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Bankruptcy Law in the United States

Bradley Hansen, Mary Washington College

Since 1996 over a million people a year have filed for bankruptcy in the United States. Most seek a discharge of debts in exchange for having their assets liquidated for the benefit of their creditors. The rest seek the assistance of bankruptcy courts in working out arrangements with their creditors. The law has not always been so kind to insolvent debtors. Throughout most of the nineteenth century there was no bankruptcy law in the United States, and most debtors found it impossible to receive a discharge from their debts. Early in the century debtors could have expected even harsher treatment, such as imprisonment for debt.

Table 1. Chronology of Bankruptcy Law in The United States, 1789-1978

Date

Event

1789

The Constitution empowers Congress to enact uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy.

1800

First bankruptcy law is enacted. The law allows only for involuntary bankruptcy of traders.

1803

First bankruptcy law is repealed amid complaints of excessive expenses and corruption.

1841

Second bankruptcy law is enacted in the wake of the Panics of 1837 and 1839. The law allows both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy.

1843 

1841 Bankruptcy Act is repealed, amid complaints about expenses and corruption.

1867

Prompted by demands arising from financial failures during the Panic of 1857 and the Civil War, Congress enacts the third bankruptcy law.

1874

The 1867 Bankruptcy Act is amended to allow for compositions.

1878

The 1867 Bankruptcy Law is repealed.

1881

The National Convention of Boards of Trade is formed to lobby for bankruptcy legislation.

1889

The National Convention of Representatives of Commercial Bodies is formed to lobby for bankruptcy legislation. The president of the Convention, Jay L. Torrey, drafts a bankruptcy bill.

1898

Congress passes a bankruptcy bill based on the Torrey bill.

1933-34

The 1898 Bankruptcy Act is amended to include railroad reorganization, corporate reorganization, and individual debtor arrangements.

1938

The Chandler Act amends the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, creating a menu of options for both business and non-business debtors.

1978

The 1898 Bankruptcy Act is replaced by The Bankruptcy Reform Act. 

To say that there was no bankruptcy law in the United States for most of the nineteenth century is not to say that there were no laws governing insolvency or the collection of debts. Americans have always relied on credit and have always had laws governing the collection of debts. Debtor-creditor laws and their enforcement are important because they influence the supply and demand for credit. Laws that do not encourage the repayment of debts increase risk for creditors and reduce the supply of credit. On the other hand, laws that are too strict also have costs. Strict laws such as imprisonment for debt can discourage entrepreneurs from experimenting. Many of America's most famous entrepreneurs, such as Henry Ford, failed at least once before making their fortunes.

Over the last two hundred years the United States has shifted from a legal regime that was primarily directed at the strict enforcement of debt contracts to one that provides numerous means to alter the terms of debt contracts. As the economy developed groups of people became convinced that strict enforcement of credit contracts was unfair, inefficient, contrary to the public interest, or simply not in their own self interest. Periodic financial crises in the nineteenth century generated demands for bankruptcy laws to discharge debts. They also led to the introduction of voluntary bankruptcy and the extension of the right to file for bankruptcy to all individuals. The expansion of interstate commerce in the late nineteenth century led to demands for a uniform and efficient bankruptcy law throughout the United States. The rise of railroads gave rise to a demand for corporate reorganization. The expansion of consumer credit in the twentieth century and the rise in consumer bankruptcy cases led to the introduction of arrangements into bankruptcy law, and continue to fuel demands for revision of bankruptcy law today.

Origins of American Bankruptcy Law

Like much of American law, the origins of both state laws for the collection of debt and federal bankruptcy law can be found in England. State laws are, in general, derived from common law procedures for the collection of debt. Under the common law a variety of procedures evolved to aid a creditor in collecting a debt. Generally, the creditor can obtain a judgment from a court for the amount that he is owed and then have a legal official seize some of the debtor's property or wages to satisfy this judgement. In the past a defaulting debtor could also be placed in prison to coerce repayment. Bankruptcy law does not replace other collection laws but does supercede them. Creditors still use procedures such as garnishing a debtor's wages, but if the debtor or another creditor files for bankruptcy such collection efforts are stopped.

Under the U.S. Constitution, adopted 1789, bankruptcy law became a federal law in the United States. There are two clauses of the Constitution that influenced the evolution of bankruptcy law. First, in Article One, Section Eight Congress was empowered to enact uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy. Second, the Contract Clause prohibited states from passing laws that impair the obligation of contracts. Courts have generally interpreted these clauses so as to give wide latitude to the federal government to alter the obligations of debt contracts while restricting state governments. States, however, are not completely barred from altering the terms of contracts. In its 1827 decision on Ogden vs. Saunders the Supreme Court declared that states could pass laws that granted a discharge for debts that were incurred after the law was passed; however, a state discharge can not be binding on creditors who are citizens of other states.

The evolution of bankruptcy law in the United States can be divided into two periods. In the first period, which encompasses most of the nineteenth century, Congress enacted three laws in the wake of financial crises. In each case the law was repealed within a few years amid complaints of high costs and corruption. The second period begins in 1881 when associations of merchants and manufacturers banded together to form a national association to lobby for a federal bankruptcy law. In contrast to previous demands for bankruptcy law, which were prompted largely by crises, late nineteenth century demands for bankruptcy law were for a permanent law suited to the needs of a commercial nation. In 1898 the Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy was enacted and the United States has had a bankruptcy law ever since.

The Temporary Bankruptcy Acts of 1800, 1841 and 1867

Congress first exercised its power to enact uniform laws on bankruptcy in 1800. The debates in the Annals of Congress are brief but suggest that the demand for the law arose from individuals who were in financial distress. The law was modeled after the English bankruptcy law of the time. The law applied only to traders. Creditors could file a bankruptcy petition against a debtor, the debtor's assets would be divided on a pro rata basis among his creditors, and the debtor would receive a discharge. Although debtors could not file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, it was generally believed that many debtors asked a friendly creditor to petition them into the bankruptcy court so that they could obtain a discharge. The law was intended to remain in effect for five years. Complaints that the law was expensive to administer, that it was difficult and costly to travel to federal courts, and that the law provided opportunities for fraud led to its repeal after only two years. Similar complaints were to follow the passage of subsequent bankruptcy laws.

Bankruptcy law largely disappeared from national politics until the Panic of 1839. A few petitions and memorials were sent to Congress in the wake of the Panic of 1819, but no law was passed. The Panic of 1839 and the recession that followed it brought forward a flood of petitions and memorials for bankruptcy legislation. Memorials typically declared that many business people had been brought to ruin by economic conditions that were beyond their control not through any fault of their own. In the wake of the Panic, Whigs made the attack on Democratic economic policies and the passage of bankruptcy relief central parts of their platform. After gaining control of Congress and the Presidency, the Whigs pushed through the 1841 Bankruptcy Act. The law went into effect February 2, 1842.

Like its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was short-lived. The law was repealed March 3, 1843. The rapid about-face on bankruptcy was the result of the collapse of a bargain between Northern and Southern Whigs. Democrats overwhelmingly opposed the passage of the Act and supported its repeal. Southern Whigs also generally opposed a federal bankruptcy law. Northern Whigs appear to have obtained the Southern Whigs votes for passage by agreeing to distribute the proceeds from the sales of federal lands to the states. A majority of Southern Whigs voted for passage but then reversed their votes the next year. Despite its short life, over 41,000 petitions for bankruptcy, most of them voluntary, were filed under the 1841 law.

The primary innovations of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 were the introduction of voluntary bankruptcy and the widening of the scope of occupations that could use the law. With the introduction of voluntary bankruptcy, debtors no longer had to resort to the assistance of a friendly creditor. Unlike the previous law in which only traders could become bankrupts, under the 1841 Act traders, bankers, brokers, factors, underwriters, and marine insurers could be made involuntary bankrupts and any person could apply for voluntary bankruptcy.

After repeal of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, the subject of bankruptcy again disappeared from congressional consideration until the Panic of 1857, when appeals for a bankruptcy law resurfaced. The financial distress caused to Northern merchants by the Civil War further fueled demands for bankruptcy legislation. Though demands for a bankruptcy law persisted throughout the War, considerable opposition also existed to passing a law before the War was over. In the first Congress after the end of the War, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was enacted. The 1867 Act was amended several times and lasted longer than its predecessors. An 1874 amendment added compositions to bankruptcy law for the first time. Under the composition provision a debtor could offer a plan to distribute his assets among his creditors to settle the case. Again, complaints of excessive fees and expenses led to the repeal of the Bankruptcy Act in 1878. Table 2 shows the number of petitions filed under the 1867 law between 1867 and 1872.

Table 2. Bankruptcy Petitions, 1867-1872

Year

Petitions

1867

7,345

1868

29,539

1869

5,921

1870

4,301

1871

5,438

1872

6,074

Source: Expenses of Proceedings in Bankruptcy In United States Courts. Senate Executive Document 19 (43-1) 1580.

During the first three quarters of the nineteenth century the demand for bankruptcy legislation rose with financial panics and fell as they passed. Many people came to believe that the forces that brought people to insolvency were often beyond their control and that to give them a fresh start was not only fair but in the best interest of society. Burdened with debts they had no hope of paying they had no incentive to be productive, creditors would take anything they earned. Freed from these debts they could once again become productive members of society. The spread of the belief that debtors should not be subjected to the harshest elements of debt collection law can also be seen in numerous state laws enacted during the nineteenth century. Homestead and exemption laws declared property that creditors could not take. Stay and moratoria laws were passed during recessions to stall collection efforts. Over the course of the nineteenth century, states also abolished imprisonment for debt.

Demand For A Permanent Bankruptcy Law

The repeal of the 1867 Bankruptcy Act was followed almost immediately by a well-organized movement to obtain a new Bankruptcy law. A national campaign by merchants and manufacturers to obtain bankruptcy legislation began in 1881 when The New York Board of Trade and Transportation organized a National Convention of Boards of Trade.The participants at the Convention endorsed a bankruptcy bill prepared by John Lowell, a judge from Massachusetts. They continued to lobby for the bill throughout the 1880s.

After failing to obtain passage of the Lowell bill, associations of merchants and manufacturers met again in 1889. Under the name of The National Convention of Representatives of Commercial Bodies they held meetings in St. Louis and in Minneapolis. The president of the Convention, a lawyer and businessman named Jay Torrey, drafted a bill that the Convention lobbied for throughout the 1890s. The bill allowed both voluntary and involuntary petitions, though wage earners and farmers could not be made involuntary bankrupts. The bill was primarily directed at liquidation but did include a provision for composition. A composition had to be approved by a majority of creditors in both number and value. In a compromise with states' rights advocates, the bill declared that exemptions would be determined by the states.

The merchants and manufacturers, who organized the conventions, provided credit to their customers whenever they delivered goods in advance of payment. They were troubled by three features of state debtor-creditor laws. First, the details of collection laws varied from state to state, forcing them to learn the laws in all the states in which they wished to sell goods. Second, many state laws discriminated against foreign creditors, that is, creditors who were not citizens of the state. Third, many of the state laws provided for a first-come, first-served distribution of assets rather than a pro rata division. With the first-come, first-served rule, the first creditor to go to court could claim all the assets necessary to pay his debts leaving the last to receive nothing. The first-come, first-served rule of collection tended to create incentives for creditors to race to be the first to file a claim. The effect of this rule was described by Jay Torrey: "If a creditor suspects his debtor is in financial trouble, he usually commences an attachment suit, and as a result the debtor is thrown into liquidation irrespective of whether he is solvent or insolvent. This course is ordinarily imperative because if he does not pursue that course some other creditor will." Thus the law could actually precipitate business failures. As interstate commerce expanded in the late nineteenth century more merchants and manufacturers experienced these three problems

Merchants and manufacturers also found it easier to form a national organization in the late nineteenth century because of the growth of trade associations, boards of trade, chambers of commerce and other commercial organizations. By forming a national organization composed of businessmen's associations from all over the country, merchants and manufacturers were able to act in unison in drafting a bankruptcy bill and lobbying for a bankruptcy bill. The bill they drafted not only provided uniformity and a pro rata distribution, but was designed to prevent the excessive fees and expenses that had been a major complaint against previous bankruptcy laws.

As early as 1884, the Republican Party supported the bankruptcy bills put forward by the merchants and manufacturers. A majority in both the Republican and Democratic parties supported bankruptcy legislation during the late nineteenth century. It took nearly twenty years to enact bankruptcy legislation because they supported different versions of bankruptcy law. The Democratic Party supported bills that were purely voluntary (creditors could not initiate proceedings) and temporary (the law would only remain in effect for a few years). The requirement that the law be temporary was crucial to Democrats because a vote for a permanent bankruptcy law would have been a vote for the expansion of federal power and against states' rights, a central component of Democratic policy. Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, votes on bankruptcy split strictly along party lines. The majority of Republicans preferred the status quo to the Democrats bills and the majority of Democrats preferred the status quo to the Republican bills. Because control of Congress was split between the two parties for most of the last quarter of the nineteenth century neither side could force through their version of bankruptcy law. This period of divided government ended with the 55th Congress, in which the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was passed.

Railroad Receivership and the Origins of Corporate Reorganization

The 1898 Bankruptcy Act was designed to aid creditors in liquidation of an insolvent debtor's assets, but one of the important features of current bankruptcy law is the provision for reorganization of insolvent corporations. To find the origins of corporate reorganization one has to look outside the early evolution of bankruptcy law and look instead at the evolution of receiverships for insolvent railroads. A receiver is an individual appointed by a court to take control of some property, but courts in the nineteenth century developed this tool as a means to reorganize troubled railroads. The first reorganization through receivership occurred in 1846, when a Georgia court appointed a receiver over the insolvent Munroe Railway Co. and successfully reorganized it as the Macon and Western Railway. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century the number of receiverships increased dramatically; see Table 3. In theory, courts were supposed to appoint an indifferent party as receiver, and the receiver was merely to conserve the railroad while the best means to liquidate it was ascertained. In fact, judges routinely appointed the president, vice-president or other officers of the insolvent railway and assigned them the task of getting the railroad back on its feet. The object of the receivership was typically a sale of the railroad as a whole. But the sale was at least partly a fiction. The sole bidder was usually a committee of the bondholders using their bonds as payment. Thus the receivership involved a financial reorganization of the firm in which the bond and stock holders of the railroad traded in their old securities for new ones. The task of the reorganizers was to find a plan acceptable to the bondholders. For example, in the Wabash receivership of 1886, first mortgage bondholders ultimately agreed to exchange their 7 percent bonds for new ones of 5 percent. The sale resulted in the creation of a new railroad with the assets of the old. Often the transformation was simply a matter of changing "Railway" to "Railroad" in the name of the corporation. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries judges denied other corporations the right to reorganize through receivership. They emphasized that railroads were special because of their importance to the public.

Unlike the credit supplied by merchants and manufacturers, much of the debt of railroads was secured. For example, bondholders might have a mortgage that said they could claim a specific line of track if the railroad failed to make its bond payments. If a railroad became insolvent different groups of bondholders might claim different parts of the railroad. Such piecemeal liquidation of a business presented two problems in the case of railroads. First, many people believed that piecemeal liquidation would destroy much of the value of the assets. In his 1859 Treatise on the Law of Railways, Isaac Redfield explained that, "The railway, like a complicated machine, consists of a great number of parts, the combined action of which is necessary to produce revenue." Second, railroads were regarded as quasi-public corporations. They were given subsidies and special privileges. Their charters often stated that their corporate status had been granted in exchange for service to the public. Courts were reluctant to treat railroads like other enterprises when they became insolvent and instead used receivership proceedings to make sure that the railroad continued to operate while its finances were reorganized.

Table 3. Railroad Receiverships, 1870-1897

Percentage of

Receiverships

Mileage in

Mileage put in 

Year

Established

Receivership

Receivership

1870

3

531

1

1871

4

644

1.07

1872

4

535

0.81

1873

10

1,357

1.93

1874

33

4,414

6.1

1875

43

7,340

9.91

1876

25

4,714

6.14

1877

33

3,090

3.91

1878

27

2,371

2.9

1879

12

1,102

1.27

1880

13

940

1.01

1881

5

110

0.11

1882

13

912

0.79

1883

12

2,041

1.68

1884

40

8,731

6.96

1885

44

7,523

5.86

1886

12

1,602

1.17

1887

10

1,114

0.74

1888

22

3,205

2.05

1889

24

3,784

2.35

1890

20

2,460

1.48

1891

29

2,017

1.18

1892

40

4,313

2.46

1893

132

27,570

15.51

1894

50

4,139

2.31

1895

32

3,227

1.78

1896

39

3,715

2.03

1897

21

1,536

0.83

Source: Swain, H. H. "Economic Aspects of Railroad Receivership." Economic Studies 3, (1898): 53-161.

Depression Era Bankruptcy Reforms

Reorganization and bankruptcy were brought together by the amendments to the 1898 Bankruptcy Act during the Great Depression. By the late 1920s, a number of problems had become apparent with both the bankruptcy law and receivership. Table 4 shows the number of bankruptcy petitions filed each year since the law was enacted. The use of consumer credit expanded rapidly in the 1920s and so did wage earner bankruptcy cases. As Table 5 shows, voluntary bankruptcy by wage earners became an increasingly large proportion of bankruptcy petitions. Unlike mercantile bankruptcy cases, in many wage earner cases there were no assets. Expecting no return, many creditors paid little attention to bankruptcy cases and corruption spread in the bankruptcy courts. An investigation into bankruptcy in the southern district of New York recorded numerous abuses and led to the disbarment of of more than a dozen lawyers. In the wake of the investigation President Hoover appointed Thomas Thacher to investigate bankruptcy procedure in the United States. The Thacher Report recommended that an administrative staff be created to oversee bankruptcies. The bankruptcy administrators would be empowered to investigate bankrupts and reject requests for discharge. The report also suggested that many debtors could pay their debts if given an opportunity to work out an arrangement with their creditors. It suggested that procedures for the adjustment or extension of debts be added to the law. Corporate lawyers also identified three problems with the corporate receiverships. First, it was necessary to obtain an ancillary receivership in each federal district in which the corporation had assets. Second, some creditors might try to withhold their approval of a reorganization plan in exchange for a better deal for themselves. Third, judges were unwilling to apply reorganization through receivership to corporations other than railroads. Consequently, the Thacher report suggested that procedures for corporate reorganization also be incorporated into bankruptcy law.

Table 4. Bankruptcy Petitions Filed, 1899-1997


Petitions per
Percentage 
Year 
Voluntary 
Involuntary
Total
10,000 Population
Involuntary
1899
20,994
1,452
22,446
3.00
6.47
1900
20,128
1,810
21,938
2.88
8.25
1901
17,015
1,992
19,007
2.45
10.48
1902
16,374
2,108
18,482
2.33
11.41
1903
14,308
2,567
16,875
2.09
15.21
1904
13,784
3,298
17,082
2.08
19.31
1905
13,852
3,094
16,946
2.02
18.26
1906
10,526
2,446
12,972
1.52
18.86
1907
11,127
3,033
14,160
1.63
21.42
1908
13,109
4,709
17,818
2.01
26.43
1909
13,638
4,380
18,018
1.99
24.31
1910
14,059
3,994
18,053
1.95
22.12
1911
14,907
4,431
19,338
2.06
22.91
1912
15,313
4,432
19,745
2.07
22.45
1913
16,361
4,569
20,930
2.15
21.83
1914
17,924
5,035
22,959
2.32
21.93
1915
21,979
5,653
27,632
2.75
20.46
1916
23,027
4,341
27,368
2.68
15.86
1917
21,161
3,677
24,838
2.41
14.80
1918
17,261
3,124
20,385
1.98
15.32
1919
12,035
2,013
14,048
1.34
14.33
1920
11,333
2,225
13,558
1.27
16.41
1921
16,645
6,167
22,812
2.10
27.03
1922
28,879
9,286
38,165
3.47
24.33
1923
33,922
7,832
41,754
3.73
18.76
1924
36,977
6,542
43,519
3.81
15.03
1925
39,328
6,313
45,641
3.94
13.83
1926
40,962
5,412
46,374
3.95
11.67
1927
43,070
5,688
48,758
4.10
11.67
1928
47,136
5,928
53,064
4.40
11.17
1929
51,930
5,350
57,280
4.70
9.34
1930
57,299
5,546
62,845
5.11
8.82
1931
58,780
6,555
65,335
5.27
10.03
1932
62,475
7,574
70,049
5.61
10.81
1933
56,049
6,207
62,256
4.96
9.97
1934
58,888
4.66
1935
69,153
5.43
1936
60,624
4.73
1937
55,842
1,643
57,485
4.46
2.86
1938
55,137
2,169
57,306
4.41
3.78
1939
48,865
2,132
50,997
3.90
4.18
1940
43,902
1,752
45,654
3.46
3.84
1941
47,581
1,491
49,072
3.69
3.04
1942
44,366
1,295
45,661
3.41
2.84
1943
30,913
649
31,562
2.35
2.06
1944
17,629
277
17,906
1.35
1.55
1945
11,101
264
11,365
0.86
2.38
1946
8,293
268
8,561
0.61
3.13
1947
9,657
697
10,354
0.72
6.73
1948
13,546
1,029
14,575
1.00
7.06
1949
18,882
1,240
20,122
1.35
6.16
1950
25,263
1,369
26,632
1.76
5.14
1951
26,594
1,099
27,693
1.81
3.97
1952
25,890
1,059
26,949
1.73
3.93
1953
29,815
1,064
30,879
1.95
3.45
1954
41,335
1,398
42,733
2.65
3.27
1955
47,650
1,249
48,899
2.98
2.55
1956
50,655
1,240
51,895
3.10
2.39
1957
60,335
1,189
61,524
3.61
1.93
1958
76,048
1,413
77,461
4.47
1.82
1959
85,502
1,288
86,790
4.90
1.48
1960
94,414
1,296
95,710
5.43
1.35
1961
124,386
1,444
125,830
6.99
1.15
1962
122,499
1,382
123,881
6.77
1.12
1963
128,405
1,409
129,814
6.99
1.09
1964
141,828
1,339
143,167
7.60
0.94
1965
149,820
1,317
151,137
7.91
0.87
1966
161,840
1,165
163,005
8.42
0.72
1967
173,884
1,241
175,125
8.95
0.71
1968
164,592
1,001
165,593
8.39
0.60
1969
154,054
946
155,000
7.77
0.61
1970
161,366
1,085
162,451
8.07
0.67
1971
167,149
1,215
168,364
8.26
0.72
1972
152,840
1,094
153,934
7.33
0.71
1973
144,929
985
145,914
6.89
0.68
1974
156,958
1,009
157,967
7.39
0.64
1975
208,064
1,266
209,330
9.69
0.60
1976
207,926
1,141
209,067
9.59
0.55
1977
180,062
1,132
181,194
8.23
0.62
1978
167,776
995
168,771
7.58
0.59
1979
182,344
915
183,259
8.14
0.50
1980
359,768
1,184
360,952
15.85
0.33
1981
358,997
1,332
360,329
15.67
0.37
1982
366,331
1,535
367,866
15.84
0.42
1983
373,064
1,670
374,734
15.99
0.45
1984
342,848
1,447
344,295
14.57
0.42
1985
362,939
1,597
364,536
15.29
0.44
1986
476,214
1,642
477,856
19.86
0.34
1987
559,658
1,620
561,278
23.12
0.29
1988
593,158
1,409
594,567
24.27
0.24
1989
641,528
1,465
642,993
25.71
0.23
1990
723,886
1,598
725,484
29.03
0.22
1991
878,626
1,773
880,399
34.85
0.20
1992
971,047
1,443
972,490
38.08
0.15
1993
917,350
1,384
918,734
35.60
0.15
1994
844,087
1,170
845,257
32.43
0.14
1995
856,991
1,113
858,104
32.62
0.13
1996
1,040,915
1,195
1,042,110
39.26
0.11
1997
1,315,782
1,217
1,316,999
49.16
0.09
Sources: 1899-1938 Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States; 1939-1997; and Statistical Abstract of the United States. Various years. The Report of the Attorney General did not provide the numbers voluntary and involuntary from 1934-36.

Table 5. Wage Earner Bankruptcy and No Asset Cases, 1899-1933
 


Percentage of Cases
Year 
Wage Earners
With No Assets
1899
5,288
51.12
1900
7,516
40.52
1901
7,068
48.99
1902
6,859
47.25
1903
4,852
41.36
1904
5,291
40.55
1905
5,426
40.75
1906
2,748
42.29
1907
3,257
42.11
1908
3,492
40.29
1909
3,528
38.46
1910
4,366
36.49
1911
4,139
48.14
1912
4,161
50.70
1913
4,863
49.63
1914
5,773
49.96
1915
6,632
49.88
1916
6,418
53.29
1917
7,787
57.12
1918
8,230
57.05
1919
6,743
64.53
1920
5,601
67.41
1921
5,897
65.66
1922
7,550
52.70
1923
10,173
61.10
1924
13,126
62.17
1925
14,444
61.23
1926
16,770
64.02
1927
18,494
64.86
1928
21,510
63.19
1929
25,478
67.34
1930
28,979
68.44
1931
29,698
69.15
1932
29,742
66.25
1933
27,385
62.76

Sources: 1899-1938 Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States; 1939-1997; and Statistical Abstract of the United States. Various years. The Report of the Attorney General did not provide the numbers voluntary and involuntary from 1934-36.

In 1933, Congress enacted amendments that allowed farmers and wage earners to seek arrangements. Arrangements offered more flexibility than compositions. Debtors could offer to pay all or part of their debts over a longer period of time. Congress also added section 77, which provided for railroad reorganization. Section 77 solved two of the problems that had plagued corporate reorganization. Bankruptcy courts had jurisdiction of the assets throughout the country so that ancillary receiverships were not needed. The amendment also alleviated the holdout problem by making 2/3 votes of a class of creditors binding on all the members of the class. In 1934, Congress extended reorganization to non-railroad corporations as well. The Thacher Report's recommendations for a bankruptcy administrator were not enacted, largely because of opposition from bankruptcy lawyers. The 1898 Bankruptcy Act had created a well-organized group with a vested interest in the evolution of the law--bankruptcy lawyers.

Although the 1933-34 reforms were ones that bankruptcy lawyers and judges had wanted, many of them believed that the law could be further improved. In 1932, The Commercial Law League, the American Bar Association, the National Association of Credit Management and the National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy joined together to form the National Bankruptcy Conference. The culmination of their efforts was the Chandler Act of 1938. The Chandler Act created a menu of options for both individual and corporate debtors. Debtors could choose traditional liquidation. They could seek an arrangement with their creditors through Chapter 10 of the Act. They could attempt to obtain an extension through Chapter 12. A corporation could seek an arrangement through Chapter 11 or reorganization through Chapter 10. Chapter 11 only allowed corporations to alter their unsecured debt, whereas Chapter 10 allowed reorganization of both secured and unsecured debt. However, corporations tended to prefer Chapter 11 because Chapter 10 required Securities and Exchange Commission review for all publicly traded firms with more than $250,000 in liabilities.

By 1938 modern American bankruptcy law had obtained its central features. The law dealt with all types of individuals and businesses. It allowed both voluntary and involuntary petitions. It enabled debtors to choose liquidation and a discharge, or to choose some type of readjustment of their debts. By 1939, the vast majority of bankruptcy cases were, as they are now, voluntary consumer bankruptcy cases. After 1939 involuntary bankruptcy cases never again rose above 2,000. (See Table 4). The decline of involuntary bankruptcy cases appears to have been associated with the decline in business failures. According to Dun and Bradstreet, the number of failures per 10,000 listed concerns averaged 100 per year from 1870 to 1933. From 1934-1988 the failure rate averaged 50 per 10,000 concerns. The failure rate did not rise above 70 per 10,000 listed concerns again until the 1980s. Also, the number of failures, which had averaged over 20,000 a year in the 1920s did not reach 20,000 a year again until the 1980s. The mercantile failures which had so troubled late nineteenth century merchants and manufacturers were much less of a problem after the Great Depression.

Table 6. Business Failures, 1870-1997

Failures per

Year

Failures 

10,000 Firms

1870

3,546

83

1871

2,915

64

1872

4,069

81

1873

5,183

105

1874

5,830

104

1875

7,740

128

1876

9,092

142

1877

8,872

139

1878

10,478

158

1879

6,658

95

1880

4,735

63

1881

5,582

71

1882

6,738

82

1883

9,184

106

1884

10,968

121

1885

10,637

116

1886

9,834

101

1887

9,634

97

1888

10,679

103

1889

10,882

103

1890

10,907

99

1891

12,273

107

1892

10,344

89

1893

15,242

130

1894

13,885

123

1895

13,197

112

1896

15,088

133

1897

13,351

125

1898

12,186

111

1899

9,337

82

1900

10,774

92

1901

11,002

90

1902

11,615

93

1903

12,069

94

1904

12,199

92

1905

11,520

85

1906

10,682

77

1907

11,725

83

1908

15,690

108

1909

12,924

87

1910

12,652

84

1911

13,441

88

1912

15,452

100

1913

16,037

98

1914

18,280

118

1915

22,156

133

1916

16,993

100

1917

13,855

80

1918

9,982

59

1919

6,451

37

1920

8,881

48

1921

19,652

102

1922

23,676

120

1923

18,718

93

1924

20,615

100

1925

21,214

100

1926

21,773

101

1927

23,146

106

1928

23,842

109

1929

22,909

104

1930

26,355

122

1931

28,285

133

1932

31,822

154

1933

19,859

100

1934

12,091

61

1935

12,244

62

1936

9,607

48

1937

9,490

46

1938

12,836

61

1939

14,768

70

1940

13,619

63

1941

11,848

55

1942

9,405

45

1943

3,221

16

1944

1,222

7

1945

809

4

1946

1,129

5

1947

3,474

14

1948

5,250

20

1949

9,246

34

1950

9,162

34

1951

8,058

31

1952

7,611

29

1953

8,862

33

1954

11,086

42

1955

10,969

42

1956

12,686

48

1957

13,739

52

1958

14,964

56

1959

14,053

52

1960

15,445

57

1961

17,075

64

1962

15,782

61

1963

14,374

56

1964

13,501

53

1965

13,514

53

1966

13,061

52

1967

12,364

49

1968

9,636

39

1969

9,154

37

1970

10,748

44

1971

10,326

42

1972

9,566

38

1973

9,345

36

1974

9,915

38

1975

11,432

43

1976

9,628

35

1977

7,919

28

1978

6,619

24

1979

7,564

28

1980

11,742

42

1981

16,794

61

1982

24,908

88

1983

31,334

110

1984

52,078

107

1985

57,078

115

1986

61,616

120

1987

61,111

102

1988

57,098

98

1989

50,631

65

1990

60,747

74

1991

88,140

107

1992

97,069

110

1993

86,133

96

1994

71,558

86

1995

71,128

82

1996

71,931

86

1997

84,342

89

Source: United States. Historical Statistics of the United States: Bicentennial Edition. 1975; and United States. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington D.C.: GPO. Various years.

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

In contrast to the decline in business failures, personal bankruptcy climbed steadily. Prompted by a rise in personal bankruptcy in the 1960s, Congress initiated an investigation of bankruptcy law that culminated in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which replaced the much amended 1898 Bankruptcy Act. The Bankruptcy Reform Act, also known as the Bankruptcy Code or just "the Code", maintains the menu of options for debtors embodied in the Chandler Act. It provides Chapter 7 liquidation for businesses and individuals, Chapter 11 reorganization, Chapter 13 adjustment of debts for individuals with regular income, and Chapter 12 readjustment for farmers. In 1991, seventy-one percent of all cases were Chapter 7 and twenty-seven percent were Chapter 13. Many of the changes introduced by the Code made bankruptcy, especially Chapter 13, more attractive to debtors. The number of bankruptcy petitions did climb rapidly after the law was enacted. Lobbying by creditor groups and a Supreme Court decision that ruled certain administrative parts of the Act unconstitutional led to the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. The 1984 amendments attempted to roll back some of the pro-debtor provisions of the Code. Because bankruptcy filings continued their rapid ascent after the 1984, recent studies have tended to look toward changes in other factors, such as consumer finance, to explain the explosion in bankruptcy cases.

Bankruptcy law continues to evolve. To understand the evolution of bankruptcy law is to understand why groups of people came to believe that existing debt collection law was inadequate and to see how those people were able to use courts and legislatures to change the law. In the early nineteenth century demands were largely driven by victims of financial crises. In the late nineteenth century, merchants and manufacturers demanded a law that would facilitate interstate commerce. Unlike its predecessors, the 1898 Bankruptcy Act was not repealed after a few years and over time it gave rise to a group with a vested interest in bankruptcy law, bankruptcy lawyers. Bankruptcy lawyers have played a prominent role in drafting and lobbying for bankruptcy reform since the 1930s. Credit card companies and customers may be expected to play a significant role in changing bankruptcy law in the future.

References

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Citation: Hansen, Bradley. "Bankruptcy Law in the United States". EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. August 14, 2001. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/hansen.bankruptcy.law.us