota allows higher taxes on   
polluted property and a graduated income tax under its uniformity   
clause. Wisconsin does not permit property tax credits funded by   
lottery proceeds to go only to owners of primary residences, because   
this policy benefits only certain property owners. Wisconsin does,   
however, allow school vouchers to be used for private schools under   
its uniformity clause. Interestingly, however, Florida does not.   
Maybe some states are not quite as bound to the venal slaveholding   
past via their tax codes as others. Or perhaps Einhorn's comment that   
"taxation has never been a major theme in [the] history [of slavery].   
Nor should it be" (p. 201), is more valid when reversed.  
  
  
Jenny Wahl, Professor of Economics, Carleton College in Northfield,   
MN, is the author of _The Bondsman's Burden: An Economic Analysis of   
the Common Law of Southern Slavery_. Her recent work includes "Stay   
East, Young Man? Market Repercussions of the _Dred Scott_ Case"   
(_Chicago-Kent Law Review_), "The Mismeasure of Man's Well-Being"   
(_National Tax Journal_), and "Blacks, Whites, and _Brown_: Effects   
on the Earnings of Men and Their Sons."  
  
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