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Elites, Minorities, and Economic Growth

Author(s):Brezis, Elise S.
Temin, Peter
Reviewer(s):Szostak, Rick

Published by EH.NET (May 2001)

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Elise S. Brezis and Peter Temin, editors, Elites, Minorities, and Economic Growth. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1999. x + 255 pp. $95 (cloth), ISBN: 0-444-82848-6.

Reviewed for EH.NET by Rick Szostak, Department of Economics, University of Alberta.

This book contains papers presented at a conference held at Bar-Ilan University in June of 1997. The conference, in turn, was inspired by a recognition that there has been very little research on the role of either elites or minorities in economic growth (though such a role often receives anecdotal treatment in general works). Moreover, the editors — Elise Brezis of Bar-Ilan University and Peter Temin of MIT — note that the literature which does exist is fragmented: not only do students of one society rarely draw parallels with elite or minority behavior elsewhere, but sociologists and economists approach these issues from different angles and thus rarely interact.

The editors/organizers are to be applauded for drawing together scholars from (at least) sociology, economics, and history departments. They could, though, have included information on the departmental affiliations of contributors. The reader is, instead, left to deduce which disciplinary perspective is at work in different chapters. The geographic range addressed is also fairly broad: Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East are the subject of several papers, while North America and Southeast Asia are discussed one time each. Most of the papers deal with the twentieth century, but a handful investigate developments in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries.

Sadly, the potential for comparative analysis is realized only in the introductory chapter. Rarely in later chapters do authors make even a passing reference to countries other than those they study, nor do they usually discuss how their analysis might benefit from the insights of other disciplines. Of course, this result largely reflects the limited scope and fragmentation of the pre-existing literature. One might have hoped, though, that interaction at the conference itself would have encouraged greater efforts at integration from contributors.

The editors’ introductory essay provides a good introduction not only to the book but also to the subject in general. After brief definitions of the relevant terms (a good strategy in an area ripe for semantic confusion), the editors discuss the key questions which motivate this collective inquiry. With respect to elites, we can ask how members are recruited into elites, how elite membership changes over time, how elite groups develop values, how powerful and united elites are, whether it is best to think in terms of one or diverse elites in particular societies, whether elites dominate democratic decisionmaking, and whether it is advantageous to have distinct economic and political elites.

With respect to minorities, the editors note that minority groups are often observed to play a disproportionate role in economic activity, but that we have not progressed beyond the broadest conjectures in attempting to understand why. While I agree with the editors, I wonder if a helpful first step in such a research agenda would be to attempt to quantify just how “surprising” this result is. There are, after all, lots of minority groups that either underperform or have no special success relative to their societies. Is the number of minority success stories (much) greater than we could expect tooccur randomly?

The editors review some of the possible explanations for minority success: that minorities have different values from the wider society; in particular that certain minorities which value Scripture may thus encourage literacy, education, and even rationality; that minorities may have strong kinship bonds — which will be especially important in societies where legal protections are weak and thus there are strong incentives to deal only with those one can “trust” [they could usefully have referenced here the work of Avner Greif on early modern ethnic trading groups in Europe and the Middle East]; and the possibility that minorities might be naturally rebellious and thus prone to economic and technological innovation. They note that countries which constrain minorities are usually close-minded in other ways [note that we might thus exaggerate the role of minorities in economic growth, by confusing correlation with causation]. They do not reprise the oft-heard argument that minorities might emphasize economic activity because they are barred from success in government, church, or military.

Beyond all of these questions of how elites and minorities function (and how minorities can become elites), there is the question of whether it matters. To what extent can the relative economic success or failure of countries be attributed to the nature of their elites and the behavior of their minorities? While I would urge scholars to appreciate the interrelated set of questions outlined by the editors, subscribers to this list will likely find the couple of papers which attack this last question of greatest interest.

As with any conference volume, there is considerable variety in quality and orientation in the sixteen papers. Some are largely speculative, and serve at best to raise questions for others to pursue. And some are concerned with the political influence of minorities and elites rather than their (related) economic influence. All naturally look at only a subset of the questions raised in the introduction. I will describe a handful of papers which might be of particular interest to list subscribers.

Peter Mathias asks how members of minorities can become members of elites. He notes that both religion and language can place powerful barriers between groups, and these in turn can create a strong sense of belonging among members of religious or linguistic minorities. He argues that business was much more risky at the time of the Industrial Revolution than today, and the incentives for dealing with members of one’s own (trusted) group much greater. Nevertheless, as members of minority groups succeeded economically, they faced incentives to assimilate into elite groups. Many descendants of Quaker industrialists did become Anglican, though Jewish families were much less likely to convert.

Eliezer B. Ayal studies the success of Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia. These groups arrived with little money, business experience, or education, but came to dominate large-scale business across the region. Ayal suggests that indigenous groups were “unsuited” to business, but does not at all explain why this might be. Ayal briefly reviews some of the possible explanations of minority success, adding one novel element: that colonial authorities actively sought to promote minorities to solidify their own power. Ayal argues that the Chinese business elite not only could not have been replaced by equally sagacious indigenous businesspeople, but that they encouraged political elites to pursue growth-enhancing policies; growth would thus have been much slower without these minorities. Critical of Malaysia’s attempts to favor Malay business since 1971, Ayal suggests that it would have experienced even more rapid growth otherwise. I would have liked Ayal to explore the relationship between economic and political elites in more detail. Are minority business elites more willing to cooperate with corrupt political elites (in return for protection)? Do the latter, like colonial governments, see some advantage in nourishing a minoritybusiness elite?

Peter Temin asks whether the recruitment of the American economic elite is as “democratic” as is commonly believed. He notes that Americans’ faith in democracy is rooted in a faith in economic mobility. Since Temin lacks evidence on the class of origin of Fortune 500 CEOs, he examines their education, gender, race, and religion. Here, too, the data are imperfect (Temin estimates an “upper bound” for Jews and Catholics by looking at surnames), but Temin’s results appear robust. He finds that the business elite is almost entirely male and white (there is one Asian and a handful of Hispanics; amazingly, given the prominence of multinationals on the list, there are almost no foreign-born CEOs), Protestant, and university-educated (with the Ivy League hugely overrepresented; Temin notes that entrance to such institutions decades ago depended more on family connections than SAT scores). [Temin does not, however, discuss the possibility that his results might reflect to some extent the tendency, noted by Mathias, for successful individuals to assimilate.] The American political elite — Temin looks at members of Congress — has become broadly representative of Blacks, Hispanics and Catholics, and women receive much better representation there than in the Fortune 500. However, the business elite is scarcely more representative of the population than it was a century ago. Temin takes the fact that CEOs are on average three inches taller than the rest of the population as further evidence that they came from a privileged background; a more powerful explanation may lie in the commonly observed (in psychological studies) fact that people tend to view the tall as more trustworthy and capable. Temin does not speculate on whether a wider appreciation of the narrow selection of the American business elite would decrease Americans’ faith in democracy. He does note that America is still a more mobile society than Europe. Americans might at least become more curious about the influence the business elite exerts on the political elite; recall Ayal’s discussion of how “minority” business elites can influence more representative political elites.

Joel Mokyr is one of the few authors to explicitly draw on the insights of a discipline other than his own: biology. Mokyr has long been advocating the application of evolutionary theory to economic history. In this paper he argues that technological innovation is effectively an act of rebellion against conventional wisdom and vested interests. He discusses the sorts of environments in which such rebelliousness is most likely to be approved. He argues that smaller societies, especially city-states, which are likely to be open to minorities, will be prone to encouraging this beneficial form of rebellion.

Finally, Francois Crouzet asks why a minority of family businesses are able to survive beyond the fabled third generation. He discusses several reasons why such dynastic survival is rare, including the economic and political challenges which any business will face over a period of a century or more, as well as the possibility of having too few or too many heirs. He notes that dynasties are more likely to survive in certain sectors: iron, brewing, pottery, chocolates, and banking (and textiles in France but not England). He conjectures that dynasties are most likely to survive in sectors that are viewed with respect by existing elites: the temptation to sell out and join the landowning class is thus reduced. I wondered also if continued family control might be especially beneficial in sectors where reputational effects loom large.

Rick Szostak is Professor of Economics at the University of Alberta. His research spans the areas of economic history, methodology, and interdisciplinary theory and practice. He has recently begun work on a manuscript that draws on each of these areas, tentatively titled “Exogenous Growth: Interdisciplinary and Historical Perspectives.” His books include The Role of Transportation in the Industrial Revolution (McGill-Queen’s, 1991), Technological Innovation and the Great Depression (Westview, 1995), Technology and American Society: A History (with Gary Cross; Prentice-Hall, 1995), Econ-Art: Divorcing Art From Science in Modern Economics (Pluto, 1999), and A Schema For Unifying Human Science: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Culture (forthcoming, Susquehanna University Press).

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Subject(s):Social and Cultural History, including Race, Ethnicity and Gender
Geographic Area(s):General, International, or Comparative
Time Period(s):20th Century: WWII and post-WWII

Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History

Author(s):Fogel, Robert W.
Reviewer(s):Davis, Lance

Robert W. Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. xv + 296 pp.

Review Essay by Lance Davis, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology. led@hss.caltech.edu

For those of us who lived through the exciting days of the “cliometric revolution,” the publication of Robert Fogel’s Railroads and American Economic Growth represented a very major milestone – it was as if we now had proof that we had left the bumpy and unpaved dirt road of the first few years and could see ahead a straight and well-paved highway into the future. (See note 1.) The roots of “clio” clearly lay in the 1956 publication of Cary Brown’s “Fiscal Policy in the Thirties: A Reappraisal” and, a few months later, in Alfred Conrad and John Meyer’s initial presentation of “The Economics of Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South.” Brown showed that, unlike the findings of the then-current historiography, government economic policy during the 1930’s was not an example of President Roosevelt’s imaginative application of the modern tools of Keynesian fiscal policy; and Conrad and Meyer demonstrated that, despite nearly a century of traditional historiography, ante-bellum slavery was profitable and, at least by implication, that, if the goal was to eliminate slavery before the 1940’s, the Civil War was not an extremely costly and totally unnecessary enterprise. However, these findings – findings that have been well substantiated by later research – while convincing to the small cadre of “converted,” were still not generally accepted by the historical profession. Thus, cliometrics did not really begin to flower until the publication of Robert Fogel’s study of the impact of railroads on American growth in the nineteenth century. Not only did it generate a spate of parallel studies (of Russia, Mexico, Brazil, England, and Scotland, to cite only five), but much more importantly, it provided a methodological foundation for the systematic study of economic history and long-term economic growth.

Despite the attention that had been paid to the construction of the Erie Canal, given the role of the national market in underwriting this country’s rise to become, economically at least, the richest nation in the world, and, given the speed with which rails came to dominate the transport network that provided the basis for that national market, it is not surprising that historians had concluded that railroads were the indispensable and driving force behind American growth in the nineteenth century. To the best of my knowledge, before the first annual Cliometric Conference (a conference held at Purdue University in 1960), few economic historians, neither those traditionally nor those cliometrically inclined doubted this fundamental tenant of American development. (See note 2.) Moreover, although some cliometricians may have been aware of the concept of social savings – a concept that was closely related to the economic literature on cost/benefit analysis – none had attempted to measure the savings attached to any specific legal or technical innovation. (Fogel had touched on a similar concept in The Union Pacific Railroad (1960), but his first published paper dealing specifically with social savings was still almost two years in the future – “A Quantitative Approach to the Study of Railroads in American Economic Growth” (1962).)

With its publication, Railroads proved once and for all that economic history, while still depending on the product of scholars “slugging it out in the archives,” could benefit mightily from the careful application of economic theory and econometrics. On the one hand, although the work immediately generated substantial controversy, and even today one might quibble about a few days or a few months, in the long run, there has been little question about the book’s major conclusion – that the level of per capita income achieved by January 1, 1890 would have been reached by March 31, 1890, if railroads had never been invented. Moreover, Fogel’s work also indicated that there was no other industry that was likely to have been more important than the railroads; and, thus, if not railroads, no other industry could have played the role that historiography attributed to the rails. On the other hand, the evidence is overwhelming that, since the publication and subsequent debate over Railroads, almost all economic history has been written by scholars who have either been trained in economics or who have found it necessary to acquire (either formally or informally) those basic economic and econometric skills. What, then, in addition to the central importance of the subject, made this such a path-breaking work? As the title suggests, the book is actually a collection of four interrelated, but really distinct, substantive essays: “The Interregional Distribution of Agricultural Products,” “The Intraregional Distribution of Agricultural Products,” “Railroads and the ‘Take-off’ Thesis: The American Case” and “The Position of Rails in the Market for American Iron, 1840-1860: A Reconstruction.” Any attempt at evaluating the contribution of the book rests on the evaluation of the methods and findings of the four.

If Fogel had limited his work to the last two essays – the two that in many ways were the most central to the then intense discussions of the “Axiom of Indispensability,” the work would have been important; but it would never have had anywhere near the impact that it actually did. In the third essay, “The Takeoff,” Fogel, although not addressing the question of whether or not there was in fact a “takeoff” between 1843 and 1860, in order to operationalize his argument, chooses the first of W.W. Rostow’s criteria for a “leading industry”: in this case, what impact did the railroads have on the “change in the percentage distribution of output among the various industries?” Then, drawing on the best available data – data reported by Robert Gallman in his seminal (1960) study of commodity output – Fogel finds that the impact of the railroads on that percentage distribution was minimal. In the case of iron, railroads, except at the end of the period, accounted for only a minor fraction of the output change (overall, including the later period, it was still only 17 percent); for coal, it was less than 5 percent; for lumber, barely 5 percent; in the case of transport equipment only 25 percent (only half of the change accounted for by vehicles drawn by animals); and for machinery it was less than 1 percent. Thus, for all manufacturing, the railroads accounted for less than 3 percent of the change – hardly a ringing endorsement for what was purported to be a “leading industry.”

In his more detailed examination of the impact of railroads on the development of the iron industry (an attempt to assess the importance of railroads to industrialization because of their alleged “backward linkages”), Fogel found it necessary to produce a new series on pig iron output between 1840 and 1860 and to revise the estimates of the consumption of railroads to account for imports and recycled rails as well as changes in the weight of rails. These new estimates represented a major contribution to our understanding of the industrial history of the period. Fogel’s primary interest, however, was not on the production of the new series, but on estimating the importance of the railroads in the development of the iron industry. His results, again, indicate that railroads did not dominate the development of the iron industry in the two decades before the Civil War. In fact, his conclusions strongly support Douglass North’s conclusion that, from the point of view of backward linkages, it would be as sensible to talk about an iron stove theory of the development of the iron industry as a railroad theory.

In these two essays Fogel demonstrates a command of what had heretofore been the best of traditional economic history, but in neither chapter are there any major methodological breakthroughs – merely a carefully constructed series of new estimates and the demonstration of an ability to bring those estimates to bear on important issues. In the first and second of the four substantive chapters – the estimate of the social savings from the interregional and from the intraregional distribution of agricultural products – Fogel’s methodological innovations do, however, play a central role. First, in both essays, he attempts to explicate and to provide estimates of the appropriate counterfactual – what the world would have been like had there been no railroads. Although historians have long employed counterfactual arguments – sometimes it seems without realizing it – to most historians the idea of an explicit counterfactual was still a very foreign notion in the early 1960s. Second, in both chapters Fogel employs the concept of social savings (the difference in social costs between the real and the counterfactual worlds) to provide a measure of the value of the introduction of the railroad. The concept of social savings is itself an important research tool; but, from a methodological point of view, it is equally important that the measure was defined operationally, so that Fogel’s calculations could be tested against alternative estimates and against possible alternative definitions. As an aside, however, it is interesting to note that, although the two studies are very very important from the view point of methodological innovation, from the point of view of traditional economic history, they are not as strong as the third and fourth substantive essays. In the second substantive essay – the social savings arising from the intraregional distribution of agricultural commodities – Fogel begins by noting that the substitution of rail for water was more rapid in the intraregional than in the interregional distribution of agricultural commodities, and, that, since the distances to be shipped in the intraregional case were only a third as great for rail as for water transport, one would expect that the social savings from the innovation would be greater. To estimate those savings he proposes two measures: alpha (a direct measure of the cost differences with and without the railroads) and beta (an indirect measure based on the difference in the value of the land that would have been economically productive with railroads and the lesser number of acres and, thus, the lesser value of land that would have been economically productive in the absence of those railroads).

Fogel then estimates alpha for a sample of counties in the North Atlantic region and concludes that the direct costs (alpha) would amount to a loss of 2.5% of GNP, and that adjustment for excluded indirect costs (alpha-2) would have increased that figure to 2.8% of GNP. Neither estimate, however, includes the potential savings that would have resulted from the construction of additional canals and better roads. He admits that the North Atlantic region may not provide an adequate representation of the entire country, but he argues that it would be too expensive and difficult to extend this direct measure of savings to the rest of the country.

As an alternative, Fogel suggests that, since water transport was available for about 76% of the land value in the U.S., since, in the absence of railroads, 75% of the loss of land value would be in the four states of Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas, and since all of the lost land could be brought into production with only a small extension of the canal network, a measure based on the difference in the value of arable land provides an equally good measure of social savings. He concludes that the cost of the direct loss of arable land from the absence of railroads (beta) would amount to 1.8% of GNP, and that the total loss – the sum of direct and indirect costs (beta-2) – would amount to 2.1% of GNP. Again, however, beta-2 does include the potential savings that would result from additional canals and better roads. Making further adjustments for the unbuilt canals and better roads, Fogel provides two estimates for the social savings from intraregional trade: alpha-3 equal to 1.2% of GNP and beta-3 equal to 1.0% It was, however, Fogel’s estimates of the social savings generated by railroads in interregional shipping (the first substantive essay), that really touched off the methodological revolution. As in the second essay, the use of explicit counterfactuals and the innovation of the concept (as well as his estimates) of the social savings broke new ground. In this case, however, there were also other very important methodological innovations.

Fogel begins with an operational definition of interregional distribution: “the process of shipping commodities from the primary markets of the Midwest to the secondary markets of the East and South.” While there were good estimates of agricultural production and agricultural exports, there were no data on the method and routes of shipment that were used to move agricultural commodities from producing areas to the points of domestic and foreign consumption; and it is here that Fogel introduces his single most significant innovation. He focuses of four commodities (wheat, corn, beef, and pork) – commodities that together represented 42 percent of agricultural income. He, first, estimates the export surplus at ten primary markets in the west and the consumption in the almost 200 deficit trading areas in the East and South (exports are attributed to the port from which they were shipped). The potential rail and water shipping routes from West to East were easily identified, and the costs of rail and water shipment were well known. To simplify the problem, Fogel focuses on a sample of 30 of the 825 potential routes between pairs of cities in the West and the East. Since the actual choice of routes is unknown, he very imaginatively suggests a linear programming model to estimate the routes – with and without railroads – that would have been selected had the shippers been guided by cost minimization. He then estimates the costs of the inferred shipments, costs estimated both with and without rails. Since there were also additional costs of water transport (lost cargoes, transshipment expenses, extra wagon haulage, time lost because of slower speed and because the canals and rivers froze, and the capital costs of the canals that were not included in the water rates), Fogel adjusts his original cost differentials to account for these additional expenses. His result is an estimate of the social savings in interregional shipment resulting from the innovation of railroads of six-tenths of one percent of GNP, a figure that would have increased to only 1.3%, had he assumed that rail rates were zero.

In this chapter Fogel made four important innovations that were to have a major impact of the nature of research in economic history: (1) the operational definition of social savings; (2) the use of an explicit counterfactual; (3) the use of a formal economic model to estimate what costs would have been had the decisions been made by economic man; and (4) his choice, when it was necessary to make assumptions about the actual world, of assumptions that were biased against his central findings. (See note 3.) Even more than his estimates of interregional social savings, the work in this essay completely changed the way economic historians would do business in the future. There is, however, one blemish in the story. Professor Fogel never actually solved the linear programming problem; his choice of routes was based on what he assumed the solution would have been.

Notes:

1. To give you some feeling about that first decade, one might note that the term “cliometrics” was coined by my then colleague at Purdue, Stanley Reiter – he had been toying around with questions raised by a new discipline that he called “theometrics” (for example, “how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?); and, in his joking way, he suggested that the work in quantitative history seemed to be drawn from similar academic stream.

2. Bob Fogel and, perhaps, Douglass North and Al Fishlow, were the major exceptions. Fogel, himself, has said that he began his investigation fully believing that it would confirm the importance of the railroads. Fishlow (1965) reached conclusions for the antebellum period very similar to those Fogel reached about the latter part of the nineteenth century. Not long before this, North (1961, p. 164) wrote, “While the value added of rails was approximately $6.5 million in 1860 and roughly equals to the value added of bar iron, it was dwarfed by the value added of the polyglot classification of iron castings, which was $21 million in 1860. Indeed, the value added in stove making alone was equal to that of iron rails.”

3. For example, Fogel made no adjustment for changes in non-rail transport that might have been made had there been no railroads: he holds both origins and destinations fixed despite the fact that there would almost certainly have been some such adjustments in the absence of railroads; and he assumes that, in the absence of railroads, water rates would be constant rather than declining as might have been the case had canal builders exploited potential economies of scale.

References:

E. Cary Brown. 1956. “Fiscal Policy in the Thirties: A Reappraisal,” American Economic Review, 46 (December).

Alfred Conrad and John Meyer. 1958. “The Economics of Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South” Journal of Political Economy, 66 (April). This paper was first presented at the meeting of the Economic History Association in 1956.

Albert Fishlow. 1965. American Railroads and the Transformation of the American Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Robert Fogel. 1960. The Union Pacific Railroad: A Case Study of Premature Enterprise. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Robert Fogel. 1962. “A Quantitative Approach to the Study of Railroads in American Economic Growth: A Report of Some Preliminary Findings,” Journal of Economic History, 22 (June).

Robert E. Gallman. 1960. “Commodity Output in the United States,” in Conference on Income and Wealth, Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century, 24, Studies in Income and Wealth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Douglass North. 1961. The Economic Growth of the United States 1790 to 1860 Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Subject(s):Transport and Distribution, Energy, and Other Services
Geographic Area(s):North America
Time Period(s):19th Century

Accounting for Growth: Information Systems and the Creation of the Large Corporation

Author(s):Levenstein, Margaret
Reviewer(s):Miranti, Paul

Published by EH.NET (September 1999)

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Margaret Levenstein. Accounting for Growth: Information Systems and the Creation of the Large Corporation. Margaret Levenstein. Stanford, Ca., Stanford University Press, 1998. ix + 277p p. appendices, illustrations and index. Cloth, $49.50. ISBN 0-8047-3003-2

Review for H-Business and EH.NET by Paul Miranti, Rutgers University. miranti@everest.rutgers.edu

Margaret Levenstein has written an important book that should have a major im pact on the history of accounting and information systems and its connections to the theory of the growth of the firm. Dr. Levenstein argues that changes in corporate organization, strategy, market structure and technology serve as the drivers of modifications in the design and structure of accounting systems. This is a significant departure from the traditional approach followed by accounting historians who often focus more narrowly on the details of methodological evolution per se, placing little emphasis on other contextual factors. Central to her study is an asynchronous, three-stage categorization of accounting system development for the purposes of: (1) operational control; (2) short-term decision making; and (3) long-term capital allocations. These classifications enrich the analysis of firm practice by highlighting how changing priorities influenced information function, flows and content. They also help to avoid the rigidities inherent in such shop-worn constructs as the entity or proprietary theories that permeate many method studies in this field. The explanatory power of Margaret Levenstein’s propositions are tested by analyzing the experience of the Dow Chemical Company and its predecessor, the Midland Chemical Company during the period 1894- 1914. She persuasively argues that Dow’s accounting systems underwent an important transformation during this era as the firm made the transition from an adaptive strategy appropriate for an uncompetitive, cartelized market to an innovative strategy involving product diversification and competitive market settings. Midland Chemical, the precursor adaptive firm, only required a rudimentary accounting system to satisfy the limited information requirements necessary to operate successfully in the cartlelized market for its primary product, potassium bromide. The Dow Chemical Company, the innovative successor, on the other hand, needed a more elaborate accounting system to capture the wider array of information needed to exploit the market potential of electrochemical technology after it abandoned the bromide cartel in 1900.

Some of Margaret Levenstein’s findings are at a variance with earlier studies that dealt with the nature of the relationship between accounting information and corporate growth. She notes, for example, that capital allocation decisions at Dow were informed largely by marginal profit data rather than return on investment analysis which Alfred Chandler has identified as a major evaluative mechanism in modern corporations. This difference is probably more a function of the lack of sophistication in accounting and finance in an emergent enterprise whose management was dominated by chemists. Some AT&T subsidiaries were using return on investment as early as 1911. Moreover, it is not clear when Donaldson Brown actually developed the more elaborate Du Pont ROI calculation which included three components: profit margin, sales turnover and financial leverage. It may have been perfected after the 1914 cut-off date for the Dow study. And it did not become central to planning at General Motors until after 1921 when Brown joined the management team organized to resurrect that firm’s depleted finances. Second, Dr. Levenstein’s findings also do not support the conclusion of Johnson and Kaplan that corporate accounting practice was shaped strongly by professional accountants who were primarily concerned with the questions relating to financial reporting. At Dow professional accountants were consulted after the process of system evolution was well advanced (1900) and that their recommendations were only embraced selectively by management. Moreover, audits by independent public accountants were only performed occasionally (1900, 1905, 1910) with regular annual audits not beginning until 1911 which suggests that the linkage between the requirements of financial reporting and corporate accounting policy may have been weak. What is more surprising is that such a marginal enterprise actually engaged as advisors leading representatives of what then was a small and poorly understood profession. Professional accounting had only been licensed in New York since 1897 and was just beginning to be organized in Michigan and Ohio when Dow employed Haskins & Sells. The choice of a firm which had played a leading role in Progressive reform in Chicago and New York may imply that there is a question concerning the sociology of knowledge here that goes beyond the confines the current study. Perhaps, Dr. Levenstein’s next work on the Cleveland Trust, which provided important financial support to Dow, will shed more light on how professional accounting won acceptance among business and political elites as a means for strengthening social and economic ordering.

One dimension of Margaret Levenstein’s study which might have been expanded more is a generally excellent discussion of Dow’s haphazard capital costing policies. Initially, the firm only recorded repairs and betterment expenses. Later, seemingly arbitrary depreciation charges were recorded apparently in order to maintain surplus accounts at some desired level, perhaps conditioned by the amount of dividends management wished to pay out. The study, however, does not find any connections with contemporary developments in regulated public service enterprises where the de bate over depreciation raged because of its impact on rate bases. The accounting sections of the Hepburn Act of 1907, for example, were intended in part to require greater uniformity in depreciation practice among the nation’s railroads. More surprising was lack of discussion of the significance of the depreciation policies under the federal corporate income tax which became operative at the end of the period under survey.

Margaret Levenstein’s unique model which blends history and theory represents an important contribution to the accounting literature on a par, I believe, with the well known paradigms of such scholarly duos as Johnson and Kaplan, Meckling and Jensen and Watts and Zimmerman. Her ideas about the drivers of accounting evolution invites further confirmatory case studies to test her conclusions which were predicated on the experience of a single great firm in its formative stages of development. Dr. Levenstein’s study serves as an exemplar of the potential richness of case studies in accounting history-a genre that too often in the past has neither amplified theory nor major interpretative themes.

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Subject(s):Business History
Geographic Area(s):North America
Time Period(s):20th Century: Pre WWII

Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study

Author(s):Barro, Robert J.
Reviewer(s):Dawson, John W.

EH.NET BOOK REVIEW

Published by EH.NET (July 1998)

Robert J. Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. xii + 145 pp. $22.50 (cloth), $12.50 (paper); ISBN: 0-262-02421-7 (cloth), 0-262-52254-3 (paper).

Reviewed for EH.NET by John W. Dawson, Department of Economics, Bellarmine College.

Robert Barro and his associates have been leaders in assembling a vast empirical growth literature during the past decade. This book summarizes many of Barro’s own findings in this area and provides a general overview of the empirical research on growth to date.

The text of the book is divided into three chapters which are based on Barro’s Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures, delivered at the London School of Economics in February 1996. The first chapter briefly reviews the history of growth theory and, in particular, describes the convergence hypothesis associated with neoclassical growth theory. The discussion quickly turns to the regression framework to be used throughout the rest of the book, which is based on the neoclassical framework.

In Chapter 1, the regression framework is applied to a panel of data covering roughly a hundred countries over the years 1965-1990 in an effort to determine what factors are important in explaining long-run growth. In using panel data instead of a pure cross section, the approach differs from Barro’s early work in this area (e.g., see Barro (1991)), but is not unlike the analysis in his more recent studies (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). The findings highlighted in this chapter are that the growth rate of real per capita GDP is enhanced by better maintenance of the rule of law, smaller government consumption, longer life expectancy, more male secondary and higher levels of schooling, lower fertility rates, and improvements in the terms of trade. The data also support the notion of conditional convergence; that is, for given values of these variables, countries with a lower initial level of real per capita GDP grow faster. The analysis also looks at democracy and inflation as potential factors determining growth rates, but their roles are the topics of Chapters 2 and 3. Finally, Chapter 1 concludes with projections of growth rates through the end of the century based on the empirical framework developed earlier in the chapter.

Chapter 2 looks at the role of political freedom in determining growth rates; that is, whether or not a more democratic form of government promotes long-run growth. The findings suggest that increases in political rights initially increase growth but tend to retard growth once a moderate level of democracy has been attained, but Barro states that “one cannot conclude from this evidence that more or less democracy is a critical element for economic growth” (p. 61). With this, the analysis turns to developing a framework for determining the level of democracy over time and across countries. While this has largely been a topic of interest to political scientists, the main finding is that levels of democracy are a function of economic factors. In particular, “the positive relation between democracy and prior measures of prosperity–the Lipset [1959] hypothesis–is well established as an empirical regularity” (p. 86). The chapter closes with long-run forecasts of the level of democracy across countries based on the empirical model developed in the chapter.

The third chapter considers the effects of inflation on long-run economic performance. Inflation has received relatively little attention as a potential determinant of long-run growth, but the issue is particularly timely given many central banks’ apparent preoccupation with price stability as a policy goal. The major result is that inflation is estimated to have a negative effect on growth, but “the clear evidence for adverse effects of inflation comes from the experiences of high inflation [annual rates in excess of 20%]” (p.117). Barro devotes a large part of this chapter to dealing with endogeneity issues; that is, ensuring that causation is running from inflation to growth and not in the other direction.

Barro’s approach to studying the determinants of growth is very much data-driven. However, economic historians will be interested in various aspects of the analysis that look at the role of institutions in the growth process. The analysis in Chapter 1 includes a “rule of law” index which is intended to “gauge the attractiveness of a country’s investment climate by considering the effectiveness of law enforcement, the sanctity of contracts, and the state of other influences on the security of property rights” (p. 27). The rule of law index is found to be statistically significant in explaining growth. Chapter 1 also introduces a democracy index into the empirical framework, but a detailed discussion of this relationship is postponed until Chapter 2. In that discussion, the role of other institutional and cultural issues such as ethnolinguistic fractionalization, colonial heritage, and religious affiliation are considered in the growth-democracy relationship.

There is no indication of the intended audience for this book, but it appears to be rather versatile. It provides a very general but useful overview of modern growth theory with particular emphasis on the convergence hypothesis, and provides a fairly complete statement of current methodology and conclusions in the empirical growth literature. All of this could be useful to students of growth at the graduate level and to economists who are not current in the growth literature. More importantly, in my opinion, is the book’s potential for use in the undergraduate classroom and among laymen. With very few exceptions, most of the terminology used in the text is accessible to undergraduates. Most of the exceptions fall in the area of econometrics, but the use of graphs throughout the book to illustrate key estimated relationships largely eliminates this potential problem. I have also found that a lecture or two on basic regression analysis makes even the large tables of regression results accessible to advanced undergraduates. The exposition keeps mathematical notational to an absolute minimum, and uses everyday terminology in many cases to describe the more difficult concepts. Only in the discussion of the debate over cross-section versus panel estimation in Chapter 1 and the choice of instruments in Chapter 3 does the text become sufficiently thick to hinder the interested undergraduate reader.

In several instances the author’s emphasis of the results may need to be qualified. For example, Chapter 2 states that “one cannot conclude from this evidence that more or less democracy is a critical element for economic growth” (p. 61). In the concluding observations following Chapter 3, however, the results concerning democracy are reported as a main result of the analysis: “Increases in political rights initially increase growth but tend to retard growth once a moderate level of democracy has been attained” (p. 119). In addition, the reader may well leave Chapter 2 questioning the direction of causation between democracy and growth, given that empirical models of both are considered in that chapter. Similarly, the results concerning inflation may not be appropriately portrayed, in the end, as being perhaps entirely driven by experiences of inflation in excess of 20% annually. Despite these minor shortcomings, I am confident in saying that the book succeeds in its overall goal of providing a useful summary of the empirical evidence on the determinants of recent economic growth.

References

Barro, R.J., 1991, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 2 (May): 407-433.

Barro, R.J. and X. Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Economic Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill).

Lipset, S.M., 1959, “Some Social requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53: 69-105.

John W. Dawson Department of Economics Bellarmine College

John Dawson is author of “Institutions, Investment, and Growth: New Cross-Section and Panel Data Evidence,” forthcoming in Economic Inquiry.

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Subject(s):Economic Development, Growth, and Aggregate Productivity
Geographic Area(s):General, International, or Comparative
Time Period(s):20th Century: WWII and post-WWII

The Chinese Market Economy, 1000-1500

Author(s):Liu, William Guanglin
Reviewer(s):Pomeranz, Kenneth

Published by EH.Net (June 2017)

William Guanglin Liu, The Chinese Market Economy, 1000-1500. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015.  xviii + 374 pp., $30 (paperback), ISBN: 978-1-4384-5568-6.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Kenneth Pomeranz, Department of Economics, University of Chicago.

William Guanglin Liu has written a valuable book on a big, important, topic: the general trajectory of the Chinese economy from roughly 1000-1650.  (The title says 1500, but the argument goes beyond that date.) The research is excellent, and the author comes up with some original and inventive ways to use his data.  At times, however, it frames its arguments in overly stark forms, and makes claims that go beyond what it can prove.  But despite these concerns, this is a book well worth reading, which will stimulate very useful debate on fundamental questions of Chinese economic history.

As a first approximation, Liu’s theses are hard to argue with.  The author shows that China experienced very impressive growth during the Song dynasty (ca. 960-1279), a period in which there was also a striking expansion of the role of markets in Chinese society.  He also show that the policies of Zhu Yuanzhang (r. 1368-1398), founder of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) dealt a major blow to China’s economy by trying to resurrect an idealized world of largely autarkic and demonetized villages.  It took a long time for China to recover from this: in contrast to many scholars who think that by 1500 China had returned to a market economy generating at least a Song level of prosperity, Liu argues that this did not happen until at least 1600, and quite likely not even then.  Moving beyond China, Liu then suggests that this historical case shows the centrality of market institutions for stimulating economic growth, beginning at a very low level of development.

The first three of these points — the marketization and relative prosperity of Song times, and the damaging effects of early Ming policies — are broadly accepted.  The first controversy concerns matters of degree: how prosperous? How marketized?  How big and lasting a blow did the early Ming inflict?  A second set of controversies centers on causation, and thus on the role of other factors.  For instance, Liu says very little about the many technological innovations during the Song — including the invention of gunpowder, the magnetic compass, paper money, and the importation (from Southeast Asia) of early-ripening rice — except to note that some of the most important innovations did not diffuse rapidly.  Some others would assign those innovations (and some that began in the Tang, such as printing) a good deal of credit for the growth that occurred in the Song, and continued into the Yuan (1279-1368) in some parts of the empire. While we will never have the data necessary to arrive at a precise allocation of growth to different factors, there is still room for further productive discussion about relative weights. Likewise, it is possible to show that the Mongol conquests of the mid-thirteenth century had a devastating impact in some places (especially North China and Sichuan), and very little elsewhere (the Middle and Lower Yangzi Valley, and in the far south); the relative weight of those different regional stories is still unsettled, and matters greatly in whether Liu is justified in placing an overwhelming emphasis on early Ming anti-market policies in explaining an apparent stagnation or decline in living standards between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries.

One of the book’s contributions is to concentrate in one place the arguments for transformational change concentrated in the Song period, and followed by a later reversal: a once popular view (e.g. Elvin 1973) that has lately given way to a tale of more gradual progress across several centuries (Smith and Von Glahn 2003).  Making the best of flawed data, Liu estimates population growth of 0.92% per year between 980 and 1109, a remarkable rate for a pre-modern society.  And drawing on a large body of secondary scholarship, he points to considerable evidence for changes in agriculture — capital deepening, especially in the form of massive investments in irrigation, and increasing use of oxen – which should, logically, have raised agricultural yields significantly, allowing a population that had more than tripled to eat as well or better than its forebears.

Unfortunately, however, we lack much good data on actual yields in the Song.  Liu notes that Dwight Perkins’ well-known estimates are (like most others for this period) inferences from agricultural rents, and that much of the land in question was land used to support schools; he further argues that school land was often rented out at below-market rates, depressing these inferred yields, and that the land which families donated to schools was often their least fertile property, anyway.  Meanwhile several of Perkins’ later data points come from agricultural handbooks, and probably represent optimal results.  Thus Liu argues, the impression of slow but steady growth across centuries that emerges from Perkins’ highly influential work may well be a statistical illusion. He prefers the older idea of a Song boom followed by little progress in subsequent dynasties.   Building on work by Zhou Shengchan, Liu tries to work backwards from data on population and average food consumption to estimate thirteenth century yields in the Lower Yangzi region; the results vary considerably among prefectures, but are generally near the high end of our range of estimates for any period before the arrival of modern farm inputs.  They would therefore leave little room for continued growth in the Yuan, Ming, or even Qing.

If verified, this would be a very important finding, but I have my doubts.  In part, my doubts come from personal experience, as adopting a similar methodology for estimating eighteenth century output of various crops led to extremely high estimates.[1]  There are also technical problems with some of this data (particularly in Table 7.8), though probably not big enough to change the results dramatically.[2]   The most we can say with strong confidence, I think, is that some Song farmers achieved yields near the pre-modern maximum, and more and more of their neighbors caught up over time — though whether this happened over decades or centuries remains very uncertain.

For most non-food items, we simply lack the data to generate serious estimates of per capita consumption in Song times; and while anecdotal evidence of rising consumption exists, Liu prefers not to rely on it.  Instead, he relies on an estimate of real wages for unskilled workers to show that living standards in the Song were as high as they ever got in China prior to the twentieth century.  Because we have not found for China any very long series of wages for privately-hired workers in a relatively standardized occupation in a particular place — like the long runs of wages for construction workers on European cathedrals and colleges, for instance — Liu constructs a long-run series of military wages, for which data are comparatively rich; and because we lack data for enough commodities to construct a long-run price index, he uses grain prices as the denominator for his series.  The resulting series peaks at its very beginning (in 1004) and fluctuates wildly while declining overall for the next roughly 170 years. It is then relatively stable until another steep drop in the early Ming, and recovers slightly in the late Ming before declining again in the early Qing (Figure E-1).

Liu has done us a considerable service by piecing this data series together, but as a proxy for the living standards of ordinary people it must be taken with a very large grain of salt.  Governments did not engage soldiers through a true labor market, nor did the institutional setting of military recruitment or the conditions of being a soldier (aside from the wage) remain constant over time.  Moreover, even if we had a reliable private sector wage series, it would not necessarily follow that this was a reliable basis for estimating popular living standards, much less per capita GDP, as Liu argues (p. 133).  Wage earners were never more than 15 percent of the labor force in late imperial China, and most farmers either owned their own land or had a relatively secure tenancy (especially in Qing times).  Consequently, they earned far more than unskilled laborers did — perhaps three times as much on average, according to preliminary estimates I have made for the eighteenth century (and for the early twentieth, where the data are better). (Among other things, this is confirmed by the fact that tenants and smallholders could support families, while unskilled laborers could rarely afford to marry. And for GDP per capita, we would also have to average in the earnings of well-to-do families.  Last but not least, if the ratio between wages and average farm earnings changed over time — as it might well have, given a gradual strengthening of tenant usufruct rights over the course of the late empire — even a much better wage series might not tell us what we want to know about general living standards.

But if Liu does not prove his most ambitious claims, he does succeed in proving many of his smaller empirical claims.  In particular, the evidence for relative prosperity in the Song and a sharp decline in the early Ming seems too much to explain away, even if one can raise doubts about each individual measurement.  The money supply contracted very sharply in early Ming times, followed by the introduction of government notes (for state payments) that soon became almost worthless; customs receipts (and presumably long-distance trade declined; and the wage decline between ca. 1050 and ca. 1400 is too big to be explained entirely by data problems.  A separate estimate, later in the book, suggests that per capita income in North China might have fallen by as much as half between 1121 (on the eve of the Song loss of the North) and 1420, though output per capita seems to have remained stable in the Yangzi Delta.  Liu also makes a strong case that Song people were freer than their early Ming counterparts, and perhaps even less unequal economically (though Song writing shows so much worry about inequality that one is tempted to believe there was fire behind so much smoke).

This brings us to the problem of explaining these differences.  Liu provides a straightforward answer: Song reliance on the market worked while the early suppression of it backfired.  Moreover, this represents a timeless truth, most recently vindicated by the sharp contrast between the Maoist and post-Maoist periods.  Here. I think, Liu lets his argument outrun his evidence, focusing too exclusively on one broad-brush contrast.

It would be hard to deny that the increased influence of market principles in the Song stimulated growth: above all, probably, the agricultural growth of the south, which required significant investment (especially for water management) that would surely have been more modest had earlier dynasties’ restrictions of private landowning remained in force; and given the surpluses that southern agriculture soon generate, and the relatively easy transportation that its rivers offered, impressive commercial and urban growth soon followed.  Since the coastline south of the Yangzi also has far more good sites for ports than the coastline north of the Yangzi, the southward shift of China’s economic center of gravity was also propitious for foreign trade, which boomed under both the Song and the (Mongol) Yuan.

Even in the south, however, the state provided essential infrastructure (though its role declined over time), and often played a very active role in foreign trade. In the north, meanwhile, both the enormous system of canals built by the Song government and the huge concentration of demand in the capital region were crucial, both for consumer markets and the growth of a precocious iron industry stimulated by unprecedented levels of military spending.   A variety of inventions also must have contributed something to the robust growth of the Song period.

Nor, I think, would many people deny that the early Ming attempt to return to local autarky had serious and lasting negative consequences. But we should bear in mind that the North, where Liu’s decline in estimated output between 1121 and 1420 was concentrated, suffered a number of  major shocks in this period, all of which bypassed or fell much more lightly on the south (except for Sichuan). These included conquests by three sets of northern invaders (including, most devastatingly, the Mongols); the prolonged turmoil that toppled the Mongols and brought the Ming to power; a civil war between supporters of two Ming heirs; and repeated, enormous, Yellow River floods, including two that dramatically shifted the river’s course (out of six such incidents in the last 4,000 years) and made it impossible to rebuild the Song-era canal system.   Ming policies certainly did great damage, too, but the relative size of these setbacks needs more detailed analysis before we can accept Liu’s almost exclusive emphasis on the Ming founder’s anti-market policies.

I would also caution against lumping all the parts of Ming anti-commercialism under the heading “command economy,” and comparing it to an ideal type of “market economy,” as Liu often does (e.g. pp. 1, 4-12, 134-136, 197, 199).  No pre-modern state could maintain the vigorous intervention needed to run a true command economy for long.  The Ming may have been more effective than most, but their massive redistribution of property and forced migration was over by about 1425, with land and labor again being exchanged in private markets;[3] the system of artisan conscription unraveled during the fifteenth century; foreign trade outside the official tribute system gradually returned; and so on.  This did not mark the end of Ming anti-commercialism as an attitude, or of its effects: among other problems, the dynasty never tried to provide the money supply that the private economy needed, saddling its subjects with costs that lingered for centuries.[4]   But even if this failure was originally part of an aggressive state’s attempt at command economy, it soon evolved into something else: the failure of a relatively weak state to undertake even those interventions that could have benefited both itself and the private economy.  The succeeding Qing dynasty (1644-1912) certainly had no dream of a command economy, and often (though not always) sought to encourage markets;  and the state’s share of GDP may have slipped as low as 2 percent, compared to at least 10 percent and perhaps as much as 20 percent at the peak of Song military-fiscalism.[5]  Yet the Qing provided the most stable bronze currency — the money used for most everyday transactions — China had ever known, while uncoined silver provided a reasonably adequate currency for big transactions; and it mobilized impressive resources for various physiocratic projects, from water control to grain price stabilization to promotion of best practices in agriculture and handicrafts. (That it spent much less, proportionately, on its military than the Song or Ming had facilitated this combination of low extraction and significant services.[6])  And for about a century and a half, they presided over impressive demographic and economic growth, Interestingly,  three prominent economic historians — Loren Brandt, Debin Ma, and Thomas Rawski, none of them remotely anti-market — have argued that the principal reason why Qing economic development was not even better was that the government was too minimalist: that a small government spread across a vast area was unable to prevent all sorts of local actors — from bandits to local elites employing private enforcers to rogue government clerks — from interfering with local markets and property rights.[7]  Such interference was clearly a problem in the late Ming as well, though it is not precisely measurable in either period.  It does, however, remind us that a simple contrast between “market economy” and “command economy” does not give us enough tools to understand the different relationships between state and market in imperial China, or anywhere else.

Nonetheless, the book does an impressive job of demonstrating how much dynamism the marketizing economy of the Song generated, and how much of those gains had been lost by the mid-Ming, at least in certain regions.  The author’s efforts to quantify trends that many others have been content to describe qualitatively are impressive; this is a book where the appendices are often as thought-provoking as the text.  The results are not as revolutionary or dispositive as the book sometimes suggests, but they will stimulate productive debates for years to come.

Notes:

1. Lacking data on the acreage devoted to non-grain crops in certain areas, I decided to estimate how much land must have been devoted to non-grain crops, relying on generally accepted numbers for population, grain consumption, and imports, and then multiply the acreage left over by conservative estimates of yields for the non-grain crops.  The results came out so high that I cut them in every way I could think of — including, in one case, arbitrarily reducing the estimate of non-grain acreage by half. The results I came up with were still at the high end of the existing range of estimates, or in some cases significantly beyond it.  I am not ready to toss out those estimates completely, and would be happy to see this approach vindicated; but I am inclined to be cautious here, especially since Liu has not made the same efforts to depress his results as I did.

2. The conversions from Zhou’s numbers, which mostly use Yuan dynasty measurements, is complicated. Trying to reproduce his results for one prefecture after an email exchange with me, Prof. Liu got a figure about 1 percent lower.

3. A rare set of household-level records, for instance, shows a family with modest landholdings in Huizhou engaged in no less than 18 land purchases or sales between 1391 (not long after the Ming came to power) and 1432.  See Von Glahn 2016: 291-293.

4. Von Glahn 1996 and Kuroda 2000 suggest that this was finally addressed with moderate success in the Qing.

5. Perkins 1967: 492; Wang 1973: 133 for the Qing; Golas 1988: 93-94 comes up with 24 percent for the Song, but admits that this seems unlikely.  Hartwell 1988: 79-80 suggests a bit over 10 percent.

6. On military spending compare Hartmann 2013: 29 with Zhou 2000: 36-38.

7. Brandt Ma and Rawski 2014: 60, 76, and 79.

References:

Brandt, Loren, Debin Ma and Thomas Rawski. 2014.  “From Divergence to Convergence: Reevaluating the History behind China’s Long Economic Boom,” Journal of Economic Literature 52(1):45-123.

Elvin, Mark. 1973.  The Pattern of the Chinese Past.  Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Goals, Peter, 1988. “The Sung Economy: How Big?”  Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies 20: 89-94.

Hartmann, Charles. 2013.  “Sung Government and Politics,” in John Chafee and Dennis Twitchett, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Volume V Part 2: Sung China, 960-1279 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press):19-133.

Hartwell, Robert. 1988. The Imperial Treasuries: Finance and Power in Song China,” Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies 20: 18-89

Kuroda Akinobu. 2000. “Another Monetary Economy: The Case of Traditional China,” in A.J. H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu, eds, Asia-Pacific Dynamism, 1500-2000 (London: Routledge): 187-198.

Perkins, Dwight. 1967. “Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China,” Journal of Economic History 27 (4): 478–92

Perkins, Dwight. 1969. Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968.  Chicago: Aldine Publishing.

Smith, Paul, and Richard Von Glahn, eds., 2003. The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History.  Cambridge:  Harvard Asia Center.

Von Glahn, Richard. 1996.  Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700.  Berkeley: University of California Press.

Von Glahn, Richard. 2016.  The Economic History of China: From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wang Yeh-chien. 1973. Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Zhou Yumin. 2000.  Wan Qing caizheng yu shehui bianqian (Late Qing Fiscal Administration and Social Change).   Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe.

Kenneth Pomeranz is University Professor of History at the University of Chicago.  His best known book is The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, 2000).  His most recent publication is “The Data We Have vs. the Data We Want: A Comment on the State of the Divergence Debate,” Pt. I and Pt II New Economics Papers (June 8, 2017) https://nephist.wordpress.com/2017/06/06/the-data-we-have-vs-the-data-we-need-a-comment-on-the-state-of-the-divergence-debate-part-ii/. Forthcoming publications include “Water, Energy, and Politics: Chinese Industrial Revolutions in Global Environmental Perspective,” in Gareth Austin, ed., Economic Development and Environmental History in the Anthropocene (forthcoming, 2017: Bloomsbury Academic).

Copyright (c) 2017 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (June 2017). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://eh.net/book-reviews/

Subject(s):Economic Development, Growth, and Aggregate Productivity
Economywide Country Studies and Comparative History
Geographic Area(s):Asia
Time Period(s):Medieval
16th Century
17th Century

Rulers, Religion, and Riches: Why the West Got Rich and the Middle East Did Not

Author(s):Rubin, Jared
Reviewer(s):Mokyr, Joel

Published by EH.Net (April 2017)

Jared Rubin, Rulers, Religion, and Riches: Why the West Got Rich and the Middle East Did Not. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. xxi + 273 pp. $30 (paperback), ISBN: 978-1-108-40005-3.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Joel Mokyr, Departments of Economics and History, Northwestern University.

The Middle East, it has been said, is not just a collection of failed states. It is a failed region. It generates a disproportional number of the world’s orphans and refugees, its GDP per capita is intolerably low despite oil riches, and there are few signs that there is light at the end of tunnel. Democracy seems to have been put on the back burner indefinitely, and human rights are a lost cause in most countries and in retreat elsewhere. Intellectually, too, things look rather dismal: In 2005 Harvard University alone produced more scientific papers than 17 Arabic-speaking countries combined. Muslim countries contribute just 2.5 percent of more than 11.5 million papers published worldwide each year (Muslims constituted 23 percent of the world’s population in 2010). A 1997 Scientometrics paper estimated that 46 Muslim countries (which of course contain much more than the Middle East) contributed 1.17 percent to world science literature as opposed to Spain (1.48 percent).

Is the Islamic religion to blame? Jared Rubin, in this stimulating and highly original study, would deny that emphatically. Although this is a book about religion and its implication for institutional and economic change, Rubin is little interested in the actual doctrinal content of religion. He points out, as many others have, that the essence of Islam could not possibly be as rigid and opposed to commerce and economic change as it may seem, because for the first centuries of its existence, the nations that adopted Islam flourished not just commercially but also in terms of technology, architecture, poetry, agriculture, medicine, and engineering, while western Europe was an ignorant, violent and poverty-stricken backwater. What we have witnessed since 1200 is more than a “divergence”: it is a Great Reversal, of momentous importance till the present day.

Rubin’s book presents us with an explanation for this great reversal, which will have to be taken into account from now on in all future discussions on the economic history of the Islamic world. He does not oversell his argument as the reason for the great reversal, he makes a plausible argument for it as a complementary argument to the ones other serious scholars have made. The book is divided into a few chapters that outline the theory and logic of the argument and then applies these insights to a number of historical case studies. It is a tale that combines economic history, political economy, and religion in a unique and novel way.

Here is the basic argument: any kind of ruler has power because his or her subjects accept their rule and their main concern is what Rubin calls “propagating their rule.”  How do you get people to accept you as their ruler and let you keep your job? Political power is supported by a combination of coercion (that is, violence) and legitimacy (people willingly accept a ruler because they believe that this person has the right to rule them). Through most of history, rulers depended on a combination of the two, though the weights of each differed greatly depending on their costs and benefits. Rubin is exclusively interested in the legitimacy part. Legitimacy is provided by what he calls “legitimizing agents” — groups or entities that have enough influence to make the subjects of the ruler follow instructions and pay taxes. An obvious legitimizing agent is the religious establishment — for example, European rulers once ruled ex dei gratia and called themselves the most Catholic King. Some modern royalty still include the line in their title, although in most places such relics are empty.

Rubin observes that in the early medieval period, both Christian and Muslim rulers used religious authorities as legitimizing agents, but that at some point in the later Middle Ages, Muslim and western European society diverged. Whereas in the Ottoman Empire the sultans continued to rely on religious authorities for their legitimacy, in many western societies the Church’s political leverage was diminished irreversibly. From the beginning, Rubin points out, Christian doctrine envisaged separate spheres for secular and religious power. The schisms and exiles to which the late medieval papacy was subject weakened it greatly in the face of ambitious rulers, and the reformation administered to religious legitimization the coup de grace. Apart from a few corners of Europe such as Spain, religion lost the power it had exercised since even before the prophet Samuel anointed Kings Saul and David.

Why and how did this matter to economic history? Rubin argues that religious authorities were in general conservative, and that the institutions they established are less aligned with commerce and finance than when an economically important elite such as rich urban merchants and artisans are more powerful. As a result of their political influence, religious authorities in the Middle East were successful in blocking critical breakthroughs, most notably the printing press and more sophisticated financial institutions. The printing press facilitated the success of the Reformation, and the Reformation had further favorable economic effects, as has recently been shown by a pair of important papers (Cantoni, Dittmar and Yuchtman, 2016; Dittmar and Meisenzahl, 2016). One might add that even in France, in which the reformation was suppressed, the power of religious authorities to legitimize the king disappeared. Napoleon famously took the crown out of the hands of Pope Pius VII during his 1804 coronation and crowned himself, symbolizing that his legitimization came from military power, not God.

In summary, Rubin argues that the leaders of organized religion tended to be conservative across the board. Their influence, he thinks, depended on their monopoly of eternal truths, and updating those truths threatened to erode their credibility.  The Islamic world was unable to curtail the influence of Islamic scholars until the Islamic world had fallen hopelessly behind Europe. Even within Christian Europe, the power of religious authorities, he feels, helped determine the difference between successful regions such as the Netherlands and Britain and economic laggards such as Spain. When discussing the past three centuries, the influence of religious authorities is somewhat diminished, but what counts in Rubin’s view is that in all poor and backward states, the institutional structure and the capability of key players to “sit at the bargaining table” as he calls it was little affected by the urban-commercial classes whose demands for free and open markets, constraints on the executive, and a rule of law led to rapid economic progress in the north-west corners of Europe.

By combining an institutional argument with religion through the effect that religion had on institutions and politics (rather than on cultural beliefs), Rubin’s argument is reminiscent of an important recent book by Karel Davids, which has not thus far received sufficient attention (Davids, 2013). Both books, in a different way, stress how religious institutions mattered regardless of the precise content of religion. Davids, however, emphasizes another aspect, namely the role of religion in the generation and dissemination of technology. Rubin is primarily interested in institutions that support markets. Yet an explanation of modern economic growth cannot possibly avoid the primum movens of economic growth, which was the rapid expansion and dissemination of useful knowledge. In early medieval Islam, engineers, doctors, and chemists were at the forefront of pushing the envelope. By 1600 the Islamic world had become a follower, by 1800 they were a laggard. A natural extension of Rubin’s idea is that a government dominated by religious authorities will also be less than accommodating to out-of-the-box ideas from natural philosophers, astronomers, mathematicians, and medical doctors. The tradeoff between religiosity and scientific and technological progress has become a serious topic of investigation in recent years (Benabou, Ticchi, and Vindigni, 2014; Squicciarini, 2016). Their findings support the notion that devoutness affects innovativeness negatively and that political institutions could be used by powerful religious leaders to suppress what they considered heretical views.

Rubin is correct in pointing out that in the most progressive countries in western Europe the ability of religious leaders to halt progress was limited.  A striking example of this phenomenon is provided by Amir Alexander (2014), who documents the fierce resistance to infinitesimal mathematics by the Jesuits in the seventeenth century, which seriously slowed down the development of mathematics in Italy. The reason the reactionary powers such as the Jesuits were not able to slow down the development of radical new ideas in Europe materially is primarily the high level of political fragmentation in Europe. If a particular ruler tried to crack down on his most creative subjects because they wrote things he felt to be subversive or heretical, they could always move across the border. Such outside options may have been much more limited in the Ottoman Empire and in China. Interstate competition is another factor that rulers worried about, beside Rubin’s legitimization story. After all, every ruler faced both internal and external threats. Without interstate competition, or “emulation” as eighteenth-century writers called it, Europe might never have had the Enlightenment, which opened the doors to so many of the institutional and technological changes that have helped create economic modernity.

Here and there one could nitpick some of Rubin’s historical interpretations. His account of Spain’s political economy would have greatly benefitted from a closer attention to Regina Grafe’s path-breaking work (Grafe, 2012). Rubin’s agnosticism as to the actual content of religion may be somewhat misplaced: the Sunni revival of the eleventh century did in time move the ruling orthodoxy into a more conservative direction, as Eric Chaney (2015) has shown. More generally, an argument that focuses on “the ruler” and the significance of the propagation of political power may exaggerate the ability of the state to control what the citizens did in pre-twentieth-century societies.

All the same, Rubin has written an important and timely book. His methodology is very much that of the historically informed economist: certain choices are made at some point because they make sense, that is, the benefits to those that make the decision exceed the costs. But once made, these initial conditions can have cascading unintended and unanticipated consequences, and those historically contingent causal chains may well be what drove much of the great and little divergences that our profession is so interested in. Equally important, this well-argued and sensible book about Islam provides a much-needed antidote to the toxic rubbish masquerading as scholarship produced by some of the Islamophobes in the current American administration (e.g., Gorka, 2016). The Middle East’s problem is not Islam; it is History.

References:

Alexander, Amir. 2014. Infinitesimal: How a Dangerous Mathematical Theory Shaped the Modern World. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Benabou, Roland, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. 2014. “Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion and Growth.” Unpublished working paper, Princeton University.

Cantoni, Davide, Jeremiah Dittmar and Noam Yuchtman. 2016.  “Reformation and Reallocation: Religious and Secular Economic Activity in Early Modern Germany.” Unpublished.

Chaney, Eric. 2015. “Religion and the Rise and Fall of Islamic Science.” Unpublished working paper, Harvard University.

Davids, Karel. 2013. Religion, Technology and the Great and Little Divergences. Leiden: Brill.

Dittmar, Jeremiah E. and Ralf Meisenzahl. 2016. “Origins of Growth: Health Shocks, Institutions, and Human Capital in the Protestant Reformation.” Unpublished.

Gorka, Sebastian. 2016. Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing.

Grafe, Regina. 2012. Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, and Backwardness in Spain, 1650–1800. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Squicciarini, Mara. 2017. “Devotion and Development: Religiosity, Education, and Economic Progress in 19th-century France.” Unpublished working paper, Northwestern University.

Joel Mokyr is the author of Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press, 2016).

Copyright (c) 2017 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (April 2017). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://eh.net/book-reviews/

Subject(s):Economic Development, Growth, and Aggregate Productivity
Economywide Country Studies and Comparative History
Geographic Area(s):Europe
Middle East
Time Period(s):General or Comparative

Innovation and Its Enemies: Why People Resist New Technologies

Author(s):Juma, Calestous
Reviewer(s):Mokyr, Joel

Published by EH.Net (January 2017)

Calestous Juma, Innovation and Its Enemies: Why People Resist New Technologies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. xii + 416 pp. $30 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-0-19-046703-6.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Joel Mokyr, Department of Economics, Northwestern University.

Technological progress is, by general consensus, the chief engine of modern economic growth. It is also an untidy and highly non-linear historical process. Any notion that in the real world some kind of good-ideas-drive-out-bad-ideas rule obtains should be abandoned from the outset. Many old and bad ideas are retained for many years, even centuries, and many good ideas are rejected, resisted, maligned, and at times abandoned. In 1679, William Petty, the founder of political economy, wrote that “when a new invention is first propounded, in the beginning every man objects, and the poor inventor runs the gantloop of all petulent wits … not one [inventor] of a hundred outlives this torture … and moreover, this commonly is so long a doing that the poor inventor is either dead or disabled by the debts contracted to pursue his design” (The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty, Charles Henry Hull, ed. Cambridge University Press, 1899, Vol. 1, p. 74).

In the interest of full disclosure: the title of Calestous Juma’s engaging and informed book is identical to the title of a paper written by this reviewer and published in 2000 and elaborated upon in my Gifts of Athena (2002). Juma graciously acknowledges this in the first footnote to the book. There is no question that he has taken the idea a great deal further, yet it is written very much in the same spirit. Resistance to new technology has three major origins. First, there are the incumbents who fear a threat to the stream of rents generated by their physical capital, human capital, market power, or political influence. Innovation inevitably disrupt such rents. Second, there is the concern about broader repercussions: innovations have unintended ripple effects on a host of social and political variables that may generate additional costs and pain to people even if they themselves have no direct say over whether to adopt the innovation. And beyond that there is risk- and loss-aversion, the often well-founded fear than a new technique may have unanticipated and unknowable consequences. These three motives often merge and create powerful forces that use political power and persuasion to thwart innovations. As a result, technological progress does not follow a linear and neat trajectory. It is, as social constructionists have been trying to tell us for decades, a profoundly political process.

As the late Nathan Rosenberg pointed out in a classic essay entitled “Uncertainty and Technological Change,” by definition innovation is a journey into the unknown. The unforeseen and unintended consequences could be negative, making what seemed at the time to be an improvement actually welfare-reducing. The classic case of reducing engine-knock by adding lead to gasoline in the 1920s with horrid consequences that only now are becoming fully known stands as a classic example, but many others come to mind. Knowing this has biased the popular view of innovations — and various organizations have played upon these fears. Yet it is striking that the bias is not distributed uniformly: while transgenic salmon is still not available to consumers despite the complete absence of any evidence of harmful effects, cellular phones and GPS have spread like wildfire, perhaps because they were able to align themselves with the forces of globalization.

In a series of fascinating case studies arranged in separate chapters, Juma illustrates these principles over and over again. The chapters have clever titles (my favorite is the one on the fierce and persistent resistance of the American dairy lobby to margarine, entitled “smear campaigns”) and are well-written and documented. A few of them deal with well-known cases, such as the resistance of Moslem society to the printing press and the struggle of European farm lobbies and environmentalists against transgenic crops. Others concern little-known episodes, such as the tale of AquaBounty, an aquaculture firm founded by Elliott Entis, which ingeniously devised a slightly genetically-altered salmon that matures in half the time of regular salmon. The technique offers considerable cost savings and environmental advantages, yet has no discernible negative side effects. Yet the idea was fought tooth and nail by well-meaning but misguided environmentalists as well as salmon fishers, who worried about competition and denounced Entis’s idea using inflammatory terms such as “Frankenfish.” The product is still not available and environmentally correct chain stores such as Whole Foods have already announced they will not carry it. Yet with fishery depletion one of the major environmental disasters looming, such techniques are exactly what is needed.

Juma is at his most eloquent and informative in his chapter on transgenic crops. The use of such crops, as he points out, is not only a way to increase agricultural productivity but also environmentally responsible, as it leads to lower use of pesticides and fertilizer. Yet it is ironically opposed by a coalition of environmentalists that led to the formulation of the infamous Cartagena protocols of 2000. As he points out, the main thrust of this emblematic manifestation of resistance to transgenic crops, known as the “precautionary principle,” was to reverse the burden of proof: the originator of the biological innovation had to show it was harmless before it could be marketed — basically an impossible task. As he stresses over and over again, the logical error of those driven by loss- or risk-aversion is to assume that the status quo is risk-free.

One could quibble about some of Juma’s decisions to include certain episodes and not others. The struggle between Edison’s DC and Westinghouse’s AC (the “war of the currents”) is not really a case of “resistance to innovation” as much as a struggle between two incompatible new network standards. Most readers will be disappointed that there is no chapter on the long and fascinating history of popular resistance to nuclear power, one of the paradigmatic cases of technological conservatism that is still with us. This reviewer would have liked more discussion of the Luddites — the resistance movement that gave the phenomenon its name — as well as the fanatical resistance to medical innovations such as the anti-vaccination campaigns conducted by certain groups mostly affiliated with Christian and Muslim radical philosophy. Religious authorities, whose beliefs are often based on “not-playing-God,” get little attention despite their record of resisting many new ideas. To economic historians, the absence of much discussion of workers’ resistance based on the fear of technological unemployment and dystopian scenarios in the Player Piano mode seems a bit disappointing, as this seems to be a main concern of modern-day critics of innovation, such as Jeremy Rifkin, as well as more serious academics. The cost of innovation in terms of accelerated depreciation of human capital should have been stressed a bit more. Yet these minor quibbles do not detract from the value of a timely and insightful book.

In the end, perhaps the surprising thing is not that there has been so much resistance to technological progress, but that humanity has actually been able to overcome most of it. For much of human history, the heavy hand of conservatism and neophobia (what Timur Kuran has called the “tenacious past”), suppressed intellectual innovators of all kinds, condemning many past societies to a fate of virtual technological stasis. When reactionary forces were weakened in Europe after 1500, innovation slowly found its way to the surface, but even then it had to struggle against opponents every inch of the way. In that sense our globalized age must consider itself lucky. While some societies may try to resist certain innovations, original and creative minds can always go offshore and develop their ideas in more hospitable places. In the end, if an idea is truly superior, it will catch on, if with a disastrous delay. After all, Islamic countries in the end overcame their reluctance to the printing press (in no small part thanks to a Hungarian-born convert to Islam named Ibrahim Muteferrika, as Juma recounts). Yet the absence of printing and inexpensive books in Arabic or Turkish for centuries has had inestimably deleterious consequences for the intellectual and political development of the Middle East. As Juma stresses repeatedly, doing nothing is risky too, especially if your competitors storm ahead.

Joel Mokyr is the author of A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press, 2017).

Copyright (c) 2017 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (January 2017). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://eh.net/book-reviews/

Subject(s):History of Technology, including Technological Change
Geographic Area(s):General, International, or Comparative
Time Period(s):17th Century
18th Century
19th Century
20th Century: Pre WWII
20th Century: WWII and post-WWII

Handbook of Cliometrics

Editor(s):Diebolt, Claude
Haupert, Michael
Reviewer(s):Mitch, David

Published by EH.Net (July 2016)

Claude Diebolt and Michael Haupert, editors, Handbook of Cliometrics. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 2016. xxii + 590 pp.  $149 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-3-642-40405-4.

Reviewed for EH.Net by David Mitch, Department of Economics, University of Maryland – Baltimore County.

There is by now a long tradition of handbooks in economics. And they have varied over the decades in their intended audience and aims. J.M. Keynes in his 1922 introduction to the Cambridge Economic Handbook series described it as “intended to convey to the ordinary reader and to the uninitiated student some conception of the general principles of thought which economists apply to economic problems.”  Kenneth Arrow and Michael Intrilligator in their introduction to the North-Holland Handbooks in Economics series describe them as “a definitive source, reference and teaching supplement for use by professional researchers and advanced graduate students. Each Handbook contains self-contained surveys of the current state of a branch of economics in the form of chapters prepared by leading specialists on various aspects of this branch of economics.”

Claude Diebolt (University of Strasbourg) and Michael Haupert (University of Wisconsin-La Crosse), the editors of Springer’s Handbook of Cliometrics have not clearly identified the audience at which the volume is aimed. They do indicate in their introduction (p. xi) that the contributions “stress the usefulness of cliometrics for economists, historians, and social scientists in general.” Their preface and introduction describe the handbook as one that “contains digested knowledge in an easily accessible format,” (p. xv) while also asserting the aim “to foster world-class research” (p. xv).  They have followed the lead of North-Holland’s handbook series of choosing leading specialists in various branches of cliometrics to write its chapters but appear to have given them quite free reign regarding intended audience, scope, and methodology employed.   Indeed one message the volume as a whole conveys is the diversity of formats that can be associated with cliometric history ranging from exercises in applied econometrics to purely verbal narrative expositions.

The volume comes in at just under 600 pages. It is divided into 22 chapters subsumed under some 7 headings.  This implies an average allotment of 27 pages per chapter with the actual chapters varying from 15 to 35 pages in length.  By way of comparison, the North-Holland Handbook of Economic Growth, Vols. 1A and 1B (to choose just one immediately available volume from the many in the series) runs to a total  of 1800 pages in some 28 chapters for an average length of 64 pages per chapter.  The considerable relative restriction in length for the Springer Handbook implies tradeoffs between the scope and level of the audience for a given contribution.  Some contributions in this volume provide an overview of the forest, taking up general concepts such as labor markets or human capital or landmark episodes such as the Great Depression and accomplish this by aiming at primarily an undergraduate audience albeit with elegance and incisiveness.  Other contributions focus on specific trees, considering a few key issues, key studies or key methodologies which they cover in a depth more suitable for advanced graduate students and researchers.

What choice of topics and organization is appropriate for a handbook of cliometrics?  Insofar as cliometrics is a method rather than substantive economic history, organization according to chronological or geographical coverage would not seem in order. If cliometrics is defined as the application of economic theory and quantitative methods to the study of history, then what is to be covered in such a handbook over and above the theoretical and quantitative tools to be applied? Are there either general principles or specific techniques that can be articulated for the application of economic theory and methods to the study of history? Forums on the future of economic history (such as that from the 2015 Economic History Association annual meeting published in the December, 2015 Journal of Economic History) suggest no shortage of methodological advances to consider including Geographical Information Systems, big data and computational power, and use of quasi-experimental methods — to name just some.

The editors acknowledge the difficulty of deciding what to include and that some important and historically significant topics were excluded (p. xi) and point to the goals of achieving “variety over time, topic, and geography” and “a sampling of topics cliometrics has helped to transform over the past half-century” as principles of selection.

The seven section headings chosen for the volume seem more Fogelian than Northian in conception.  Four of the categories, Human Capital, Finance, Innovation, and Government have clear parallels with headings in The Reinterpretation of American Economic History, the important 1972 compilation by Fogel and Engerman of cliometric work. The three other categories that round off the work include a section on the history of cliometrics, a section on growth, and a section on statistics and cycles.  While Douglass North and new institutional approaches certainly get mention throughout this handbook, none of the chapters give extended coverage to institutions or a Northian framework, an understandable decision given space constraints.

The opening section on history contains both Michael Haupert’s history of cliometrics and Peter Temin’s effort to link economic history and economic development via his own illustrious career experiences.  Almost half of Haupert’s history of cliometrics is actually devoted to the history of pre-cliometric economic history; which limits the detail he provides to either old or new economic history.  Such important episodes as the controversy over the cliometrics of slavery are notably missing from his account, though it does provide a quite useful entrée to the topic. Peter Temin’s contribution fills in this gap with his insightful romp through selected cliometrics highlights over the past fifty years pointing to parallels and synergies between the study of economic history and economic development.  He offers the perspective of a pioneering practitioner of cliometrics on work by more recent generations of cliometricians. His is one of the few contributions in the volume to give explicit consideration to the quasi-experimental methods that have become widespread in the work of younger cliometricians. He also considers tensions and opportunities in publication strategies aiming at alternatively economic history or mainstream economics journals as outlets.

The second section on human capital has five contributions which differ widely in scope and detail.  Claudia Goldin and Robert Margo provide quite general, albeit cogent, overviews of respectively cliometric work on human capital and labor markets. Given their own scholarly work they both not surprisingly focus on the U.S. case, though Goldin sets this in the global context of unified growth theory with Malthusian, transition, and human capital phases.  Her treatment of education and schooling centers on her landmark 2008 book with Lawrence Katz rather than a detailed overview of recent research. She also treats health as a form of human capital in considering long run trends in mortality and life expectancy.  She does not provide any assessment or even mention of recent age-heaping approaches to estimating human capital historically.  Robert Margo’s treatment of labor markets centers around estimates of long term trends in some basic magnitudes including that of the labor force as a whole, occupational structure, wage structure, and racial differences.  He provides concise but insightful interpretations of these trends utilizing a simple demand and supply framework. Margo does refer to work exploring underlying sources and data limitations but given his space limitations does not do so in any depth.  A major and innovative area of cliometric research since the late 1970s has been in examining the relationship between nutrition, heights, and biological living standards, and disease environments as evidenced in trends in human heights, the field of anthropometrics.  Lee Craig overviews this research and his particular emphasis on nineteenth century U.S. developments allows him some focus in depth, though he does draw extensively on more global evidence.  He considers in more depth than the Goldin chapter the role of improvements in nutrition and in public health measures in improving the biological standard of living.  Franziska Tollen and Joerg Baten’s contribution provides an in-depth survey of the use of age-heaping indicators to estimate human capital.  They go in detail into the methodology of how age-heaping indicators are constructed and survey a wide range of findings stemming from use of the age-heaping approach.  Unlike other contributions in this section the level of detail is more suited to advanced researchers.  Jacob Weisdorf surveys the use of parish registers by cliometricians and economic and demographic historians more generally. He provides a useful description of the registries themselves. And he makes note of their use not only for the English and other Western European cases but also for Africa and potentially for other regions as well. Weisdorf embeds his survey in a discussion of the Malthusian population framework and the unified growth approach of Oded Galor and collaborators through the evidence parish registers can provide on trends in births, deaths, and marriages. He connects with the human capital theme by taking up the important information registries can provide on occupational trends.  He gives coverage to historically integrated occupational coding schemes that have been developed to categorize the occupations sometimes recorded on parish registries as in the work of Marco van Leeuwen, Andrew Miles and others (2004, 2005), but only passing mention to the major Cambridge Group project of using occupational information on parish registers to extend back in time knowledge about trends in English occupational structure (Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley 2014).

Section Three on Economic Growth contains a further five chapters that are quite varied in character and coverage.  Claude Diebolt and Faustine Perrin nominally give coverage to a range of growth theories, although they use the unified growth approach of Oded Galor and David Weil to provide a narrative of growth over the past millennium while offering an extension by incorporating implications of female economic and social empowerment into their discussion.   Gregory Clark offers a cliometric perspective on the British Industrial Revolution centering on the sources of productivity advance and identifying it as driven by an “upturn in the rate of technological innovation” (p. 207).  Although he does not provide an in-depth survey of cliometric work on the Industrial Revolution, Clark does consider some of the leading underlying explanations that have been offered including institutional and intellectual approaches and those grounded in human capital; he argues that none can provide convincing explanations. He thus concludes that the “Industrial Revolution remains one of history’s great mysteries” (p. 232). James Foreman-Peck takes up economic-demographic interactions by using a simple linear specification of the Malthusian model as his starting point and quite effectively uses it as a unifying framework for his review both of empirical evidence and causal estimation strategies. While I would have been interested in seeing further discussion of the implications of relaxing the assumptions of linearity, Foreman-Peck’s contribution should prove an effective teaching tool in showing how some simple micro-specifications can have far-reaching applications.  Emanuele Felice provides a quite detailed discussion of issues involved in constructing GDP estimates that are comparable across countries and over time and even for sub-national regions, as well as turning to the evidence and approaches in using such estimates to examine tendencies to growth convergence and factors influencing these tendencies.  Markus Lampe and Paul Sharp take up the topic of trade, turning first to the importance of trade, then to how to measure the extent of trade and market integration, then to the role of institutions, technology, and policy in determining trade and finally to the measurement and determinants of trade policy. Their coverage is very well informed, but with only a sentence or two to devote to each study they consider, the emphasis is on breadth rather than depth.

Section Four on Finance, has more unity and coherence between its four chapters than other sections of this volume.  Larry Neal’s opening contribution on the cliometrics of finance focuses specifically on surveying the market for sovereign debt from early modern times through the early twentieth century and the market for short-term commercial credit with particular emphasis on exchange rates, including extensive comments for both topics on available data sources. Neal concludes, however, with extended general reflections on both the accomplishments and limitations of the now quite extensive body of cliometric work on finance.  For his contribution, the late John James defines “Payment Systems” as “the complex of financial instruments and relationships that transfer value between buyers and sellers to complete their transactions” (pp. 353-54).  James provides a wide ranging narrative account — suitable for non-specialists that can be viewed as informed by a cliometric framework or spirit rather than directly cliometric — of the evolution of payment systems so defined from the demonetization accompanying the collapse of the Roman Empire through the early twenty-first century U.S.  In contrast to Neal and James, Matthew Jaremski organizes his survey of cliometric work on financial crises methodologically.  He first considers studies that employ survival and hazard models to examine determinants of banking crises, then turns to the use of data envelopment analysis for a production function/efficiency perspective on deposit insurance and then in the last part of the survey considers approaches to deal with simultaneity in the interaction between financial crises and more general economic activity; these include vector auto-regression, instrumental variables approaches and difference-in-difference models.  Jaremski’s exposition is lucid despite the amount of technical detail presented, though it seems aimed at specialists and researchers in the field.  Caroline Fohlin concludes the Finance section with a wide-ranging international comparative perspective on financial systems.  She starts with some basic typologies on financial systems, distinguishing first between functional and institutional perspectives and then to standard distinctions between a) bank-based versus market-based systems, b) universal versus specialized systems and c) relationship versus arms-length systems.  She then turns to the extent to which the actual historical evolution of financial systems adds complexity to these distinctions. She proceeds to consider determinants of choices between the various types of systems she distinguishes and to evidence on the nexus between finance and economic growth.  Throughout her detailed survey of a large number of studies and countries, Fohlin warns against rigid classification by over-arching categories or mono-causal explanations, leaving her with the final conclusion (p. 427) that “history matters.”

The remaining three sections of the volume each contain pairs of contribution.  The two essays in the fifth section on Innovation provides a quite interesting contrast.  Stanley Engerman and the late Nathan Rosenberg comment on “innovation in historical perspective” by arguing that uncertainty associated with the innovation process implies that the richness of historical accounts of the innovation process can capture important aspects that would be missed in an ahistorical theoretical framework. Engerman and Rosenberg were both early contributors to cliometrics; their chapter, as with that of John James described above, can perhaps be seen as more informed by a cliometric framework than involving direct application of either the theoretical or empirical methods associated with Cliometrics.  In contrast, Jochen Streb directly embraces “the Cliometric Study of Innovations,” surveying both theoretical and empirical cliometric studies of the history of innovation with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on patents as measures of innovation.

The sixth section is on “Statistics and Cycles.”  The contribution by Thomas Rahlf in this section on “Statistical Inference” is actually a history of thought of statistical inference during the twentieth century.  He attempts to link this with cliometrics in the last part of his essay by suggesting that Alfred Conrad, John Meyer and others formulating cliometric methodology were informed by a Bayesian approach and that the history of Bayesian statistics is thus relevant for understanding the methodology of cliometrics.  He also suggests that cliometric inference could benefit from further attention to the criticisms of econometric methodology offered by Rudolf Kalman of Kalman filter fame. However, neither of these suggestions is articulated in any detail. The other contribution is by Terence Mills on “Trends, Cycles, and Structural Breaks in Cliometrics,” which offers a helpful primer on developments over the past quarter century in time-series statistics and econometrics pertinent to this topic and provides a number of illustrations based on cliometric work.

In the final section on government Price Fishback contributes an essay focused on a particular historical episode in which the role of government loomed large and on which he has considerable expertise, that of the 1930s Great Depression in the United States. And Jari Eloranta brings his specialist knowledge to surveying a recurring situation in which governments have been prominent, that of war.  Given the large literatures they each consider, Fishback and Eloranta make the quite sensible choice of providing non-technical narrative overviews suitable for undergraduates and general readers.

Given the varying audiences at which the contributions appear to aim, as well as the range of formats and styles of the contributions, it may be more apt to label this volume a companion to cliometrics or a cliometric sampler than a handbook with the comprehensiveness the latter title might imply. Indeed, as already mentioned above, the editors are more circumspect than Springer’s blurb on its website about the comprehensiveness of coverage.  One can readily come up with a list of topics in which cliometrics has made important contributions that are omitted, including coverage of work on the major economic sectors, income and wealth inequality, and (as noted above) extended treatment of institutional approaches. And as suggested above, I would also have welcomed discussion of quasi-experimental approaches — both opportunities and reservations, in light of how prevalent this has become in recent research.  Nevertheless, given the apparent constraints on length presumably set by the publisher, the choice of topics is quite appropriate.  The editors are to be commended for taking on such a challenging yet important assignment and for recruiting such a strong set of contributors.  The resultant volume contains worthwhile contributions that readers from a range of disciplines and varying degrees of commitment to cliometrics will want to consult.   As more and more historians and sociologists, as well as economists, seem to be venturing into financial history, economic history, and the history of capitalism, it would be interesting to know more about how persuaded they will be about the usefulness of cliometrics by the essays in this volume.

References:

Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, eds. 2005. Handbook of Economic Growth Vols. 1A and 1B, Amsterdam: North-Holland Elsevier.

William Collins, Kris Mitchener, Ran Abramitzky, and Naomi Lamoreaux. 2015. “Essays: The Future of Economic History,” Journal of Economic History, 75, 4: 1228-1257.

Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, editors. 1972. The Reinterpretation of American Economic History, New York: Harper and Row.

Oded Galor and David N. Weil. 2000. “Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond,” American Economic Review, 90, 4: 806-828.

Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz. 2008. The Race between Education and Technology, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

J.M. Keynes. 1922. “Introduction to H.D. Henderson, Supply and Demand,” Cambridge Economic Handbooks – 1, New York: Harcourt and Brace, pp. v-vi.

Marco H.D. van Leeuwen, Ineke Maas and Andrew Miles. 2004. “Creating a Historical International Standard Classification of Occupations: An Exercise in Multinational, Interdisciplinary Cooperation,” Historical Methods, 37, 4: 186-197.

Bart Van de Putte and Andrew Miles. 2005. “A Social Classification Scheme for Historical Occupational Data,” Historical Methods, 38, 2: 61-94.

Leigh Shaw-Taylor and E.A. Wrigley. 2014. “Occupational Structure and Population Change” in Roderick Floud, Jane Humphries, and Paul Johnson, editors, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, New Edition, Vol.1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 53-88.

David Mitch is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. He is the author of “Schooling for All by Financing by Some,” Paedagogica Historica, 52: 4 (August, 2016): 325-348.

Copyright (c) 2016 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (July 2016). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://eh.net/book-reviews/

Subject(s):Development of the Economic History Discipline: Historiography; Sources and Methods
Economic Development, Growth, and Aggregate Productivity
Education and Human Resource Development
Financial Markets, Financial Institutions, and Monetary History
Historical Demography, including Migration
History of Economic Thought; Methodology
History of Technology, including Technological Change
Military and War
Industry: Manufacturing and Construction
International and Domestic Trade and Relations
Labor and Employment History
Living Standards, Anthropometric History, Economic Anthropology
Macroeconomics and Fluctuations
Geographic Area(s):General, International, or Comparative
Time Period(s):General or Comparative

The Engine of Enterprise: Credit in America

Author(s):Olegario, Rowena
Reviewer(s):Wright, Robert E.

Published by EH.Net (February 2016)

Rowena Olegario, The Engine of Enterprise: Credit in America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016. v + 301 pp. $40 (cloth), ISBN: 978-0-674-05114-0.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Robert E. Wright, Thomas Willing Institute, Augustana University.
Rest assured that I did not judge this book by its cover, ugly as the 1940 GMAC advertisement the book designer chose to use appears to my eye. But try as I might, I could not find an appropriate audience for this (perhaps overly) ambitious undertaking after perusing it for several days. There is no preface to help readers to understand the author’s goals or the book’s purpose and the introduction launches directly into the content.

As its title suggests, the thesis of The Engine of Enterprise is that “the United States was built on credit” (p. 1) or, with more nuance, “despite problems with credit that were at times severe, and which Americans have never fully solved, credit has been the invigorating principle that turned potential wealth into national prosperity” (p. 226) (my emphases). The proof comes in the form of five narrative chapters covering the colonial and early national (Chapter 1: “The Foundations of Credit in the New Republic”), antebellum (Chapter 2: “Credit, Enterprise, and Risk in the Antebellum Era”), postbellum (Chapter 3: “Credit in the Reconstructed Nation”), interwar and postwar (Chapter 4: “A Nation of Consumers and Homeowners”), and late twentieth century (Chapter 5: “The Erosion of Credit Standards”) periods, plus a brief postscript (“Creative and Destructive Credit”) on the causes and consequences of the Panic of 2008. The chapters do not follow a cookie cutter format but many cover the same topics, e.g., consumer credit, business credit, bankruptcy, and so forth.

While narrative descriptions of the evolution of different types of credit abound, the book does not show the primal importance of credit in statistically rigorous (e.g., Rousseau and Sylla 2005) or internationally comparative (e.g., Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine 2007) ways, or even cite the finance-led growth literature (see Levine 2005 for a review). Moreover, the finance-led growth hypothesis was tempered by studies (e.g., Martin 2010; Wright 2008) that showed that financial development is just one of a series of growth-inducing economic changes that begin with secure human rights and end with improvements in physical and human capital that drive productivity gains. Because microfinance failed to spur growth in anarchic or dictatorial states, few continue to baldly assert the primacy of finance, let alone just its credit component. Alexander Hamilton had it exactly right when he argued that credit “was among the principal engines of useful enterprise” (p. 4) (my emphasis), i.e., that credit is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of economic growth. It is the fuel injection system, in other words, not the entire engine.

The book is unlikely to appeal to other specialists, either, as it is not based on new or extensive archival research or even novel interpretations of printed primary sources. As a senior research fellow at Said School of Business, author Rowena Olegario lives thousands of miles from scores of archival U.S. bank records that range from underutilized to completely untouched (for a partial list, see New Bedford Whaling Museum 2011), but one would think that Oxford University could afford to pay for the filming of, and/or travel to, at least one set of U.S. banking records. Moreover, although Olegario occasionally alludes to the theory of asymmetric information, the book is largely devoid of pertinent economic theories. So in her narrative, the early economy was “vulnerable to external shocks” (p. 24) due to unregulated banks and banknotes rather than the nation’s solution to the Trilemma or Impossible Trinity, a bimetallic standard demanding free international capital flows and fixed exchange rates in lieu of a central bank with significant monetary policy discretion.

Although The Engine of Enterprise presents more evidence about what people thought than how they behaved, the book is not a compelling “history of thought” either. Olegario, for instance, credits Henry C. Carey with being “the most notable economist of his time” and with anticipating “the new institutional economics by a century and a half” (p. 7). Carey’s life (1793-1879) overlapped those of important American political economists like Edward Atkinson (1827-1905), Alexander Bryan Johnson (1786-1867), and Erasmus Peshine Smith (1814-1882), not to mention numerous European economists of far more probity. Moreover, most of Carey’s ideas merely reiterated the thought of Hamilton and other financial founding fathers and even his own biological father. Olegario herself later (p. 59) admits that Carey was less important than Henry George (1839-1897).

Given its long coverage, from the colonial period to the present, the book might have been designed as a survey text, but for what course and at what level? Graduate students would quickly dismiss The Engine of Enterprise because it does not discuss historiography and glosses over the few debates that it explicitly recognizes without describing the major issues or even mentioning the major contributors. For example, Olegario informs readers that “historians are not in full agreement about how stringently” (p. 28) usury laws were enforced in colonial America but the corresponding note refers only to Geisst (2013). Most other debates are not even hinted at in the notes. For instance, the author blithely asserts that some colonial bills of credit depreciated because they “were insufficiently backed by land or taxes” (p. 21) without mentioning the long debate over “backing theory” (e.g., Michener 2015). Moreover, many endnotes point to a relatively limited set of broad secondary sources, like Wood (1991), Morgan (2000), and Calomiris and Haber (2014), rather than relevant specialized monographs like Kamoie (2007), which details the credit relations of the important Tayloe family in Virginia, or Roney (2014), which describes how NGOs in colonial Philadelphia served as financial intermediaries. Worse, works long since superseded are cited, some with disturbing frequency (e.g., Foulke 1941; Trescott 1963).

I also doubt that anyone teaching a financial history survey would adopt this book as an undergraduate text. The prose, while competent, is pedestrian throughout and hence more likely to bore Millennials than to spur their interest in financial history. Similarly, general readers usually demand ripping yarns like those spun in Kamensky (2008) or Mihm (2009). Lucid sections can of course be found (particularly recommended are the discussions of bankruptcy), but their benefits are outweighed by conceptual flaws and errors of commission and omission. By the latter, I mean missing important supporting data, superior examples, or more telling points. For instance, to make the point that Benjamin Franklin “took for granted that credit was essential to commerce” (p. 2), Olegario adduces mere words, Franklin’s “Advice to a Young Tradesman,” rather than Franklin’s actual actions, most notably his establishment of microfinance institutions in Philadelphia and Boston (Yenawine and Costello 2010). Likewise, the best evidence that the “new banks were meant not just to serve the needs of governments and merchants but also tradesmen, farmers, and manufacturers” (p. 24) is not Pennsylvania’s Omnibus Banking Act of 1814 but studies like Lockard (2000) and Wang (2006) that document actual bank lending patterns, a type of direct evidence that the author suggests does not exist (p. 64).

Olegario has particular difficulty astutely narrating the history of early U.S. finance because she accepts a narrow anthropological literature (e.g., Muldrew 1998) that sees much of the colonial credit system as pre-capitalist, as part of a “moral economy” characterized by “trust” and “barter” (pp. 24-25). But Olegario herself destroys both claims, presumably inadvertently. “Households bartered produce, game, and animal skins to obtain the services of blacksmiths, coopers, and other artisans,” she claims, but then adds that such exchanges were “notated in rough ledgers [sic] using monetary values even though no actual cash changed hands” (p. 24). So such transactions were not barter (trading one good for another without the use of money in any of its forms) at all but rather a form of open account, book credit, or “bookkeeping barter” (Michener 2011). Olegario also subverts the supposed reliance of colonial creditors on “trust” by detailing the widespread use of collateral, co-signers, lawsuits, prison, threats of reputation tarnishing, and other devices designed to induce borrowers to repay their debts. Colonists were certainly more apt to be lax when lending to family and friends, but that does not mean a “noncommercial morality” (p. 25) suffused the economy as family matters stand no differently today.

Other errors abound and many would flummox students and general readers. Olegario claims, for example, that bills of exchange “functioned as currency” (p. 21) by conflating negotiability (via endorsement) and currency (passing from hand to hand without formal assignment). By conflating banknotes with bank loans, she can assert that “entrepreneurial society desired … paper money” (p. 23) when in fact it sought intermediation. Imagine the confusion that would ensue were students to read that retailers “notated the value of purchased goods in a day book or ledger without issuing [sic] formal instruments like notes or bills of exchange” (p. 24). (Borrowers, not lenders, issue debt instruments.) Or that the Bank of the United States (1791-1811) was “rechartered [sic]” (p. 42) to be “in existence … again [sic]” (p. 49) as the Bank of the United States (1816-1836)!

I could continue but won’t for fear of drawing a flag for unscholarly-like conduct. Perhaps some readers will think I deserve a flag already but when the author’s school and publisher are so prestigious I think it incumbent upon reviewers to support negative generalizations with sufficient citations, details, and examples. The dust jacket can be removed if readers don’t like it, but the same can’t be said of the text, so potential readers must be credibly pointed elsewhere, like to the recent works cited below.

References:

Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Ross Levine. 2007. “Finance, Inequality, and Poverty: Cross-Country Evidence.” Journal of Economic Growth (March): 27-49.

Calomiris, Charles and Stephen Haber. 2014. Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Foulke, Ray. 1941. The Sinews of American Commerce. New York: Dun and Bradstreet.

Geisst, Charles. 2013. Beggar Thy Neighbor: A History of Usury and Debt. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Kamensky, Jane. 2008. The Exchange Artist: A Tale of High Flying Speculation and America’s First Banking Collapse. New York: Viking.

Kamoie, Laura Croghan. 2007. Irons in the Fire: The Business History of the Tayloe Family and Virginia’s Gentry, 1700-1860. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

Levine, Ross. 2005. “Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence.” Handbook of Economic Growth, edited by Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.

Lockard, Paul. 2000. “Banks, Insider Lending, and Industries of the Connecticut River Valley of Massachusetts, 1813-1860.” Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Martin, Joe. 2010. Relentless Change: A Casebook for the Study of Canadian Business History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Michener, Ron. 2011. “Money in the American Colonies.” EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. http://eh.net/encyclopedia/money-in-the-american-colonies/

Michener, Ron. 2015. “Redemption Theories and the Value of American Paper Money.” Financial History Review (December): 1-21.

Mihm, Stephen. 2009. A Nation of Counterfeiters: Capitalists, Con Men, and the Making of the United States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Morgan, Kenneth. 2000. Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy, 1660-1800. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Muldrew, Craig. 1998. The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

New Bedford Whaling Museum. 2011. “Records of the Merchants Bank Finding Aid, Appendix C,” MSS 107, New Bedford, Mass. http://www.whalingmuseum.org/explore/library/finding-aids/mss107#idp10883696

Roney, Jessica Choppin. 2014. Governed by a Spirit of Opposition: The Origins of American Political Practice in Colonial Philadelphia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Rousseau, Peter and Richard Sylla. 2005. “Emerging Financial Markets and Early U.S. Growth.” Explorations in Economic History (March): 1-26.

Trescott, Paul. 1963. Financing American Enterprise: The Story of Commercial Banking. New York: Harper and Row.

Wang, Ta-Chen. 2006. “Courts, Banks, and Credit Markets in Early American Development.” Ph.D. Dissertation. Stanford University.

Wood, Gordon. 1991. Radicalism of the American Revolution. New York: Random House.

Wright, Robert. 2008. One Nation under Debt: Hamilton, Jefferson, and the History of What We Owe. New York: McGraw Hill.

Yenawine, Bruce and Michele Costello. 2010. Benjamin Franklin and the Invention of Microfinance. London: Pickering & Chatto.

Robert E. Wright is the Nef Family Chair of Political Economy at Augustana University and the author or co-author of seventeen books, including, with Richard Sylla, Genealogy of American Finance (Columbia University Press, 2015).

Copyright (c) 2016 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (February 2016). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://eh.net/book-reviews/

Subject(s):Financial Markets, Financial Institutions, and Monetary History
Geographic Area(s):North America
Time Period(s):18th Century
19th Century
20th Century: Pre WWII
20th Century: WWII and post-WWII

Project 2000/2001

Project 2000

Each month during 2000, EH.NET published a review essay on a significant work in twentieth-century economic history. The purpose of these essays was to survey the works that have had the most influence on the field of economic history and to highlight the intellectual accomplishments of twentieth-century economic historians. Each review essay outlines the work’s argument and findings, discusses the author’s methods and sources, and examines the impact that the work has had since its publication.

Nominations were received from dozens of EH.Net’s users. P2K
selection committee members were: Stanley Engerman (University of
Rochester), Alan Heston (University of Pennsylvania), Paul
Hohenberg, chair (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute), and Mary
Yeager (University of California-Los Angeles). Project Chair was
Robert Whaples (Wake Forest University).

The review essays are:

Braudel, Fernand
Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century Time
Reviewed by Alan Heston (University of Pennsylvania).

Chandler, Alfred D. Jr.
The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
Reviewed by David S. Landes (Department of Economics and History, Harvard University).

Chaudhuri, K. N.
The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760
Reviewed by Santhi Hejeebu.

Davis, Lance E. and North, Douglass C. (with the assistance of Calla Smorodin)
Institutional Change and American Economic Growth.
Reviewed by Cynthia Taft Morris (Department of Economics, Smith College and American University).

Fogel, Robert W.
Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History
Reviewed by Lance Davis (California Institute of Technology).

Friedman, Milton and Schwartz, Anna Jacobson
A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960
Reviewed by Hugh Rockoff (Rutgers University).

Heckscher, Eli F.
Mercantilism
Reviewed by John J. McCusker (Departments of History and Economics, Trinity University).

Landes, David S.
The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present
Reviewed by Paul M. Hohenberg (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute).

Pinchbeck, Ivy
Women Workers and the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850 
Reviewed by Joyce Burnette (Wabash College).

Polanyi, Karl
The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time
Reviewed by Anne Mayhew (University of Tennessee).

Schumpeter, Joseph A.
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
Reviewed by Thomas K. McCraw (Harvard Business School).

Weber, Max
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
Reviewed by Stanley Engerman.

Project 2001

Throughout 2001 and 2002, EH.Net published a second series
of review essays on important and influential works in economic
history. As with Project 2000, nominations for Project 2001 were
received from many EH.Net users and reviewed by the Selection
Committee: Lee Craig (North Carolina State University); Giovanni
Federico (University of Pisa); Anne McCants (MIT); Marvin McInnis
(Queen’s University); Albrecht Ritschl (University of Zurich);
Winifred Rothenberg (Tufts University); and Richard Salvucci
(Trinity College).

Project 2001 selections were:

Borah, Woodrow Wilson
New Spain’s Century of Depression
Reviewed by Richard Salvucci (Department of Economics, Trinity University).

Boserup, Ester
Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change under Population Pressure
Reviewed by Giovanni Federico (Department of Modern History, University of Pisa).

Deane, Phyllis and W. A. Cole
British Economic Growth, 1688-1959: Trends and Structure
Reviewed by Knick Harley (Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario).

Fogel, Robert and Stanley Engerman
Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery
Reviewed by Thomas Weiss (Department of Economics, University of Kansas).

Gerschenkron, Alexander
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective
Review Essay by Albert Fishlow (International Affairs, Columbia University).

Horwitz, Morton
The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860
Reviewed by Winifred B. Rothenberg (Department of Economics, Tufts University).

Kuznets, Simon
Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread
Reviewed by Richard A. Easterlin (Department of Economics, University of Southern California).

Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel
The Peasants of Languedoc
Reviewed by Anne E.C. McCants (Department of History, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

North, Douglass and Robert Paul Thomas
The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History
Reviewed by Philip R. P. Coelho (Department of Economics, Ball State University).

de Vries, Jan
The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600-1750
Review Essay by George Grantham (Department of Economics, McGill University).

Temin, Peter
The Jacksonian Economy
Reviewed by Richard Sylla (Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University).

Wrigley, E. A. and R. S. Schofield
The Population History of England, 1541-1871: A Reconstruction

Project Coordinator and Editor: Robert Whaples (Wake Forest
University)