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DYNASTIES: THE CASE OF FRANCE'S
1940 ENABLING ACT**

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ECONOMIC HISTORY



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JEL Classification: D72, H89, N44

Keywords: Autocratic reversals, democratic dynasties, voting behavior, World War II

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A Positive Effect of Political Dynasties: the Case of France's 1940 Enabling Act*

Jean Lacroix^a, Pierre-Guillaume Méon^a, Kim Oosterlinck^{a,b}

Abstract

The literature on political dynasties in democracies usually considers them as a homogenous group and points out their negative effects. By contrast, we argue that they may differ according to their origin and that democratic dynasties — those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals — show stronger support for democracy. This claim is backed by an analysis of the vote by the French parliament on July 10, 1940, of an enabling act granting full power to Marshal Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third Republic. Using newly collected data from the biographies of the members of the then parliament, we observe that members of a democratic dynasty were more likely, by a margin of between 7.6 and 9.0 percentage points, to oppose the act than were members of other political dynasties or elected representatives belonging to no political dynasty. We report suggestive evidence showing that the effect of democratic dynasties was possibly driven by internalized democratic norms and beliefs.

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1. Introduction

Dynastic politicians, defined specifically as politicians who are related by blood to other individuals formerly holding political office (Dal Bó et al., 2009, Geys and Smith, 2017), have long been suspected of undermining the representative nature of democracies (Pareto, 1901, Michels, 1911). On average they are less educated (Geys, 2017), conduct poorer public policies (Braganca et al., 2015) and put less effort into politics (Rossi, 2017, Geys and Smith, 2017). Those results are obtained by grouping all dynastic politicians together. But should political dynasties be considered, always and everywhere, as a monolithic group? In other words, are there grounds for expecting members of different types of dynasties to act in different ways?

We argue that politicians belonging to a “democratic dynasty” should be distinguished from their non-democratic peers and that they are more likely to stand-up for democracy, should the necessity arise. We define democratic dynastic politicians on the basis of two criteria. First, he or she must belong to a dynasty and should therefore be related to other individuals formerly holding political office. Second, the dynasty has to qualify as democratic. We consider a dynasty as democratic if its founder showed explicit support for democracy. Accordingly, the founders of democratic dynasties must have opposed former autocratic regimes, supported the democratic regime in which they started their political career, or both.

The conjecture that politicians belonging to a democratic dynasty are more likely than their non-dynastic peers to stand up for democracy, rests on a series of non-mutually exclusive reasons. Firstly, democratic political dynasties have a vested interest in democracy, because they survive thanks to the transmission of an electoral advantage (Camp, 1982, Dal Bó et al., 2009, Fiva and Smith, 2018). That advantage is specific to democracy and would be lost following an autocratic reversal. Secondly, democratic dynasties may cultivate and transmit a democratic culture in line with the literature on the transmission of values within families (Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Jennings et al., 2009). Thirdly, democratic dynastic politicians evolve in a pro-democracy environment that may shape their preferences and serve as a commitment device (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2009, Olson, 1993, Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2017).

To study how dynastic politicians behave when democracy is threatened, we analyze the enabling act giving full powers to Marshal Pétain in France on July 10, 1940. On that day, the majority of the members of the French parliament voted to surrender their powers to a

dictator. In addition to being an instance of a decision by a democratic parliament to end democracy, the vote has four key features that allow us to study the role of dynasties.

First, we know the vote of each single parliamentarian. Indeed, the *Journal officiel de la République Française* reported at the time the vote cast by each individual parliamentarian. We are therefore able to match each member's vote with their individual characteristics by using their official biography, collated in the *Dictionnaire des députés et sénateurs français (1889-1940)*.¹

Second, the vote took place at a time when the Third Republic was seventy years old. Democratic dynasties therefore had had time to appear. Using the *Dictionnaire des députés et sénateurs français (1889-1940)*, we can determine whether the father, grandfather, uncle or brother of a parliamentarian was an elected politician. Moreover, we can observe whether the forebears of that parliamentarian supported democracy. We can therefore determine whether a parliamentarian belonged to a dynasty and whether that dynasty was democratic, and we can compare the votes of parliamentarians, whether they are dynastic, non-dynastic, democratic or non-democratic.

Third, despite taking place in the wake of a military defeat, the vote was far from purely formal. Indeed, neither the defeat nor the armistice signed with Germany on June 22, 1940 implied a regime change (Paxton, 1972). France could have appointed a caretaker government to run the country, just as Belgium and the Netherlands did. Moreover, the parliamentarians knew the enabling act meant the end of the Third Republic and the advent of an autocratic regime (Odin, 1946, Ermakoff, 2008). The idea that the new regime would lead to a radical change in institutions was common knowledge, as, in early July 1940, newspapers referred to it as a permanent solution with long-term consequences.² Contemporary witnesses also stressed the emotional burden prompted by the vote (Ermakoff, 2008). Some parliamentarians who had supported the act left the chamber in tears. That is again hard to reconcile with the idea that the vote was a mere formality. Finally, the new regime implemented the “révolution nationale” (national revolution), a radical conservative reform package based on Catholicism, political centralization, large capitalist corporations, coercion, and the persecution of freemasons and Jews.

¹ We use the masculine when referring to parliamentarians in this paper, because all the members of the French parliament were male at the time of the vote on the enabling act.

² July 8, 1940, the newspaper “Le Matin” stated “It [i.e. the enabling act] will be an actual revolution in French history”. July 9, 1940, the newspaper “Le Petit Parisien” stated “what existed yesterday should not exist tomorrow”. July 10, 1940, the newspaper “Le Temps” mentioned the delegation of power as a way to “provide our country with a new soul” and the newspaper “La Croix” mentioned a “new order”.

Fourth, as the vote took place in chaotic circumstances, political parties had little control over the votes of individual parliamentarians, who were all isolated from their traditional networks. Coordination along party lines and access to networks outside the parliament were difficult. Under these extreme circumstances, the decision by parliamentarians to support or oppose the enabling act was largely an individual decision, independent of party lines.

The vote took place in Vichy, a spa and resort town where the government had retreated. Despite the practical difficulty of joining Vichy, the perceived risk of standing out, and the emotional burden involved, 80 parliamentarians opposed the act, equivalent to 12 percent of those taking part in the vote. It is precisely because the result was not unanimous that we can investigate the determinants of individual parliamentarians' votes and gauge the effect of being a dynastic politician.

We observe that members of democratic dynasties had a 7.6 to 9.0 point higher probability of opposing the enabling act than other parliamentarians. Robustness checks show that these results are not attributable to parliamentarians' ability to join the vote or to the way we treat abstention. Further propensity score estimates also prove that the baseline results hold after rebalancing our sample on observables, suggesting that the effect we observe is causal. Additional evidence suggests that the observed difference was driven by the exposure of democratic dynastic politicians to a pro-democracy environment fostering the cultural transmission of democratic values from democrat fathers to sons. However, this is not necessarily the only explanation.

By investigating the behavior of dynastic politicians in the vote on the 1940 enabling act, our paper contributes to four strands of literature. First and foremost, it shows that political dynasties should not be viewed as homogenous. As a result, our paper adds an additional dimension to the emerging literature on these dynasties (Dal Bó et al., 2009, Geys, 2017). Our historical analysis provides evidence that political dynasties that endorsed the democratic ideal from the outset behaved differently from those that did not. Furthermore, while the literature has so far insisted on the negative consequences of dynasties, this paper reports that some of them may have a positive effect by helping to consolidate democracy. Second, our paper contributes to the general literature on autocratic reversals (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, Svobik, 2008, 2015) and on the decision by democratic parliaments to pave the way for an autocratic regime (Ermakoff, 2008), by showing that democratic dynasties may contribute to stabilizing democracy. Third, our paper suggests a dimension of democratic consolidations (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, Svobik, 2008, 2015), at least in the long term. Because democratic dynasties take time to emerge, and democratic dynastic politicians may be more

likely to stand up for democracy, they could be a dimension of what Persson and Tabellini (2009) refer to as “democratic capital”. When a democratic regime has just been established, democratic dynasties simply cannot exist. As time goes by, the children of elected officials can eventually start a political career, thereby spawning a dynasty. Finally, because French parliamentarians were subject to pressures at the time of the enabling act (Calef, 1988), our paper indirectly contributes to the literature on behavior under extreme conditions (Frey et al., 2011).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 argues that democratic dynastic politicians are more likely than their peers to defend democracy; it also emphasizes key mechanisms. Section 3 depicts the political and institutional context in France in 1940. Section 4 describes our data and method. Section 5 reports the baseline results, whereas Section 6 provides robustness checks. Section 7 offers suggestive evidence on the transmission channels of democratic dynasties to parliamentarians’ votes. Section 8 concludes.

2. Democratic dynasties and the defense of democracy

In this section, we elaborate on the three mechanisms making democratic dynastic politicians more likely to defend democracy. First, they have a vested interest in the survival of democracy. Second, they may have internalized democratic norms more extensively than their peers. Third, they evolve in the democratic environment of their forebears, reinforcing the second transmission channel.

2.1 A vested interest in democracy

Democratic dynastic politicians have a direct stake in the survival of democracy, because the benefits of belonging to a democratic dynasty materialize only in that regime. Dal Bó et al. (2009) document the electoral advantage of dynasties by showing that the probability of a US congressperson having a relative entering Congress in the future increases with the time this member has spent in the legislature. They estimate that having served more than one term doubles the probability that a congressperson will have a relative entering Congress. Dal Bó et al. (2009) attribute the electoral advantage of dynastic politicians to the fact that they inherit the recognition or contacts of their predecessors. Querubin (2016) reports similar

results for the Philippines and Rossi (2017) for Argentina.³ Cruz et al. (2017) provide evidence that the social networks of the families of candidates for public office facilitate clientelism. Dynastic politicians also benefit from not needing to invest in as much human capital as other politicians in order to be elected (Daniele and Geys, 2014, Geys, 2017); they therefore put less effort into politics (Rossi, 2017).

The advantage of democratic dynasties may moreover be economic as well as political. Amore et al. (2015) observe that the offspring of Danish mayors have higher incomes when their parents run a larger municipality. By the same token, Gagliarducci and Manacorda (2016), Fafchamps and Labonne (2017), and Folke et al. (2017) observe that relatives of politicians have higher incomes, respectively in Italy, the Philippines, and Sweden.

To be sure, those advantages also benefit non-democratic dynasties. However, their members are able to leverage other resources, such as social networks or titles that are not conditional on the regime remaining democratic. By contrast, the benefits of belonging to a democratic dynasty depend on the regime remaining democratic. Consequently, democratic dynastic politicians have a stake in preventing autocratic reversals. They are therefore more likely than their non-dynastic or non-democratic peers to stand against an autocratic reversal, simply out of self-interest.

2.2 A stronger preference for democracy

Democratic dynasties likely nurture a culture that fosters the preference of their offspring for democracy. The transmission of political attitudes from parents to children is particularly strong in politicized families (Jennings, 1968, and Jennings et al. 2009). Parents' party identification is also a strong predictor of their children's identification (Aidt and Rauh, 2018). This assertion is in line with Bisin and Verdier's (2001) model of cultural transmission, which assumes that parents invest in transmitting to their offspring those norms that they consider beneficial. As a result, politicians who have embraced the democratic ideal or participated in establishing a democracy are likely to transmit democratic values to their children. In a situation where defending democracy may be costly, politicians will weigh the cost of defending that system against their intrinsic preference for it. Because democratic

³ The result is however not universal (Van Coppenolle, 2017, Fiva and Smith, 2018). Fiva and Smith (2018) argue that the advantage is likely stronger in candidate- than in party-centered systems. As we will underline in the next section, parties were weak in 1940 France. The dynastic advantage was therefore likely strong.

dynastic politicians have a stronger intrinsic preference for democracy, inherited from their families, they will be more likely to oppose an autocratic reversal.

A dynasty's democratic culture may affect not only the values of its members but also their beliefs in the benefits of democracy. If a dynasty of politicians has been able to emerge in a democracy, its members will be more likely to consider the regime as beneficial. Their assessment of the relevance of the regime will be improved by their forebears' experiences with democracy. This intuition echoes Piketty's (1995) model of dynastic learning. In that model, agents infer from their family history the relative role of luck and effort on economic success. If they observe upward mobility, they will upgrade the role of effort versus luck and be less supportive of redistribution. Conversely, if their family history displays downward mobility, they will downgrade the role of effort and be more supportive of redistribution. The same logic may apply to belief in the benefits of democracy. Members of democratic dynasties can observe the benefits of democracy over several generations and should therefore believe more strongly that it is beneficial. This would not only prompt them to value that regime more fully, but also to be less permeable to arguments blaming it in order to motivate a return to autocracy. The reverse would hold for non-democratic dynasties, thus exacerbating the difference between the two forms of dynasty.

In addition, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2009) argue that the congruence between the attitudes of offspring and those of their forebears may be driven by an incentive to conform to the behavior of their peers. Accordingly, democratic dynastic politicians have an additional incentive to value democracy, because, like their forebears, they are prompted to do so by a social environment that values it. In a context such as the vote of the enabling act, this incentive could offset the pressure to behave in the same way as other parliamentarians.

2.3 Enforcement of norms

The preference for democracy among democratic dynastic politicians may be reinforced by the monitoring of the dynasty itself (Geys and Smith, 2017). The whole family may monitor the actions of its members to maintain its reputation and values. The argument is in line with Olson's (1993) view that hereditary rule lengthens the horizon of leaders. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2017) model and test Olson's intuition. They find that dynastic leaders perform better in countries with few executive constraints. Dynasties may thus be able to constrain their members when other controls are ineffective. Along the same lines, Myerson (2008, 2015) argues that politicians may enter in a contract with their supporters to ensure

their support. Likewise, democratic dynastic politicians may be bound by their dynasties. That implicit contract may include supporting democracy.

In circumstances where parliamentarians with an intrinsic preference for democracy are pressured to vote for an act establishing an autocratic regime, the extra monitoring by their family, to which democratic dynastic parliamentarians are subject, may have prompted them to oppose the act.

3. Historical background

In this section, we provide the historical background needed to understand the vote of July 1940. We first present the advent of the Third Republic and then the historical and political contexts of the vote.

France's war against Prussia led to the downfall of Emperor Napoleon III in 1870 and the end of the Second Empire. This led to the establishment of the Third Republic. After several years of turmoil, the Constitutional Laws of 1875 defined the institutions of the Republic. The lower chamber of parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, was elected by universal suffrage, whereas the upper chamber, the Senate, was elected indirectly. Together, the two chambers formed the National Assembly. The head of state was the President of the Republic, who was elected by the National Assembly. The system was supplemented by the government, referred to as the Council of Ministers and chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers. The President of the Republic had limited powers but appointed the President of the Council of Ministers, who held effective executive power. The constitution created a strictly bicameral parliamentary democracy: both chambers had to vote each law in the same wording. Changing the constitution required a bicameral vote.

This constitutional setting still prevailed when the Battle of France started on May 10, 1940. In just six weeks, Germany managed to take control of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands and was occupying a large portion of France. The speed of the military defeat had direct political repercussions. On June 16, 1940, the President of the Council of Ministers, Paul Reynaud, resigned because his government was divided about the armistice. To replace him, the President of the Republic, Albert Lebrun, appointed the 84-year-old Marshal Philippe Pétain, a popular World War I hero.⁴ Pétain had acted as Vice-President of the Council of Ministers since May 18, 1940. Even though Paul Reynaud had invited him to join

⁴ He was the commander of the allied troops during the battle of Verdun and was often referred to as the "victor of Verdun". His handling of the 1917 mutinies had been perceived as humane, earning him a reputation for being concerned with the situation of soldiers and avoiding bloodshed.

his government, the two men disagreed on the desirability of seeking an armistice. Pétain was in favor and, on June 22, 1940, less than a week after his appointment, he signed an armistice with Germany making the occupation of the northern half of France official. Initially, the demarcation line between occupied and non-occupied France was not well-established at the local level. However, the line would clearly cross a number of départements, or local administrative areas (Alary, 1995, p.31).⁵

As the new President of the Council of Ministers, Marshal Pétain appointed Pierre Laval as Vice-President of the Council of Ministers on June 23. He later authorized Laval to speak on his behalf to both chambers. Pierre Laval viewed the military defeat as an opportunity to replace the republic by an authoritarian regime aligned with Germany and Italy.⁶ In doing so, he could leverage his supporters within the Assembly and take advantage of rising anti-parliamentarian sentiment. Anti-parliamentarian movements had indeed existed since the beginning of the Third Republic and gained momentum during the 1930s. More generally, the Third Republic was considered as being to blame for the military defeat, and a consensus on the necessity to renew France's political institutions had emerged.⁷

The members of parliament could therefore not ignore Pétain's intention or be unaware that the bill he was planning meant the end of the republic. Pierre Laval held several information meetings and announced an "alignment with totalitarian states", as Senator Jean Taurines, among others, reported (cited in Ermakoff, 2008, p. 121). Pierre Laval's project for an autocratic reversal was formerly supported by 18 members of parliament signing the "Bergery declaration" for a "new authoritarian order".⁸ Yet the majority of parliamentarians were not, in principle, in favor of an autocratic regime. In particular, the Chamber of Deputies had been elected in 1936, leading to a left-wing coalition known as the Popular Front.

The vote on the enabling act took place in Vichy exactly eighteen days after the armistice was signed, and sixteen days after it came into force (Wieviorka, 2001, p.25). The choice of location had been dictated by the successive retreats the government had been forced to undertake in order to avoid being captured.⁹ The government convened parliament on the night of July 4. Parliamentarians were scattered all over the country; some were still in their

⁵ Départements are the main administrative area in France. They are divided in smaller districts where deputies are elected.

⁶ Pierre Laval was an influential politician of the Third Republic. He had been elected as a socialist parliamentarian in 1914, served as minister several times and twice as President of the Council of Ministers. He had also been the French ambassador to Italy, where he befriended Benito Mussolini.

⁷ On July 9, 1940, the National Assembly voted on the principle of a constitutional reform. Only three deputies and one senator opposed the principle of a constitutional revision.

⁸ The declaration was named after Gaston Bergery, a left-of-center parliamentarian, who drafted it.

⁹ Vichy was chosen because its hotels could accommodate the members of the government, the parliament, and the administration.

constituencies, others were refugees. Some were still in the army, whereas others were prisoners of war, or had been killed in action (Wieviorka, 2001, p.31). Traveling was made particularly difficult by the disorganization caused by the war. Fewer than 300 parliamentarians were present in Vichy by July, 8 – representing 45 percent of parliamentarians voting in July 10, 1940 and around 36 percent of all parliamentarians (Ermakoff, 2008, p.127). For those who had managed to reach the city, the journey had been exhausting. Not only was it difficult for parliamentarians to get to Vichy, it was also hard for them to find a place to stay and work. Political parties had collapsed, making it even more difficult to coordinate any opposition to the bill.¹⁰ In short, debate and coordination ahead of the vote was almost impossible, even more so since parliamentarians did not receive a draft of the bill until July 9, the day before the vote.

Two groups of parliamentarians nonetheless explicitly managed to oppose Pierre Laval's project. Although they agreed on the need for a transition period, they emphasized the necessity of ensuring the stability of the republican regime. First, 38 Senators, veterans of the First World War, signed the "Taurines motion".¹¹ The motion suggested asking Marshal Pétain to draft a new constitution, but stipulated that the task had to be performed under the supervision of the competent commissions of the parliament and then be formally approved "by the Nation". This motion did not oppose the delegation of power but wanted to limit the influence of Pierre Laval on future institutions. Second, 27 parliamentarians signed on July 9, the "Badie declaration". This motion plainly opposed the dismantling of the Republic, arguing that the transition had to be political, not constitutional.¹²

Parliamentarians were subject to moral pressures. On July 4, journalists were invited to a ceremonial drill of French military units. Organized in Clermont-Ferrand, only seventy kilometers north of Vichy, the event was attended by high-ranking military officials. At the end of the drill General Maxime Weygand, Supreme Commander of the French army during the last weeks of the Battle of France and Minister for Defense in Marshal Pétain's government, declared "we must clean the country of the people who drove it where it is" (Calef, 1988, p.253). Weygand's statement lent credence to the possibility of a coup d'état and was seized upon by Pierre Laval and his supporters. Rumors of a military coup thus circulated (Ermakoff, 2008, p.88). On the day of the vote, the casino where the chambers were to meet was surrounded by the military police, officially for protection.

¹⁰ On July 9th 1940, Senator Jean-Marie Froget wrote in a letter to his daughter "There is no party anymore" (Calef, 1988, p. 432).

¹¹ The motion was named after Jean Taurines, a conservative senator and veteran of World War I, who drafted it.

¹² The motion was led by Vincent Badie, a left-of-center parliamentarian.

On July 10, 1940, the French parliament was asked to vote on a one-paragraph act that read: “The parliament provides full powers to the Government of the Republic, under the authority and the signature of Marshal Pétain. As a consequence, a new constitution for the French State will be promulgated by one or several Acts. This Constitution will guarantee the notion of Work, Family and Fatherland. It will be ratified by the Nation and applied by the Assemblies it will have created”. Passage of the act signaled the end of the Third Republic.

This was no trivial matter. The Third Republic was 65 years old in 1940, and it remains to this day the longest-lasting republican regime in French history. The new government would be no toothless legal fiction. It was recognized by the US, which did not acknowledge the French Committee of National Liberation as the representative of France until 1943. By early July 1940, newspapers were describing the new regime as a permanent solution with long-term consequences. Most of all, the regime implemented the “révolution nationale” (“national revolution”), a radical conservative reform package based on Catholicism, political centralization, large capitalist corporations, and coercion. The most horrifying dimension of the program was the persecution of freemasons and Jews by the French State. The infamous “statut des juifs” (“Jewish status”) law passed on October 3 1940 banned Jews from elected positions and a series of professions in the civil service, the army, and secondary and tertiary education. According to Paxton (1972), there is no evidence of German demands on France’s policy towards Jews until August 1941. Until then, the new regime was responsible for its anti-Semitic policies.

Despite the circumstances, the outcome of the vote was no foregone conclusion. Neither the military defeat nor the armistice signed with Germany on June 22 implied a regime change or a national revolution. At the time of the vote, Hitler’s interest was in France remaining stable to keep financing the German war effort and serve as a stepping stone to invade Great Britain (Paxton, 1972). An autocratic transition implementing a series of radical reforms could have jeopardized his plans.

Furthermore, if the vote had been insubstantial, very few parliamentarians would have opposed the act, considering the risks associated with their position. It would indeed have been much easier and less perilous to simply follow the majority. The fate of German parliamentarians clearly illustrated the risk of opposing an enabling act. Indeed, a few years earlier, on March 23, 1933, the Reichstag had surrendered power to Hitler in a vote very similar to the one taking place in Vichy. Otto Wels, the Chairman of the Socialist Democratic Party, was the only parliamentarian to speak against the enabling act (Ermakoff, 2008). After

the vote, he was forced into exile and stripped of his citizenship. French parliamentarians who cast a vote against the enabling act were thus aware of the risks they were taking.

The parliamentarians voted simultaneously, and each individual ballot was made public after being counted by the clerks. Under pressure, and in circumstances where organizing opposition was materially difficult, parliamentarians could consider that they were exposing themselves to retaliation if they opposed the motion. In a context of uncertainty, they could therefore perceive the view of the majority as the better and safer option. They therefore had an incentive to conform to the vote of their peers, which led to the bill being passed (Ermakoff, 2008).

Yet, some parliamentarians did oppose the bill and voted against it. The previous section suggests that democratic dynastic politicians would have been more likely to do so, for several reasons. They had a vested interest in maintaining a democratic regime, because they had higher democratic standards, and also because their upbringing and environment gave them a stronger sense that maintaining democracy was a viable and desirable option.

4. Data and method

4.1 Data

Our dataset draws upon the *Dictionnaire des parlementaires de 1889 à 1940*, edited by Jean Joly. The websites of the French National Assembly and the Senate report each parliamentarian's official biography. It encompasses biographical information, including genealogy, of the 847 parliamentarians in 1940. Since biographies are written in a standardized way, we are able to retrieve numerous pieces of information from the *Dictionnaire* and form the basis of our variables

Democratic and Non-Democratic Dynasties: The main variable of interest is a dummy equal to one if a parliamentarian belongs to a dynasty. To be part of a dynasty a politician must have at least one forebear who held political office at the national or local level. The *Dictionnaire* is in alphabetical order. If a politician had a relative in politics, the first paragraph of the biography systematically mentions it, stating where to find that relative in the *Dictionnaire*. (i.e. "son of the previous [parliamentarian]" or "his grandfather is..." when surnames differ). If a previous dynastic member is mentioned, so are his or her political offices. Hence even if this forebear is not in the *Dictionnaire*, we know which offices he held.

We distinguish between members of democratic dynasties and others. To define the democratic dynasty dummy, we apply the definition presented in the introduction. To qualify

as democratic, dynasty founders must either have opposed former autocratic regimes or supported one of the French republics. In practice founders of democratic dynasties opposed the following autocratic regimes: the absolute monarchy, the July Monarchy, or the two Napoleonic Empires. Additionally, founders of political dynasties who belonged to parties supporting the Third Republic also started democratic dynasties. By contrast, if the founder of the dynasty either (1) supported an autocratic regime, (2) was a member of a party showing no clear support for democratic ideals during the Third Republic (Monarchist, Bonapartists, Conservative and members of the Republican Federation and the Catholic of Liberal Action), or (3) was affiliated to no party, the dynasty they started will not qualify as democratic.¹³

Our definition of democratic dynasties is conservative, as it excludes non-affiliated politicians. It ensures that founders of democratic dynasties explicitly stood for democracy. By applying that definition, we may have underestimated the number of descendants of politicians holding democratic values. Those errors would however induce a downward bias in our estimations and would reduce the likelihood of finding an effect of democratic dynasties on the probability to oppose the enabling act.

Using biographies circumvents a drawback of other papers on dynasties using surname similarities (e.g. Geys, 2017, Cruz et al., 2017) insofar as the information on the existence of a politician forebear is reliable. Biographies also allow us to identify links between a politician and a forebear on the maternal side. We identify 126 dynasties among the 847 parliamentarians in 1940, implying that 15 percent of them were dynastic.¹⁴ 66 parliamentarians belonged to a democratic dynasty, tallying 7.8 percent of parliamentarians. The proportion of dynastic parliamentarians in our sample exceeds the one reported in Dal Bó et al. (2009) but is in line with evidence presented in Fiva and Smith (2018). The higher proportion observed in our case is likely due to the fact that we also capture forebears with a different surname.

Some aristocratic dynasties from the July Monarchy (1830-1848) remained in place up till 1940. In terms of familial links, 47 percent of dynastic politicians belonged to dynasties founded by their father. In some cases, however, the dynasties were founded by older family members or even by older brothers. This heterogeneity in dynasty types allows a better understanding of the transmission channels of our effects.

¹³ The “Fédération Républicaine” had an ambiguous position towards democratic institutions (see Agrikoliansky, 2016) whereas the Catholic “Action Libérale” was created as a result of Pope Leo XIII encyclicals “On the Church and State in France” prompting Catholics to take part in French institutions to defend Catholic values.

¹⁴ Out of dynastic parliamentarians, 11.9 percent were identified as dynastic on their maternal side. As women could not be elected at the time, they were identified as dynastic because of an uncle, a grandfather, or a great-grand-father.

All dynastic politicians and the founder of their dynasties are presented in Appendix C2.

Votes

Data on the vote of the enabling act comes from the *Journal officiel de la République française* of July 11, 1940. We identify three groups: opponents to the reform (80 of the 669 voters, or 12 percent), abstentions (20 out of 669, or 3 percent) and supporters (569 of 669, or 85 percent).

Individual characteristics

In addition to voting and dynastic status, we also control for a series of parliamentarians' characteristics.¹⁵

Age is a variable equal to the age of the parliamentarian at the time of the vote. The effect of age is ambiguous. On one hand, an older parliamentarian would suffer less from an autocratic reversal, since his career prospects would be more limited. This would decrease the likelihood of opposing the act. On the other hand, an older parliamentarian would also benefit from extensive experience with the regime and possibly have a sentimental link to it. In this case, the person would be less likely to vote for reversal.

Senator is a dummy variable equaling one if the parliamentarian was a member of the Senate.¹⁶ Due to the differences in their election, Senators and Deputies might have faced different incentives in the vote. Moreover, Senators defined themselves as guarantors of the Republic. For instance, in his first speech of the 1936-1940 mandate, the President of the Senate, Jules Jeanneney, stated "True to its traditions, the Senate acts as the attentive guardian of the Republican institutions".¹⁷

Département mean opposition and *Département mean abstention* are defined as the share of parliamentarians from the same *département* who cast a "No" vote and the share of parliamentarians who abstained. The two shares are computed for each parliamentarian, excluding him or her from the computation. They capture the correlation in the vote of parliamentarians from the same *département*, due either to local conditions, to their direct interaction, or to peer effects.

Jewish Parliamentarian is a dummy variable set to one if the parliamentarian was Jewish. We control for the Jewishness of parliamentarians because Pierre Laval, the main advocate of

¹⁵ The sources of all variables are described in Appendix C3.

¹⁶ Deputies were elected in a popular vote using male universal suffrage. Constitutionally, the Senate is composed of older politicians already having a career and elected by local politicians (see Article 4 of the constitutional law of February 24, 1875, on the organization of the Senate). In indirect elections, the dynastic advantage would be more decisive thanks to the political networks transmitted by dynasties.

¹⁷ *Journal officiel de la République – Débat au Sénat (21 Janvier 1936)*.

the enabling act, had stated that the vote would allow an alignment with Nazi Germany (Ermakoff, 2008, p.121). In consequence, Jewish parliamentarians were therefore likely to be targeted by the new regime.

Freemason is a dummy variable set to one if a parliamentarian was a Freemason according to the *Journal Officiel* of the Vichy Régime. Freemasons may have coordinated with each other. Moreover, they were targeted by attacks of Pétain's supporters. These two dimensions may have prompted a specific opposition of Freemasons to the enabling act.

Occupied département and *département crossed by the demarcation line*. A dummy variable takes a value one if a parliamentarian's *département* was occupied at the time of the vote, and another takes the value one if their *département* was crossed by the demarcation line at the time of the vote.

Parliamentarians' Political Orientation: We control for parliamentarians' political orientation according to Ermakoff's (2008, p.35) classification of parties as leftwing, centrist, and rightwing. We define a dummy for leftwing and centrist parliamentarians, with rightwing parliamentarians being the reference group.

Profession. Dummy variables control for parliamentarians' professional occupations. We distinguish between journalist, doctor, and civil servant, as well as law-related and low-skilled occupations. The reference group consists of professional politicians, defined as parliamentarians with no occupation beside their political mandates. A parliamentarian with a lucrative professional activity would not lose as much as a professional politician if the republic were to be abolished. In addition, some professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, might voice stronger opposition to the reform because they benefited from local networks protecting them from possible retaliations. Lawyers might also have a better grasp of the constitutional consequences of the vote, as hypothesized by Ermakoff (2008, p.230).

WWI veteran is a dummy variable taking the value one if the parliamentarian was a World War I veteran. We expect these individuals to be more willing to approve the reform, because veterans were more likely to admire Marshal Pétain. They might also have been more inclined to support pacifism (Gelpi and Feaver, 2002, Horowitz and Stam, 2014).

Years of study is the number of years of higher education. This information is usually mentioned in the *Dictionnaire*. If not, we use the years of study needed to obtain the highest

degree a politician has or the sum of years of study needed to obtain all the degrees he or she holds.¹⁸

Table 1 separately reports descriptive statistics on observable variables for members of democratic dynasties, members of non-democratic dynasties, and non-dynastic parliamentarians.¹⁹ The left-hand panel reports averages and standard deviations; the right-hand panel shows differences in averages.

*** INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ***

The fourth column reports differences between non-dynastic and democratic dynastic politicians. Three characteristics appear to differ across the two groups. Specifically, democratic dynastic politicians accumulated nearly one-and-a-half more years of education than non-democratic dynastic politicians. The difference is statistically significant at the one percent level. Democratic dynastic politicians were also less likely to hold low-skilled jobs and more likely to be involved in law-related positions, the differences being respectively statistically significant at the five- and one percent levels of confidence.²⁰ Democratic dynastic politicians were also more numerous in *départements* crossed by the demarcation line and less in occupied *départements*. These differences are significant at the ten-percent level of confidence or beyond.

Democratic dynastic politicians also differed from their non-democratic dynastic peers, as Column 1.5 shows. Fewer were Jewish, although the difference is significant only at the ten percent level. They were more likely to be Freemasons, at the five percent level of significance. Democratic dynastic politicians had accumulated 1.73 more years' study than their non-democratic counterparts; they were also less likely to have held a low-skill job and more likely to be journalist or to have engaged in a law-related occupation. Democratic dynastic politicians were also more likely leftwing than their non-democratic dynastic peers. The difference is significant at the one-percent level of confidence.

Finally, Column 1.6 compares non-dynastic and non-democratic dynastic parliamentarians. Non-dynastic parliamentarians were more likely than their non-democratic dynastic counterparts to be Freemasons and less likely from an occupied *département*.

¹⁸ The only exception is for doctoral studies having no predefined curriculum. If an parliamentarian earned a PhD, then we consider 8 years of study, the latter defined typical numbers of years of study to obtain a doctorate.

¹⁹ To save space, we only report variables for which we could observe differences that were statistically significant. By default, the other individual characteristics did not differ between democratic dynastic politicians and non-democratic dynastic politicians. These variables are presented in Online Appendix "Appendix Table 1"

²⁰ Several of those low-skilled parliamentarians were land-owners managing farms.

However, these differences are significant only at the ten percent level. Non-dynastic politicians were also more likely leftwing and more likely a journalist than non-democratic dynastic politicians. These differences are significant respectively at the one-percent and five-percent level. The upshot of Table 1 is that dynastic parliamentarians differed from non-dynastic parliamentarians. Most importantly within the group of dynastic parliamentarians there were substantial and statistically significant differences between democratic and non-democratic dynastic politicians. The table therefore provides evidence supporting the notion that the two groups should be distinguished and may have cast a different ballot in the vote on the enabling act. To see if they did, Figure 1 displays the shares of votes opposing the votes cast by each group.




Figure 1: Mean comparison – Shares of parliamentarians opposing the act
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Three findings emerge from Figure 1. First, democratic dynastic parliamentarians opposed the act more than non-dynastic parliamentarians. Specifically, 21.1 percent of democratic dynastic parliamentarians voted against the act, compared with 11.4 percent of non-dynastic parliamentarians. This difference is statistically significant at the five percent level of confidence. Second, democratic dynastic parliamentarians also opposed the act more than non-democratic dynastic parliamentarians, only 7.8 percent of whom did so. This difference is

statistically significant at the ten percent level. Finally, the difference between non-dynastic and non-democratic dynastic politicians is not statistically significant at accepted levels.

4.2 Methodology

To go beyond simple correlations and take into account a series of control variables, we rely on the following baseline model:

$$\text{Prob}(Vote_i = No) = f(\beta_0 + \beta_1 Democratic\ Dynasty_i + \beta_2 Non - democratic\ Dynasty_i + \Gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i)$$

(1)

Where $\text{Prob}(Vote_i = No)$ is the probability of opposing the reform. $Democratic\ Dynasty_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one if parliamentarian i belongs to a democratic dynasty. $Non - democratic\ Dynasty_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one if parliamentarian i belongs to a non-democratic dynasty. X_i is a set of control variables. β_0 , β_1 , and β_2 are coefficients. Γ is a vector of coefficients and ε_i the error term.

In the baseline specification, opposing the reform is defined as having voted “No”, because abstention cannot be interpreted as opposition to the reform. We therefore do not take abstentions into account in our baseline model and contrast “No” votes on the one hand and “Yes” votes and abstentions on the other hand.²¹

As the dependent variable is a dummy variable, the model is estimated as a binary logit model. All models are estimated using standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the party level.²²

5. Baseline results

Table 2 reports the results of our baseline regressions. It contrasts models where all dynastic politicians are pooled together, reported in odd-numbered columns, and models where we distinguish between democratic and non-democratic politicians, reported in even-numbered columns. In all cases, the reference category is the group of non-dynastic politicians.

²¹ Counting abstention as votes against the act does not change our results (see Section 6.2).

²² Our results are robust to using ordered logit or multinomial logit models (see Section 6.2). Furthermore, the results remain the same if we cluster standard errors at the *department* level. Political parties are described in Table C4 in the appendix.

*** INSERT TABLE 2 HERE ***

Column 2.1 reports a bivariate regression controlling for a single dummy variable that pools all dynastic politicians, both democratic and non-democratic. The coefficient of that variable is positive and statistically significant at the five percent level. Dynastic parliamentarians therefore seem to have opposed the act more than non-dynastic parliamentarians.

However, pooling hides substantial differences between types of dynasties. Column 2.2 reports the result of a regression where democratic and non-democratic dynastic parliamentarians are distinguished. In that regression, the coefficient of the democratic dynastic dummy is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. Conversely, the coefficient of the non-democratic dynastic dummy is negative and fails to be significant at standard levels, implying that the voting behavior of non-democratic dynastic politicians did not differ from the behavior of non-dynastic parliamentarians. The positive effect of dynastic politicians in Column 2.1 thus seems to be entirely driven by democratic dynastic parliamentarians. This finding again supports our presumption that democratic and non-democratic dynastic politicians were likely to differ in the vote.

Columns 2.3 and 2.4 report similar regressions, now controlling for the main observable characteristics of politicians. Two of those characteristics exhibit a statistically significant and positive coefficient: being a Freemason, which is positive at the five percent level, and being a civil servant, which is negative at the five percent level. Freemasons had good reasons to expect to be targeted by the future regime and had thus a stronger incentive to oppose the enabling act. By contrast, civil servants might have feared losing their job if they voted “No” and therefore had a greater incentive to conform to the vote of the majority. Mean opposition to the act in a *département* also exhibits a positive coefficient suggesting local conditions also mattered. Leftwing and centrist parliamentarians were also more likely than their rightwing counterparts to oppose the act. No other control variable appears significantly in the regressions.

More to the point, the dynastic dummy variable exhibits a positive coefficient in Regression 2.3, suggesting a general effect of being a dynastic politician. Again, when democratic and non-democratic dynasties are distinguished in Regression 2.4, the effect appears to be driven entirely by democratic dynastic politicians. Specifically, the coefficient of the democratic dynastic dummy variable is positive and significant at the five percent level

while the coefficient of the non-democratic dynastic dummy fails to be significant at any accepted level.

Regressions 2.3 and 2.4 therefore confirm the two key findings of Regressions 2.1 and 2.2. Firstly, democratic dynastic politicians were more likely to oppose the enabling act than their non-dynastic peers. Secondly, the votes of non-democratic dynastic politicians were statistically indistinguishable from those of their non-dynastic peers. Moreover, the effect of being a democratic-dynastic parliamentarian rather than a non-dynastic one was substantial. The bottom panel of Table 2 reports the point estimate of the marginal effect evaluated when each variable is set at its reference value. It amounts to a 7.6 to 9.0 percentage points greater likelihood to oppose the act.

6. Robustness checks

6.1 Taking selection in the vote into consideration

In the baseline specification, our sample consists of the parliamentarians who took part in the vote. However, out of the 847 senators and members of the Chamber of Deputies, only 669 were physically in Vichy on July 10, 1940. Some had already fled the country, were prisoners of war, or had been killed in action. Others did not travel or did not make it to Vichy because the country was in disarray. Our estimates might therefore be driven by a selection into the vote, if dynastic politicians had a different probability of being in Vichy for the vote. To account for that possibility, we estimate a sequential logit model, taking as dependent variables first the probability of being in Vichy then the probability of casting a “No” vote.²³

The results of the first stage reveal that Jewish parliamentarians and those coming from an occupied territory were less likely to be in Vichy, both coefficients being statistically significant at the one percent level. Parliamentarians from occupied *départements* undeniably faced more administrative and geographic hurdles than other politicians. The lower propensity of Jewish parliamentarians to be in Vichy is in all likelihood due to the risk of joining a vote that could eventually empower an anti-Semitic government. We also observe a negative association significant at the ten-percent level between being a journalist and participating in the vote. Likewise, we observe an association, significant at the ten percent level, between being a democratic dynastic parliamentarian and being in Vichy for the vote.

²³ The results of the estimation of the sequential logit model are reported in Table A1 in the online appendix.

Despite that association in the first stage, the results of the second stage of the sequential logit estimation confirm those of the baseline estimations. In particular, the democratic dynastic dummy variable exhibits a positive coefficient statistically significant at the five percent level, while the coefficient of the non-democratic dynastic dummy variable is statistically insignificant. Moreover, the marginal effect of being a democratic dynastic parliamentarian on the likelihood to cast a “No” vote is of the same order of magnitude as in the baseline regression. In the sample of the 847 parliamentarians in 1940, being a democratic dynastic politician increased the likelihood of being in Vichy and opposing the act by around 8 percentage points.

6.2 Taking abstention into account

We have so far opposed “No” votes, on the one hand, to both “Yes” votes and abstentions, on the other hand, thereby considering an abstention ballot as an acceptance of the reform. One might argue, however, that abstention was a compromise between explicitly opposing and explicitly endorsing the enabling act. The three positions would accordingly follow a natural ordering. We therefore estimate an ordered logit model where the dependent variable is a trichotomous variable coding the decision to cast a “Yes” vote, abstain, or cast a “No” vote, and the main explanatory variables are the two dummy variables coding democratic and non-democratic dynasties.²⁴ In this regression, the democratic dynasty dummy exhibits a positive coefficient statistically significant at the one percent level while the coefficient of the non-democratic dynastic dummy is statistically insignificant, confirming our baseline results.

We also estimate a multinomial logit model, which does not impose any ordering on the three modalities.²⁵ Being a democratic dynastic parliamentarian had no effect on the probability of abstaining. Conversely, non-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were less likely to abstain than their non-dynastic peers, the coefficient being significant at the one percent level. Yet, dynastic status relates to the decision to cast a “No” vote in the same way as in our baseline model. Specifically, democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more likely to cast a “No” vote, the estimate being statistically significant at the one percent level. By contrast, we find no effect of being a non-democratic dynastic parliamentarian on the likelihood to oppose the act,

Our baseline findings are therefore not driven by the way in which we coded abstention or ranked the three positions that parliamentarians could take in the vote.

²⁴ The results of that regression are reported in the first column of Table A2 in the online appendix.

²⁵ The results of that regression are reported in the last two columns of Table A2 in the online appendix.

6.3 Propensity score estimates

Since dynastic status is predetermined, it cannot be caused by the vote on the enabling act and reverse causality is ruled out. One may nonetheless be concerned by the fact that an omitted variable may be correlated both with the propensity of being a democratic dynastic politician and the propensity of opposing the enabling act. To address those concerns, we estimate a series of propensity score matching models using baseline controls to balance the “treated” and “non-treated” samples. We therefore compare democratic dynastic parliamentarians with other parliamentarians whose observable characteristics are similar.

Propensity score matching first computes the probability of belonging to a democratic dynasty based on the following equation:

$$\text{Prob}(\textit{Democratic Dynasty}_i) = f(\alpha + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_i) \quad (2)$$

Where all variables are defined as in Equation (1) and θ is a vector of coefficients.

From the set of baseline controls X_i and the vector of coefficients θ , Equation 2 assigns a score to each parliamentarian. This score represents their probability of being a member of a democratic dynasty according to observables. In the second step, parliamentarians from the treated group, i.e. those belonging to a democratic dynasty, are matched with the parliamentarians from the control group—those who do not belong to a democratic dynasty—with the closest score. The difference in the outcome variable between the two groups is comparable to an average treatment effect on the treated.

We successively match democratic dynastic parliamentarians to one to five other parliamentarians, so as to show that our results remain stable even when increasing the control group or the accuracy of the match.²⁶ We also successively match and compare democratic dynastic politicians (1) with non-dynastic parliamentarians, and (2) with non-dynastic plus non-democratic dynastic parliamentarians.

Propensity score estimates confirm that members of democratic dynasties opposed the enabling act more than other parliamentarians. In all our propensity score estimates, the “democratic dynasty” dummy is significant at the five percent level or beyond. This holds both when democratic dynastic parliamentarians are compared with a group pooling non-democratic dynastic and non-dynastic parliamentarians and with the group of non-dynastic parliamentarians. The order of magnitude of the effect of being a democratic dynastic politician on the probability of opposing the enabling act ranges from 9.8 to 11.1 percentage

²⁶ The results of propensity score estimations are reported in Table A3 in the online appendix.

points when democratic dynastic parliamentarians are compared with the pooled group of non-dynastic and non-democratic parliamentarians. It ranges from 8.8 to 12.7 percentage points, when democratic dynastic parliamentarians are compared with non-dynastic parliamentarians only. Those estimates are in line with our baseline estimates and suggest that our baseline results could be interpreted as causal.

7. Why did democratic dynastic politicians behave differently on July 10, 1940?

We have so far established that democratic dynastic parliamentarians voted in greater numbers against the enabling act than their peers did. This section explores several explanations for that finding.

7.1 Within party peer effects

Democratic dynastic parliamentarians might have leveraged an advantage to coordinate with their peers within their party or other political organizations. They may also have been more likely to belong to pro-democratic parties and organizations. To investigate that possibility, we control for the mean share of “No” votes and mean abstention in the vote on the enabling act and for parliamentarians’ membership in labor and agricultural organizations.²⁷ If coordination within political parties was driving the effect of democratic dynastic politicians, those means would be significant and the coefficient of the dynastic dummy would lose significance or shrink. The results of our estimations show instead that the party means are never significant at standard levels. The organizations dummy variable also bears an insignificant coefficient. In addition, controlling for party means and membership in organizations affects neither the significance nor the magnitude of the coefficient of the democratic dynastic dummy, and its marginal effect is nearly unchanged. Accordingly, the behavior of democratic dynastic parliamentarians is unlikely to be driven by their capacity to coordinate the votes of their parties.

7.2 Individual experience or recognition in the parliament

The dynastic advantage may have materialized as additional experience or parliamentary recognition, which democratic dynastic politicians may have leveraged to oppose the act. To determine whether additional experience or parliamentary recognition mattered, we proxy a parliamentarian’s recognition by the length of his biography in the *Dictionnaire des députés*

²⁷ Those party-means exclude each parliamentarian’s vote and are therefore parliamentarian-specific. Labor and agricultural organizations were a mean for workers and farmers to present their political claims in an organized manner. The results are reported in Table B1 in the appendix.

et sénateurs français (1889-1940). We also measure the time spent in a ministerial cabinet as of July 1940, the time spent with a national mandate as of 1940, the time spent as a local representative (“Conseiller général”) as of July 1940, and whether the parliamentarian was also mayor. None of those variables turns out significant in our regressions.²⁸ More to the point, the magnitude and significance of the democratic dynastic parliamentarian dummy remain in line with baseline estimates.

While these variables measure recognition and experience in general, what may have mattered on July 10, 1940, was the political capital specific to the work of a parliamentarian. We therefore also look at experience and recognition within parliament. Specifically, we measure the number of commissions on which each parliamentarian had sat as of July 1940. We also define a dummy variable set to one if the parliamentarian held a special position, namely if he had been chairman, vice-chairman, or secretary of one of the two chambers. We also code the number of interventions of each parliamentarian from 1936 to 1940 and the reactions of their peers. The parliamentary minutes published in the *Journal de la République Française* record whether a parliamentarian was applauded or booed when he spoke in the debate. We therefore create a variable measuring the number of times a parliamentarian was applauded and another measuring the number of times he was booed.²⁹ We refine those measures by distinguishing applause and heckling from left-wingers and right-wingers.

Among these measures, only the number of rounds of applause by the whole parliament exhibits a coefficient that is statistically significant at the five percent level. The coefficient is positive suggesting that popular parliamentarians were more likely to oppose the enabling act. Yet, in all the regressions controlling for parliamentary experience and recognition, the coefficient of the democratic dynastic dummy remains significant, and the size of its marginal effect remains the same. This again suggests that experience or recognition did not drive the vote of democratic dynastic parliamentarians on the enabling act.

7.3 Dynasty characteristics

We have so far pooled all democratic dynastic parliamentarians. Yet, their dynasties are not perfectly homogenous, notably in terms of timelines. Some were created by active opponents of Napoleon III, others by politicians who had simply joined democratic parties.

²⁸ The results of those regressions are reported in Table B2 in the appendix.

²⁹ These measures have been normalized inside each Chamber and inside the group of former Minister. An example: for Senators, the measure is equal to the number of boos/rounds of applause minus the mean number of boos/applause in the Senate divided by the standard deviation of the number of boos/applause in the Senate. The same operation applies to Deputies and Ministers. Results are reported in Table B3 in the appendix.

Some dynastic parliamentarians still had an elected ancestor who was alive. Investigating differences between those types of democratic dynasties may shed light on what drove the specific voting behavior of democratic dynastic parliamentarians. This is what Table 3 does.

Columns 3.1 and 3.2 replace the baseline democratic dynastic dummy by a more restrictive dummy. This dummy takes the value of one only if the founder of the dynasty was also a founder of the republic, as opposed to merely being a member of a republican party. The coefficient of the dummy variable based on this more restrictive definition is positive and statistically significant at the five percent level. Its marginal effect is only slightly larger than that of the broader democratic dynasties dummy. Accordingly, the origin of a democratic dynasty was not essential to determine the behavior of a parliamentarian, as long as the dynasty was democratic.

The regular surveillance that their family may have exercised on the actions of democratic dynastic parliamentarians may have influenced their behavior. It stands to reason that this form of monitoring would be more influential if one of their forebears was still alive. We therefore construct a dummy variable capturing for each parliamentarian whether he had an elected ancestor alive at the time of the vote. We first include that variable as a single variable of interest. The results of the regression, reported in Column 3.3, show that it is statistically insignificant. It remains statistically insignificant when the two baseline variables capturing dynastic status are included. Moreover, the democratic dynastic variable exhibits a positive coefficient statistically significant at the one percent level. Its marginal effect remains similar to its baseline estimates. The behavior of democratic dynastic politicians was thus not driven by the monitoring or pressure of surviving members of the dynasty.

Younger democratic dynasties may have nurtured a shallower democratic culture, resulting in a weaker preference for, and a weaker belief in, the relevance of democracy. To test the effect of dynasties age in the vote, we define a dummy variable taking the value one if the dynasty was only one generation old. We first include it as a single variable of interest. This variable is not statistically significant (Column 3.5). It remains statistically insignificant when the baseline dynastic dummy variables are included. Moreover, the coefficient of the baseline democratic dynasty dummy is negative and its marginal effect is equal to 16 percentage points.

*** INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ***

We finally investigate the role of the relationship of dynasties with labor and agricultural organizations. Unions were formally forbidden at the beginning of the Third Republic, but these organizations were a sounding board for political demands at the local level.³⁰ Labor organizations were thus the first political structures disseminating republican ideals. These organizations also provided parliamentarians with a local political network. We therefore define a dummy variable set to one if the founder of a dynasty belonged to such organizations.

By contrast with the previous regressions, we find that parliamentarians belonging to dynasties whose founder was involved in labor or agricultural organizations were more strongly opposed than other groups to the enabling act (Column 3.7).

Since all founders belonging to a labor organization are also considered as democratic, it is impossible to interact the democratic dynasty dummy with a labor and agricultural organizations dummy. We therefore create two subgroups in the set of democratic dynasties: one with founders also related to labor and agricultural organizations, the other with founders unrelated to labor and agricultural organizations. In this specification, democratic dynastic parliamentarians unrelated to labor organizations still opposed the reform more than other politicians, by a margin of 7.3 percentage points (Column 3.10). This difference is significant at the ten percent level. However, descendants of democratic politicians involved in labor and agricultural organizations opposed the act by 15 percentage points more than other politicians (Column 3.10). The dummy variable identifying democratic dynasties related to labor organizations term is significant at the one percent level. Parliamentarians' environment had thus an indirect effect on the vote cast by parliamentarians belonging to democratic dynasties.

7.4 When do democratic dynasties matter?

Our baseline results show that democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more likely to oppose the enabling act. Looking at other votes may shed additional light on what prompted that behavior. Did democratic dynastic parliamentarians behave in a systematically different way in votes affecting checks and balances? Or was their voting behavior different only in July 1940? To address these questions, we look at five votes that took place during the pre-war period (1937-1940) and arguably affected checks and balances. In those votes, parliament was asked to grant a delegation of powers to the government.³¹ Although the republican

³⁰ Unions were formally authorized by the Waldeck-Rousseau law of March 21st 1884.

³¹ Appendix C.1 describes the nature of those votes and reports extracts from the debate illustrating that the votes were perceived as hinging on checks and balances.

nature of the regime was not at stake, the votes increased the power of the executive. The question of checks and balances was explicitly mentioned in the parliamentary debates, as the quotes given in the appendix show. Those votes therefore provide information about the behavior of parliamentarians in instances that tilted the balance of power in favor of the government without jeopardizing the republic.

We extract three types of information from those five votes. First, we count the number of times that each parliamentarian opposed the extension of government powers. Second, we count the number of times they abstained from voting. We interpret those variables as measuring the parliamentarian's opposition to a reduction of checks and balances, hence his opposition to a threat to democracy. The third piece of information we extract from the votes is the number of times that the parliamentarian voted against the party line. As parties may have taken different stances, this variable measures the parliamentarian's independence.

The five votes took place under two presidents of the council of ministers. The first was Léon Blum's, the leader of the socialist party (SFIO) and President of the Council of Ministers from June 4, 1936, to June 21, 1937, and from March 13, 1938, to April 8, 1938. Two votes affecting checks and balances took place under his governments. Edouard Daladier, a leading figure of the "Parti Radical" was the second president of the council of ministers. He chaired the council of ministers from April 12, 1938, to March 20, 1940. Under this government, three votes affecting checks and balances took place. We can therefore distinguish the two series of votes, because political preferences may have interfered with the decision to support or oppose the extension of government power.

*** INSERT TABLE 4a HERE ***

Table 4a reports the results of a series of regressions taking in turn the three variables describing the behavior of each parliamentarian in the votes on special powers as dependent variables. We alternatively construct these different scores of opposition to delegations of power on the whole set of votes (Columns 4a.1 to 4a.3), on votes providing special powers to the Blum governments (Columns 4a.4 to 4a.6) and to the Daladier government (Columns 4a.7 to 4a.9). Explanatory variables are the same as in the baseline regression.

In Columns 4a.1, 4a.4, and 4a.7, the dependent variable is the number of times a parliamentarian opposed the grant of special powers to the government. In Columns 4a.2, 4a.5

and 4a.8, the dependent variable is the number of times a parliamentarian abstained in these votes.³² The dynastic dummies turn significant in none of the regressions reported in Table 4a. At best, we observe an association at the ten percent level between the non-democratic dynastic dummy and the number of times a parliamentarian opposed delegations of power under the Blum government.

Overall, those regressions show that the specific opposition of democratic dynastic parliamentarians to a change in the balance of power did not materialize before the vote on July 10, 1940. This finding may be explained by two non-mutually exclusive factors. First, in previous votes, the pressure to conform was weaker and the assemblies were not disorganized. The behavior of democratic dynastic politicians was de facto similar to that of other parliamentarians. Second, the stronger preference of democratic dynastic politicians for democracy may pertain to the democratic nature of the regime rather than to the balance of power within a democracy. In any case, the specific behavior of democratic dynastic parliamentarians did not materialize before the vote where democracy was at stake.

Finally, Columns 4a.3, 4a.6, and 4a.9 take as dependent variable, the proportion of the votes for which a parliamentarian opposed the party line. Again, in those regressions neither the democratic nor the non-democratic dynasty dummies exhibit a statistically significant coefficient. Accordingly, dynastic status did not prompt parliamentarians to be more independent from their parties in the votes preceding the 1940 enabling act. Until the vote on the enabling act, democratic dynastic parliamentarians were thus not particularly independent of their parties. Their parties' directives were also not at odds with the position they wanted to endorse. The role of democratic dynasties appeared only in 1940, when party coordination was impossible, uncertainty and pressures were high, and the survival of democracy directly at stake.

*** INSERT TABLE 4b HERE ***

To explicitly test whether the pattern of behavior of democratic dynastic parliamentarians in the previous votes explains their vote on the enabling act, we supplement our baseline regressions with a series of regressions controlling for each variable coding parliamentarians' votes in previous voting. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 4b. Column 4b.1 controls for the number of votes against the delegation of additional powers to the

³² A party line exists if 66 percent or more of a party's parliamentarian voted for (against) a delegation of power.

government, in addition to the baseline dynasty dummies. In that regression, the coefficient of the number of votes against the delegation of powers is statistically insignificant at standard levels, suggesting no relationship between past voting patterns and the vote on the enabling act.

However, when the number of times a parliamentarian abstained is controlled for, as in Column 4b.2, the coefficient is statistically significant at the one percent level and positive. The result is also robust to jointly controlling for the three variables capturing parliamentarians' behavior in previous votes, shown in Column 4b.4. Therefore, parliamentarians who abstained more often from voting on the delegation of powers to the government were also more likely to oppose the enabling act. This suggests the existence of a type of parliamentarian systematically opposing reforms reducing checks and balances. This observation suggests that some parliamentarians had internalized democratic norms.

We obtain a similar result when controlling for the number of times a parliamentarian voted against the party line, in Column 4b.3. The coefficient of that variable is again positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, implying that parliamentarians who had voted more frequently against the party line were also likelier to oppose the enabling act. This finding implies that parliamentarians who had proven their independence from their own party were also more independent from the rest of parliament and therefore more likely to resist pressure to conform to the vote of the majority of other parliamentarians. However, the result is not robust to jointly controlling for the three variables capturing parliamentarians' behavior in previous votes, shown in Column 4b.4.

The key result of Table 4b concerns dynastic parliamentarians. Throughout the table, the coefficient of the non-democratic dynastic variable is statistically insignificant at accepted levels, in line with baseline results. Likewise, the coefficient of the democratic dynastic variable remains positive and statistically significant at the five percent level in all the regressions, regardless of the set of control variables. This, again, is in line with baseline results. In addition, the magnitude of the marginal effect of the democratic dynastic dummy is similar to its value in baseline results.

The upshot of the table is therefore that, while some parliamentarians displayed a propensity to systematically oppose the extension of government power and to distance themselves from their party, they did not drive the effect of democratic dynastic parliamentarians in the vote for the enabling act.

7.5 Which individual characteristics explain opposition within democratic dynasties?

We have so far compared democratic dynastic parliamentarians to other politicians, finding that as a group, they behaved in a specific way. Yet, even that group was heterogeneous, as only 21.1 percent of democratic dynastic parliamentarians opposed the enabling act. Studying what prompted some democratic dynastic parliamentarians to oppose the act while others did not could shed more light on our baseline results.

We therefore run a series of regressions estimating Equation 1 on a sample restricted to the 57 democratic dynastic parliamentarians.³³ The results are reported in Table 5. To save on space, we report only the variables with a statistically significant coefficient.

*** INSERT TABLE 5 HERE ***

The only baseline control variable that exhibits a statistically significant coefficient is the one that captures parliamentarians in a low-skilled occupation. Throughout Table 5, that variable is statistically significant at the one percent level and positive. Low-skilled democratic dynastic parliamentarians were therefore more likely than their democratic dynastic peers to oppose the enabling act. Columns 5.2 and 5.3 signal that experience in the parliament correlates with opposition to the enabling act.³⁴ Specifically, the number of interventions and the dummy coding a special role in parliament exhibit a coefficient that is significant at the one percent level and negative. Accordingly, democratic dynastic parliamentarians with more experience in the Parliament were less likely than their democratic dynastic peers to oppose the act. One interpretation of this result is that democratic dynastic politicians with greater parliamentary experience may have been imbedded in a network of relationships within parliament that made it more difficult for them to vote against the majority of parliamentarians. Conversely, less experienced democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more independent.

Columns 5.4 and 5.5 show that democratic dynastic parliamentarians with stronger connections outside parliament were more likely than their democratic dynastic peers to oppose the act. More precisely, both the length of the mandate as “conseiller général” and the dummy variable signaling that the dynastic parliamentarian had connections with labor and agricultural organizations exhibit positive coefficients, significant at the one percent level in

³³ We exclude the civil servant dummy since it perfectly predicts non-opposition within democratic dynasties (9 observations).

³⁴ These measures have been normalized inside each Chamber and inside the group of (former) Minister. An example: for Senators, the measure is equal to the number of boos/applause minus the mean number of boos/applause in the Senate divided by the standard deviation of the number of boos/applause in the Senate. The same operation applies to Deputies and Ministers.

Columns 5.4 and 5.5. These findings echo the argument that connections outside parliament could help parliamentarians resist the incentive to conform to their peers when voting on the enabling act. That assistance could take several forms: giving parliamentarians a fallback option, providing them with a pro-democracy environment, giving them guidance on the right thing to do, or monitoring them.

8. Conclusion

In a crucial vote where a large majority of their peers endorsed an enabling act leading to the end of the Third Republic and the advent of a dictatorship, democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more likely than other politicians to oppose the act. The finding is specific to democratic dynastic parliamentarians, defined as members of a dynasty whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals. It does not extend to other dynastic parliamentarians. The result is robust to adding a series of control variables, to taking into account the possibility of a selection in the vote, and to the way abstention is taken into account. Moreover, propensity score estimates suggest that the relationship is causal.

We provide suggestive evidence that the specific behavior of democratic dynastic parliamentarians was not driven by peer effects within parties, or by a capacity to accumulate more experience or recognition in parliament, or by the monitoring or pressure of surviving members of the dynasty. Moreover, although the behavior of parliamentarians in previous votes granting more power to the executive is predictive of the opposition to the enabling act, we could observe no behavior specific to democratic dynastic parliamentarians. Accordingly, their role materialized only in the vote for the enabling act, when party coordination was impossible, uncertainty and pressure were high, and democracy was directly at stake.

We provide evidence that democratic dynastic parliamentarians from dynasties with a relationship to labor and agricultural organizations were particularly likely to oppose the act. Finally, among democratic dynastic parliamentarians, those with less experience in parliament but more experience in local politics and with a connection to labor and agricultural organizations were more likely to vote against the act. Although those results are only suggestive, they point to a series of non-mutually exclusive drivers of the effect of democratic dynasties, emphasizing an internalized democratic norm and the role of a pro-democratic environment in monitoring and guiding the vote of democratic dynastic parliamentarians.

Further, the finding that those with greater parliamentary experience were less likely to oppose the act while those with more local political experience were more likely to oppose it

also suggests an important role for socialization and connections during their political career. Those who had had less time to be embedded in a network of relationships within parliament and who had more relationships outside parliament could better resist the incentive to conform to the majority of parliamentarians.

Those results stand in contrast to those of the literature on political dynasties. While the literature points out the negative consequences of such dynasties, we find that in a particular instance, they were more likely to oppose an autocratic reversal. In that respect, the emergence of democratic dynasties may contribute to the long-term stabilization of democracy after a democratic transition.

Moreover, we observe that the effect was entirely driven by democratic dynastic parliamentarians, as opposed to their non-democratic dynastic peers, who belonged to a dynasty whose foundation was unrelated to the advent of or support for democracy. This finding also refines the literature on political dynasties by showing that dynasties should not be considered as a homogenous group. Our results highlight that dynasties may differ in terms of their democratic nature. Political dynasties may differ along other dimensions that have not been studied yet.

History offers numerous examples of successful or failed autocratic reversals, including Spain in the 1930s and 1980s, or authoritarian backsliding, like contemporary Hungary. Gauging the role that democratic dynasties may have played in those instances would make it possible to refine our results and test their generalizability. This offers perspectives for future research.

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Tables

Table 1: Democratic dynastic politicians versus Non-democratic dynastic politicians

	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.5)	(1.6)
	Democratic dynastic	Non-dynastic	Non-democratic dynastic	(1.2)-(1.1) No-dynastic – Democratic dynastic	(1.3)-(1.1) Non-democratic dynastic - Democratic dynastic	(1.2)-(1.3) Non-dynastic - Non-democratic dynastic
Jewish	0.045 (0.026)	0.03 (0.006)	0 (0)	-0.016 (0.022)	-0.045* (0.027)	0.03 (0.02)
Freemason	0.076 (0.03)	0.058 (0.009)	0 (0)	-0.018 (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	0.058* (0.03)
Years of study	5.17 (0.36)	3.43 (0.11)	3.72 (0.4)	-1.45*** (0.53)	-1.73*** (0.39)	-0.28 (0.41)
Low-skilled	0.09 (0.036)	0.22 (0.02)	0.2 (0.052)	0.13** (0.05)	0.11* (0.06)	0.02 (0.01)
Law	0.48 (0.061)	0.28 (0.017)	0.25 (0.056)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.08)	0.027 (0.02)
Journalist	0.14 (0.043)	0.14 (0.012)	0.03 (0.02)	0.0 (0.044)	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.10** (0.04)
Occupied	0.39 (0.06)	0.52 (0.02)	0.63 (0.06)	0.12* (0.05)	0.24*** (0.09)	0.11* (0.07)
Crossed	0.26 (0.05)	0.13 (0.01)	0.12 (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.14** (0.07)	0.01 (0.05)
Left	0.15 (0.04)	0.23 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)

Standard deviation in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Democratic dynasties and determinants of opposition to the 1940 enabling act:

Baseline results

	(2.1)	(2.2)	(2.3)	(2.4)
Dependent variable	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
Political Dynasty	0.301** (2.062)		0.995** (2.205)	
Democratic dynasty		0.728*** (3.612)		1.079** (2.525)
Non-democratic dynasty		-0.414 (-1.001)		0.808 (1.016)
In <i>Senate</i>			0.705 (1.446)	0.684 (1.408)
Age			0.0194 (1.035)	0.0194 (1.034)
Jewish			0.279 (0.596)	0.262 (0.571)
Freemason			1.008* (1.947)	0.998* (1.913)
Years of study			0.0478 (0.435)	0.0477 (0.435)
Occupation :				
Journalist			-0.398 (-0.796)	-0.405 (-0.801)
Law-related			0.500 (0.882)	0.493 (0.864)
Medical profession			0.988 (1.631)	0.977 (1.627)
Civil Servant			-1.026** (-2.348)	-1.027** (-2.317)
Low-skilled			0.382 (1.093)	0.385 (1.080)
Occupied territory			-0.231 (-0.850)	-0.236 (-0.879)
Crossed by the demarcation line			0.0889 (0.284)	0.0714 (0.221)
WWI veteran			0.285 (1.355)	0.288 (1.338)
Center			2.001*** (2.891)	1.982*** (2.894)
Left			3.208*** (5.488)	3.179*** (5.629)
Mean Abstention in the Département			0.498 (0.289)	0.491 (0.283)
Mean Opposition in the Département			2.980*** (4.490)	2.965*** (4.330)
Constant	-2.050*** (-5.770)	-2.050*** (-5.770)	-6.121*** (-4.216)	-6.084*** (-4.240)
Marginal effect (Dynasty)	0.032		0.0833**	
Marginal effect (Democratic dynasty)		0.076**		0.090***
Marginal effect (Non-democratic dynasty)		-0.043		0.068
Observations	669	669	669	669
Pseudo R ²	0.00194	0.00989	0.227	0.227

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the party-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Marginal effects are computed from the reference value of the variable

Table 3: Democratic dynasties and dynasties' characteristics

	(3.1)	(3.2)	(3.3)	(3.4)	(3.5)	(3.6)	(3.7)	(3.8)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Dependent variable	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
Dynasty – Founding fathers (III rd Republic)	1.099** (1.998)	1.168** (2.030)						
Democratic dynasty				1.084*** (2.698)		1.878** (2.555)		
Non-democratic dynasty		0.789 (1.004)		0.814 (1.042)		1.176 (1.319)		0.787 (0.992)
Dynasty with a member alive			0.733 (0.714)	-0.0426 (-0.0432)				
One-generation old dynasty					0.673 (1.240)	-0.955 (-1.101)		
Dynasty with Labor and Agr Org							1.645*** (7.102)	
Democratic & Labor and Agr Org								1.767*** (7.642)
Democratic & No Labor and Agr Org								0.883* (1.809)
Constant	-5.764*** (-4.278)	-5.939*** (-4.204)	-5.769*** (-4.463)	-6.085*** (-4.243)	-5.874*** (-4.061)	-6.153*** (-4.636)	-5.815*** (-4.659)	-6.090*** (-4.371)
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Départements</i> means	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marginal effect (Dem dyn)				0.091***		0.16***		
Marginal effect (Founding fathers)	0.093**	0.098**						
Marginal effect (No-Dem dyn)		0.066		0.068		0.98		0.066
Marginal effect (Labor and Agr Org Dyn)							0.14***	
Marginal effect (Dem+ Labor and Agr Org)								0.073**
Marginal effect (Dem+Labor and Agr Org)								0.15***
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669
Log-likelihood	-190.3	-189.5	-192.5	-189.3	-191.6	-188.5	-190.9	-188.8

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Marginal effects are computed from the reference value of the variable. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

Table 4a: When do democratic dynasties appear? Dynasties and previous votes on power delegation

	(4a.1)	(4a.2)	(4a.3)	(4a.4)	(4a.5)	(4a.6)	(4a.7)	(4a.8)	(4a.9)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
	All			Blum			Daladier		
Dependent variable	# Against C&B	# Abstained	% of votes opposed to party line	# Against C&B	# Abstained	% of votes opposed to party line	# Against C&B	# Abstained	% of votes opposed to party line
Democratic Dynasty	-0.00857 (-0.0813)	0.0283 (1.292)	0.0516 (0.405)	-0.0208 (-0.249)	0.0397 (0.996)	-0.0315 (-0.480)	0.0292 (0.535)	0.00735 (0.470)	0.0901 (1.048)
Non-democratic Dynasty	0.172 (1.091)	0.00801 (0.371)	0.0545 (0.336)	0.214 (1.444)	-0.0159 (-0.623)	-0.0491 (-0.479)	-0.0471* (-1.965)	-0.0105 (-0.919)	0.101 (0.894)
Constant	1.118*** (3.633)	0.0253 (0.696)	0.993** (2.763)	1.035*** (3.161)	0.0330 (0.503)	0.511** (2.406)	0.196* (2.069)	0.0298 (1.024)	0.532** (2.598)
Observations	669	667	669	669	603	669	669	664	669
R-squared	0.272	0.122	0.091	0.470	0.144	0.131	0.827	0.057	0.201
Adjusted R ²	0.254	0.1000	0.0684	0.457	0.121	0.110	0.822	0.0337	0.181

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Marginal effects are computed from the reference value of the variable. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

Table 4b: When do democratic dynasties appear? Controlling for previous votes on power delegation

	(4b.1)	(4b.2)	(4b.3)	(4b.4)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Dependent variable	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
Democratic dynasty	1.079** (2.489)	1.096** (2.423)	0.999** (2.248)	1.050** (2.250)
Non-democratic dynasty	0.838 (1.084)	0.770 (1.014)	0.745 (0.971)	0.660 (0.921)
# Votes against	-0.0926 (-0.386)			0.0615 (0.211)
Abstention at C&B votes		0.367*** (2.959)		0.446*** (3.764)
Opposition to party line			2.045*** (2.708)	1.668 (1.403)
Constant	-5.983*** (-3.789)	-6.726*** (-5.733)	-6.050*** (-4.282)	-6.966*** (-4.930)
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Départements</i> means	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marginal effect (Dem Dyn)	0.090***	0.090***	0.083***	0.085**
Marginal effect (No-Dem Dyn)	0.070	0.064	0.062	0.053
Observations	669	669	667	667
Log-likelihood	-189.2	-186.0	-186.8	-183.1

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Marginal effects are computed from the reference value of the variable. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

Table 5: Which individual characteristics lead to more opposition within democratic dynasties?

	(5.1)	(5.2)	(5.3)	(5.4)	(5.5)
Dependent variable	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Sample	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
	Democratic dynasties	Democratic dynasties	Democratic dynasties	Democratic dynasties	Democratic dynasties
<i>Significant Characteristics</i>					
		Experience in the parliament		Connections outside the parliament	
Interventions in Chamber (1936-1939)		-19.34*** (-5.371)			
Special role in the Assembly			-6.670*** (-4.491)		
Length as a <i>conseiller général</i>				0.147*** (2.644)	
Dynasty with Labor and Agr Org					6.036*** (3.573)
<i>Significant control variables</i>					
Low-skilled	4.038*** (3.528)	8.079*** (3.942)	8.084** (2.571)	5.631** (2.457)	7.276*** (4.497)
Constant	-19.69*** (-2.826)	-47.29*** (-3.306)	-47.55*** (-4.075)	-26.96*** (-3.902)	-27.83*** (-2.614)
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Département</i> means	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	57	57	57	57	57
Pseudo – R ²	0.649	0.737	0.722	0.694	0.705

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Marginal effects are computed from the reference value of the variable. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

ONLINE APPENDICES

Appendix Table 1: Democratic dynastic politicians versus Non-democratic dynastic politicians (Non-significant variables)

	(A.1)	(A.2)	(A.3)	(A.4)	(A.5)	(A.6)
	Democratic dynastic	Non-dynastic	Non- democratic dynastic	(A.2)-(A.1) No-dynastic – Democratic dynastic	(A.3)-(A.1) Non- democratic dynastic - Democratic dynastic	(A.2)-(A.3) Non-dynastic - Non- democratic dynastic
Age	56.53 (1.46)	56.55 (0.42)	55.85 (1.63)	0.02 (1.46)	-0.68 (2.19)	0.70 (1.54)
In <i>Senate</i>	0.5 (0.06)	0.34 (0.02)	0.4 (0.06)	-0.16*** (0.06)	-0.10 (0.09)	0.06 (0.06)
Medical Profession	0.12 (0.04)	0.11 (0.01)	0.067 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.039 (0.04)
Civil Servant	0.11 (0.04)	0.07 (0.01)	0.08 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)
Mean opposition in <i>Département</i>	0.10 (0.02)	0.11 (0.01)	0.07 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Mean abstention in <i>Département</i>	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.00)	0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Center	0.23 (0.05)	0.22 (0.02)	0.13 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.06)

Standard deviation in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix A: Robustness checks

A.1. Taking selection in the vote into consideration

Table A1: Sequential Logit

Dependent variable	(A1.1)	(A1.2)
	Going to Vichy to cast a vote	Vote _i =No
Democratic dynasty	0.466* (1.762)	1.079** (2.525)
Non-democratic dynasty	0.333 (0.746)	0.808 (1.016)
In <i>Senate</i>	-0.0216 (-0.0693)	0.684 (1.408)
Age	-0.0179 (-1.631)	0.0194 (1.034)
Jewish	-1.099*** (-2.696)	0.262 (0.571)
Freemason	-0.338 (-1.301)	0.998* (1.913)
Years of study	0.0477 (1.597)	0.0477 (0.435)
Occupation :		
Journalist	-0.408* (-1.920)	-0.405 (-0.801)
Law-related	-0.341 (-1.233)	0.493 (0.864)
Medical profession	-0.155 (-0.619)	0.977 (1.627)
Civil Servant	-0.355 (-0.929)	-1.027** (-2.317)
Low-skilled	-0.342* (-1.904)	0.385 (1.080)
Occupied territory	-1.214*** (-3.444)	-0.236 (-0.879)
Crossed by the demarcation line	-0.470 (-1.051)	0.0714 (0.221)
WWI veteran	0.320 (1.249)	0.288 (1.338)
Constant	3.143*** (5.420)	-6.084*** (-4.240)
Political orientation	Yes	Yes
<i>Départements</i> means	Yes	Yes
Marginal effect (Democratic Dynasty)	0.060*	0.090***
Marginal effect (Non-democratic dynasty)	0.014	0.068
Observations	847	847

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Marginal effects are computed from the reference value of the variable. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

A.2. Taking abstention into account

Table A2: Taking abstention into account

	(A2.1)	(A2.2)	(A2.3)
Dependent variable	Ordered logit	Multinomial Logit	Multinomial Logit
	Opposition (=0 if Vote _i =Yes / =1 if Vote _i =Abstention / =2 if Vote _i =No)	Vote _i =Abstention	Vote _i =No
Democratic dynasty	0.938*** (2.675)	-1.090 (-0.844)	1.061*** (2.577)
Non-Democratic dynasty	0.350 (0.473)	-16.13*** (-25.38)	0.766 (0.969)
Constant		-5.935*** (-2.646)	-6.120*** (-4.273)
Constant cut1	5.169*** (4.997)		
Constant cut2	5.487*** (5.498)		
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Départements</i> means	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	669	669	669
Log-likelihood	-273.7	-248.9	-248.9

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Marginal effects are computed from the reference value of the variable. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

A.3. Propensity score estimates

Table A3: Propensity Score Matching

	(A3.1) Matching - 1 match	(A3.2) Matching - 2 matches	(A3.3) Matching - 3 matches	(A3.4) Matching - 4 matches	(A3.5) Matching - 5 matches
Dependent variable	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
	Panel A / Comparison group : Non-dynastic + Non-democratic dynastic parliamentarians				
Democratic dynasty	0.105** (2.038)	0.105** (2.068)	0.111** (2.448)	0.101** (2.310)	0.0982** (2.355)
	Panel B / Comparison group : Non-dynastic parliamentarians				
Democratic dynasty	0.0877** (2.229)	0.114*** (3.408)	0.117*** (4.542)	0.127*** (5.016)	0.105*** (4.976)
Observations	669	669	669	669	669

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Matching on political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means. Standard errors take into account that the propensity score is estimated.

Appendix B: Extensions – Which are the transmission channels?

Table B1: Within-party peer effects

	(B1.1)	(B1.2)	(B1.3)	(B1.4)	(B1.7)	(B1.8)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Dependent variable	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
Political dynasty	1.011** (2.128)		1.010** (2.197)		1.023** (2.128)	
Democratic dynasty		1.103** (2.452)		1.100** (2.492)		1.119** (2.421)
Non-democratic dynasty		0.812 (1.009)		0.815 (1.031)		0.816 (1.024)
Labor and Agr Org	0.277 (0.929)	0.284 (0.971)			0.270 (0.925)	0.276 (0.965)
Mean abstention –Same Party			-5.260 (-0.214)	-5.619 (-0.229)	-4.834 (-0.197)	-5.201 (-0.213)
Mean opposition –Same Party			-0.909 (-0.284)	-0.954 (-0.299)	-0.749 (-0.238)	-0.793 (-0.252)
Constant	-6.155*** (-5.508)	-6.117*** (-5.473)	-5.992*** (-5.389)	-5.943*** (-5.338)	-6.028*** (-4.284)	-5.977*** (-4.325)
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Départements</i> means	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marginal effect (Pol Dyn)	0.085**		0.085**		0.086**	
Marginal effect (Dem Dyn)		0.092***		0.092***		0.094***
Marginal effect (Non-Dem Dyn)		0.068		0.068		0.068
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669
Log-likelihood	-189.1	-189.0	-189.3	-189.2	-189.0	-188.9

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Marginal effects are computed from the reference value of the variable. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

Table B2: Extensions – controlling for individual political capital

	(B2.1)	(B2.2)	(B2.3)	(B2.4)	(B2.5)	(B2.6)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Dependent variable	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
Democratic dynasty	1.113*** (2.728)	1.069** (2.501)	1.103*** (2.789)	1.070** (2.447)	1.060** (2.515)	1.101*** (2.862)
Non-democratic dynasty	0.748 (0.920)	0.807 (1.018)	0.812 (1.028)	0.797 (0.991)	0.748 (0.956)	0.675 (0.818)
War Medal	0.858* (1.880)					0.852* (1.852)
<i>Légion d'Honneur</i>	0.174 (0.696)					0.155 (0.672)
Length Biography		0.000150 (0.467)				0.000315 (1.194)
Length Ministerial cabinet			-0.0636 (-0.528)			-0.126 (-1.578)
Length national mandates				0.00452 (0.248)		0.000666 (0.0276)
Mayor					0.445 (1.372)	0.463 (1.607)
Length – <i>conseiller général</i>					0.00981 (0.905)	0.00726 (0.528)
Constant	-6.207*** (-4.100)	-6.026*** (-4.310)	-6.111*** (-4.337)	-6.020*** (-3.803)	-5.991*** (-4.287)	-6.069*** (-3.812)
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Départements</i> means	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marginal effect (Dem Dyn)	0.092***	0.089***	0.092***	0.090***	0.088***	0.090***
Marginal Effect (Non-Dem Dyn)	0.062	0.067	0.068	0.067	0.062	0.055
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669
Log-likelihood	-187.2	-189.2	-189.2	-189.3	-187.5	-185.1

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Marginal effects are computed from the reference value of the variable. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

Table B3: Controlling for individual political capital in Chamber

	(B3.1)	(B3.2)	(B3.3)	(B3.4)	(B3.5)	(B3.6)	(B3.7)	(B3.8)	(B3.9)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Dependent variable	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
Democratic dynasty	1.059** (2.487)	1.036** (2.156)	1.079** (2.533)	1.080** (2.442)	1.074** (2.538)	1.154*** (2.725)	1.086** (2.518)	1.072** (2.499)	1.057** (2.041)
Non-democratic dynasty	0.785 (0.940)	0.804 (1.020)	0.805 (1.011)	0.897 (1.237)	0.807 (1.017)	0.910 (1.176)	0.824 (1.058)	0.812 (1.023)	0.918 (1.185)
# commissions	0.129 (1.640)								0.140 (1.462)
Special role (=1)		0.219 (0.551)							0.215 (0.532)
# interventions (1936-1940)			-0.0360 (-0.578)						-0.255 (-1.051)
# applause Left (1936-1940)				0.259 (1.116)					0.198 (0.676)
# applause Right (1936-1940)					-0.0648 (-0.298)				0.0207 (0.0727)
# applause - chamber (1936-1940)						0.234** (2.434)			0.175 (1.029)
# boos from the right (1936-1940)							0.211 (0.837)		0.0809 (0.662)
# boos from the left (1936-1940)								-0.0754 (-0.424)	-0.118 (-0.446)
Constant	-6.385*** (-4.878)	-6.108*** (-4.267)	-6.112*** (-4.257)	-5.748*** (-3.711)	-6.077*** (-4.236)	-5.919*** (-4.096)	-5.816*** (-3.666)	-6.091*** (-4.198)	-6.088*** (-4.444)
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Département means	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marginal effect (Dem Dyn)	0.088***	0.087**	0.090***	0.089***	0.090***	0.096***	0.090***	0.090***	0.086**
Margin effect (No-dem Dyn)	0.065	0.067	0.067	0.074	0.068	0.075	0.068	0.068	0.075
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669
Log-likelihood	-188.5	-189.2	-189.2	-186.7	-189.2	-187.3	-188.3	-189.2	-184.4

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Marginal effects are computed from the reference value of the variable. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

Appendix C: Technical Appendix

Table C1: Democratic culture – Votes to measure taste for checks and balances

Date / Cabinet	Vote on power delegation	Parliamentary debate
19/03/1939 Daladier	The government is allowed to take any necessary measures to defend the Homeland by decree.	M. Fleuret “What honors and weakens a democracy is debate; the free examination of law projects by the deliberative assemblies” Journal officiel – Sénat 19/03/1939 M. Bachelet : “The powers you will provide the government with will allow it to take measures of the same kind as a dictator’s” Journal officiel – Sénat 19/03/1939
30/11/1939 Daladier	“In case of emergency, the government is allowed to take any measures guaranteeing the defense of the Nation after deliberation by the ministers’ cabinet”	M. Rotinat “The commission does not agree on renouncing the parliament’s right to control law projects, which is the mere principle of democracy.” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 30/11/1939
04/10/1938 Daladier	Grant the government with the necessary powers to “improve the economic and financial situation of the country”	M. Philip “ Be sure that we will not reform our democracy if we do not show the respect we owe each-other to discuss law projects » Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 04/10/1938 M. Grésa “Full-powers, decrees, here is a dangerous path for our democracy.” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 04/10/1938
06/04/1938 Blum	Grant the government with the necessary powers to face its financial liabilities, especially for its defense expenses.	M. Reynaud “In the present situation, we abuse the concept of popular will” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 06/04/1938 “We have no right to accept this imperative mandate” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 06/04/1938
19/06/1937 Blum	Grant the government with the necessary powers to “improve the economic and financial situation of the country”	M. Piétri “Every dictatorship took advantage of the legitimacy of the blank check. It contradicts the necessary critic which is the law of true democracies.” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 19/06/1937 M. André Albert “I thought and still think that the politics of power delegation might weaken the republican principle itself.” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 19/06/1937

Table C2: List of dynastic politicians

<u>parliamentarian in 1940</u>	<u>Democratic dynasty</u>	<u>Dynasty Founder</u>	<u>Political regime</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Party</u>
Bernard d'Aillières	NO	Augustin, Henry Caillard d'Aillières	July Monarchy	Deputy (1837-1839)	Ministerial majority
André Albert	YES	François Albert	Third Republic	Senator (1920-1927) Deputy (1928-1933) Took part in the Commune (1871)	Radical Party
Gaston Allemane	YES	Jean Allemane	Third Republic	Deputy (1901-1902 /1906-1910)	Republican - Socialist
Hubert d'Andlau de Hombourg	NO	Frédéric-Antoine-Marc d'Andlau	Monarchy	Noble at the General Estate of 1789	Royalist
Joseph Antier	NO	Abbé Antier	Absolute monarchy	Reactionary Abbot during the French Revolution	Monarchist
Paul Antier	NO	Abbé Antier	Absolute monarchy	Reactionary Abbot during the French Revolution	Monarchist
Étienne d'Audiffret-Pasquier	NO	Etienne-Denis Pasquier	Restoration July Monarchy	President of the deputies assembly (1816-1817) President of the Chamber of Pairs (1830-1848)	Monarchist
Léonide Babaud-Lacroze	YES	Antoine Babaud-Lacroze	Third Republic	Deputy (1890-1919)	Republican
Paul Bachelet	YES	Henri Bachelet	Third Republic	Senator (1920-1930)	Republican Union
Emerand Bardoul	NO	Julien-Marie Bardoul	Third Republic	Mayor of Marsac-sur Don Conseiller général of Guéméné Penfao	Republican Federation
Jacques Bardoux	YES	Agénor Bardoux	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1881) Senator (1882-1897)	Republican
Léon Baréty	YES	Alexandre Baréty	Third Republic	Conseiller général Mayor of Puget Théniers Mayor of Lauzerte (1896-1904)	Republican
Étienne Baron	YES	Jean Baron	Third Republic	Conseiller général (1892-1904)	Republican
Comte Jean de Beaumont	NO	Marc-Antoine de Beaumont	Restoration	Pair of France (1814-1830)	Monarchist
Adrien Bels	YES	Gabriel Lamothe-Pradelle	Third Republic	Deputy (1885-1888)	Republican
Paul Bénazet	NO	Louis Marie Joseph Bénazet	Restoration	General of the Empire Mayor of Dunkirk (1826-1846)	Monarchist
Louis de Blois	NO	Eugène Caillaux	Third Republic	Deputy (1871-1876) Senator (1876-1882)	Monarchist

Jean Boivin-Champeaux	YES	Paul Boivin-Champeaux	Third Republic	Senator (1907-1925)	Democratic Left
François Boux de Casson	NO	Charles de Casson	Absolute monarchy	Local Lord	Monarchist
André Breton	YES	Jules-Louis Breton	Third Republic	Deputy (1898-1921) Senator (1921-1930)	Socialist
Auguste Brunet	YES	Louis Brunet	Third Republic	Deputy (1893-1905) Senator(1905)	Republican
Louis Buyat	YES	Etienne Buyat	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1887)	Republican
Joseph Caillaux	NO	Alexandre Eugène Caillaux	Third Republic	Deputy (1871-1876) Senator (1876-1882)	Monarchist
Stanislas de Castellane	NO	Boniface de Castellane	Restoration	Pair of France (1815-1837)	Monarchist
Jean Chaulin-Servinière	YES	Lucien Chaulin-Servinière	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1898)	Progressist Republican
Alphonse Chautemps	YES	Emile Chautemps	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1905) Senator (1905-1918)	Radical Socialist
Camille Chautemps	YES	Emile Chautemps	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1905) Senator (1905-1918)	Radical Socialist
Emery Compayré	NO	Etienne Compayré	Revolution	Legislative body (1798-1903)	Bonapartist
Joseph Coucoureux	YES	Lucien Coucoureux	Third Republic	Conseiller général (1875-1907)	Republican
Charles Delesalle	NO	Charles Delesalle	Third Republic	Mayor of Lille (1904-1919)	No political affiliation (Right conservatism)
Roger Delthil	YES	Camille Delthil	Third Republic	Mayor of Moissac (1894-1895) Senator (1902)	Republican
René Delzangles	NO	Pierre Delzangles	Third Republic	Mayor of Villefranque	No political affiliation
Jean Deschanel	YES	Emile Deschanel	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1881) Senator (1881-1904)	Moderate Republican
Charles Desjardins	YES	Jules Desjardins	Third Republic	Deputy (1893-1914)	Moderate Republican
Louis de Diesbach de Belleruche	NO	Eugène de Belleruche de Diesbach	Third Republic	Deputy (1871-1876)	Bonapartist
Pierre Dignac	NO	Eugène Dignac	July Monarchy	Mayor of Gujan-Mestras	Monarchist
Jacques Duboys-Fresney	YES	Etienne Duboys-Fresney	July Monarchy	Deputy (1842-1846 / 1871-1876)	Republican
Pierre Duchesne-Fournet	YES	Paul Duchesne-Fournet	Third Republic	Deputy (1881-1885) Senator (1894-1906)	Republican
Pierre Dupuy	YES	Jean Dupuy	Third Republic	Senator (1891-1919)	Republican
Henri Elby	YES	Jules Elby	Third Republic	Senator (1923-1933)	Republican Union
Pierre Even	YES	Jacques Even	Third Republic	Deputy (1881-1885)	Republican Left

André Fallières	YES	Armand Fallières	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1889)	Republican Left
Roger Farjon	YES	Pierre Farjon	Third Republic	Deputy (1906-1910)	Republican
Camille Ferrand	YES	Emile Labussière	Third Republic	Deputy (1893-1906)	Socialist
Pierre-Étienne Flandin	YES	Hippolyte Ribière	Third Republic	Senator (1876-1885)	Republican Left
Achille-Armand Fould	NO	Achille Marcus Fould	Second Empire	Minister of State (1852-1860)	Bonapartist
François du Fretay	NO	René Monjaret de Kerjégu	Absolute monarchy	Concellor of the King Mayor of Moncontour	Monarchist
Félix Gadaud	YES	Antoine Gadaud	Third Republic	Deputy (1885-1889) Senator (1891-1897)	Republican Union
André Goirand	YES	Léopold Goirand	Third Republic	Deputy (1887-1898) Senator (1906-1920)	Republican
Georges de Grandmaison	NO	Comte Lobau	Restoration	Deputy (1828-1833)	Monarchist
Charles Robert de Grandmaison	NO	Comte Lobau	Restoration	Deputy (1828-1833)	Monarchist
Edmond Hannotin	NO	Maurice Sabatier	Third Republic	Mayor of Viry-Chatillon	Conservatism
André Join-Lambert	NO	Arthur Join-Lambert	Third Republic	Conseiller général of Brionne	Monarchist
Marquis Jacques de Juigné	NO	Jacques Leclerc de Juigné	Absolute monarchy	Representing nobility at the General Estate of 1789	Monarchist
Edgar de Kergariou	NO	Joseph de Kergariou	Restoration	Deputy (1820-1827)	Monarchist
Guy La Chambre	YES	Charles-Emile La Chambre	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1878 / 1889-1893)	Republican Moderate
Marquis Henri de La Ferronnays	NO	Pierre Léon de la Ferronnays	Restoration	Pair of France	Monarchist
Lucien Lamoureux	YES	Etienne Lamoureux	Third Republic	Deputy (1910-1914)	Republican radical socialist
Fernand Lavergne	YES	Bernard Lavergne	Second Empire	Deputy (1849-1851 / 1876-1889) Senator (1889-1900)	Montagne / Republican
Edmond Leblanc	NO	Edmond Lucien Leblanc	Third Republic	Deputy (1884-1889)	Conservative Union
Jean Le Cour Grandmaison	NO	Adolphe le Cour Grandmaison	Second Republic	Deputy (1849)	Bonapartist
Edmond Lefebvre du Prey	NO	François-Joseph Lefebvre-Cayet	Directory	Member of the "Conseil des Anciens" (1800-1811)	Monarchist
Victor Lourties	YES	Victor Lourties	Third Republic	Senator (1888-1920)	Republican left
Émile Malon	NO	Pascal Malon	Third Republic	Mayor of Saint-Georges de Rouellé	No political affiliation
Augustin Michel	YES	Adrien Michel	Third Republic	Deputy (1902-1906)	Republican moderate

Eugène Milliès-Lacroix	YES	Raphaël Milliès-Lacroix	Third Republic	Senator (1897-1933)	Republican
Joseph Monsservin	YES	Emile Monsservin	Third Republic	Senator (1892-1911)	Republican
Hubert de Montaigu	NO	François de Wendel	Restoration	Deputy (1815-1825)	Monarchist
Geoffroy de Montalembert	NO	Marc René de Montalembert	Restoration	Pair of France (1819-1830)	Monarchist
Jean Montigny	NO	Jean-Joseph de Verneilh-Puyraseau	Restoration	Deputy (1817-1824 / 1827-1830)	Monarchist
Louis Nachon	NO	Missing Name	Third Republic	Mayor of Conliège (1891-1921)	No political affiliation
Henri de Pavin de Lafarge	NO	Joseph Pavin de Lafarge	Third Republic	Mayor of Viviers (1897-1935)	Republican Federation
François Piétri	NO	Francois Piétri	French Revolution	Deputy at the Constituting Assembly	Moderate group
Étienne Pinault	YES	Eugène Pinault	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1889) Senator (1901-1913)	Republican Union
Jean-Pierre Plichon	NO	Ignace Plichon	July Monarchy	Deputy (1846-1848 / 1857-1888)	Monarchist
François Reille-Soult-Dalmatie	NO	Jean-de Dieu Soult	July Monarchy	Chief of government (1832-1834 / 1839-1847)	Monarchist
René Rollin	YES	Henri Rollin	Third Republic	Deputy (1932-1933)	Republican Radical Socialist
Guillaume des Rotours	NO	Eugène des Rotours	Second Empire	Deputy (1868-1889)	Bonapartist
Georges Roulleaux-Dugage	NO	Henri Roulleaux Dugage	Second Empire	Deputy (1852-1870)	Bonapartist
Édouard Roussel	YES	Edouard Roussel	Third Republic	Conseiller général (1898-1910)	Republican
Henri Salengro	YES	Roger Salengro	Third Republic	Deputy (1928-1936)	Socialist
Albert Sarraut	YES	Omer Sarraut	Third Republic	Mayor of Carcassone (1887)	Radical
Paul Saurin	NO	Paul Saurin	Third Republic	Senator (1927-1933)	Independant
Émile Taudière	NO	Jacques-Paul Taudière	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1893)	Conservatism
René Thorp	YES	Antoine Dubost	Third Republic	Deputy (1880-1897) Senator (1897-1921)	Radical
Pierre Sérandour	YES	Pierre Marie Sérandour	Third Republic	Deputy (1924-1928)	Republican left
Marcel-François Astier	YES	Francois Astier	Third Republic	Deputy (1909-1910)	Radical Socialist
Laurent Bonnevey	YES	Jacques Bonnevey	Third Republic	Conseiller général du Rhône	Republican
Georges Bruguier	YES	Victorien Bruguier	Third Republic	Municipal council of Nice (1888-"")	Republican
Pierre de Chambrun	NO	Joseph Aldebert de Chambrun	Second Empire	Deputy (1857-1871)	Bonapartist

Maurice Delom-Sorbé	YES	Joseph Delom-Sorbé	Third Republic	Deputy (1914-1921)	Republican Left
Marx Dormoy	YES	Jean Dormoy	Third Republic	Mayor of Montluçon (1892-1898)	Socialist
Amédée Guy	YES	Jules Guy	Third Republic	Mayor of Bonneville (1900-1904)	Republican
Jean Hennessy	NO	Jacques Hennessy	Restoration	Deputy(1824-1842)	Monarchist
François Labrousse	YES	Philippe Labrousse	Third Republic	Deputy (1884-1893) Senator (1894-1910)	Radical left
Albert Le Bail	YES	Roland le Bail	Restoration	Mayor of Plozévet (1837-1840)	Anti-Monarchist Republican
Alfred Margaine	YES	Henri Margaine	Third Republic	Deputy (1871-1888) Senator (1888-1893)	Republican Left
Robert Mauger	YES	Pierre Mauger-Violleau	Third Republic	Deputy (1924)	Republican Socialist
Léonel de Moustier	NO	Clément Edouard, de Moustier	July Monarchy	Deputy (1824-1827)	Monarchist
Léon Roche	NO	Marie-Léon Roche	Third Republic	Mayor of Oradour-sur-Vayre	No political affiliation
Isidore Thivrier	YES	Christophe Thivrier	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1895)	Republican
Théodore Steeg	YES	Jules Steeg	Third Republic	Deputy (1881-1889)	Republican Union
Paul Bastid	YES	Paul Devès	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1885)	Republican Left
Michel Tony-Révillon	YES	Tony Révillon	Third Republic	Deputy (1881-1893)	Socialist
Robert Lassalle	YES	Gustave Lassalle	Third Republic	Conseiller général of Soustons (1901-1913)	Republican
Jean Bouhey	YES	Jean-Baptiste Bouhey-Allex	Third Republic	Deputy (1902-1913)	Socialist
François de Wendel	NO	François de Wendel	Restoration	Deputy (1815-1825)	Monarchist
Jean Chiappe	NO	Ange Chiappe	Convention	Deputy (1792-1797)	Moderate - Conservatism
Bernard de Coral	NO	Jules Labat	Second Empire	Deputy(1869-1893)	Moderate Conservatism
Paul Cuttoli	YES	Jules Cuttoli	Third Republic	Deputy (1928-1936)	Republican radical
Ernest Daraignez	NO	Joseph Daraignez	Third Republic	Mayor of Hagetmau (1904-1908)	No political affiliation
Armand Dupuis	NO	Charles Dupuis	Third Republic	Mayor and Conseiller général	No political affiliation
Paul Faure	YES	M. Faure	Third Republic	Conseiller général de Dordogne	Republican
Michel Geistdoerfer	YES	Michel Geistdoerfer	Third Republic	Municipal Council of Dinan	Republican
François Charles d'Harcourt	NO	François Gabriel d'Harcourt	July Monarchy	Deputy (1827-1837)	Monarchist

James Hennessy	NO	Jacques Hennessy	Restoration	Deputy(1824-1842)	Monarchist
Paul Vasseux	NO	Name missing	Second Empire	Mayor of Golancourt	No political affiliation
Georges Denis	NO	Jean-Henri Merle d'Aubigné	First Empire (Germany)	Chaplain to Wilhem the first	Monarchist - Evangelist
Jean Neyret	NO	Blaise Neyret	Third Republic	Deputy (1914-1924)	Republican Federation
Jacques Poitou-Duplessy	NO	Roger Poitou-Duplessy	Third Republic	Deputy(1910-1914)	Catholic of Liberal Action
François de Saint-Just	NO	Victor de Saint-Just d'Autingues	Third Republic	Deputy (1924-1933)	Republican Federation
Charles Saint-Venant	YES	Charles Saint-Venant	Third Republic	Deputy (1919-1926)	Socialist
Paul Giacobbi	YES	Marius Giacobbi	Third Republic	Deputy (1914-1919) Senator (1903-1912)	Radical
Paul Reynaud	YES	Hippolyte Gassier	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1885) Senator (1930-1907)	Republican
Maurice Cabart-Danneville	YES	Jean-Baptiste De Beauvais	French Revolution	Representing clergy at the General Estates of 1789	Reformist
Amaury de la Grange	NO	Prosper de Lagrange	Second Empire	Deputy (1852-1857)	Bonapartist

Table C3: Variables description

Variable	Description	Source
<u>Dependent variables</u>		
Family Rep	1 if family member is or has been a Mayor, a <i>Conseiller général</i> or a national representative in a party of a Republican origin	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Study Years	Number of years needed to achieve the highest degree obtained by the representative	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
<u>Control variables</u>		
Freemason	1 if Freemason (0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Study Years	Number of years needed to achieve the highest degree obtained by the representative	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Conseil Général	Time as a <i>Conseiller Général</i> (in years)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Age	Age of the representative	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
<u>Constituency:</u>		
Mean No-votes per <i>département</i>	For each <i>département</i> the proportion of representatives opposing to the reform (excluding the vote of the observation)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean Abst per <i>département</i>	For each <i>département</i> the proportion of representatives abstaining (excluding the vote of the observation)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
<u>Constituency specific</u>		
Mean No-votes per party- <i>département</i>	Proportion of “No” votes on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and the same <i>département</i>	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean Abst per party- <i>département</i>	Proportion of abstention on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and the same <i>département</i>	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean No-votes per party if senator	Proportion of “No” votes on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and belonging to the <i>Sénat</i> (if the representative is a <i>Sénateur</i> , 0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean Abst per party-if Senator	Proportion of abstention on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and belonging to the <i>Sénat</i> (if the representative is a <i>Sénateur</i> , 0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
<u>Parliamentary group</u>		
Mean No-votes per parliamentary group	Proportion of «No» votes on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same parliamentary group	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean Abst per parliamentary group	Proportion of abstention on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same parliamentary group	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
<u>Personal</u>		
Occupied	1 if the <i>département</i> of the representative is occupied (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website /

Crossed	1 if the <i>département</i> of the representative is crossed by the demarcation line (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Journalist	1 if the representative is or has been a journalist (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Doc	1 if the representative has or has had a medical profession (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Civil_servant	1 if the representative is or has been a civil_servant (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Law	1 if the representative has a law degree (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Low	1 if the representative is a farmer or a worker (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Age	Age of the representative (in years)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Study Years	Number of years needed to achieve the highest degree obtained by the representative	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Mandate		
Min	Time as a <i>Ministre</i> or a <i>Secrétaire d'Etat</i> (in years)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Conseil Général	Time as a <i>Conseiller Général</i> (in years)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Mayor	1 if the representative is or has been a Mayor (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
National Mandate	Time as a <i>Député</i> or as a <i>Sénateur</i>	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Social Status		
Freemason	1 if Freemason (0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Synd	1 if the representative is or has occupied a position in an union (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Jewish	1 if the representative declared being Jewish or he was victim of antisemitic attacks during parliamentary debates (0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
WWI_veteran	1 if the representative served during WWI (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Legion	1 if the representative has a <i>Légion d'honneur</i> (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
War_Medal	1 if the representative has a <i>Croix de guerre</i> (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Left	1 if the representative belong to a leftist party (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Center	1 if the representative belong to a centrist party (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Occupied	1 if the representative is from an occupied <i>département</i> (0 otherwise)	
Crossed	1 if the representative is from an occupied <i>département</i> (0 otherwise)	
Political behavior		
Total opposition	Percentage of times a representative opposed to its parliamentary group's vote (if more than 66 percent of a parliamentary group voted along the same line)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>

Abstention	Number of times a representative abstained during the 5 previous votes dealing with checks and balances during the 1936-1940 legislature.	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Scoreno	Number of times the representative voted against checks and balance dismantlement during the past five votes on this issue	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Length Bio	Length of the Biography in Joly's dictionary	<i>Dictionnaire des parlementaires français (1889-1940)</i>
Dynasty with syndicalism	= 1 if the founder of the dynasty was active in an union	<i>Dictionnaire des parlementaires français (1889-1940) and Wikipédia page of some politicians</i>

Table C4: List of parties

Alliance démocratique	Parti agraire et paysan français
Fédération républicaine	Parti républicain
Gauche démocratique	Républicains indépendants
Gauche indépendante	Section Française de l'internationale ouvrière
Gauche radicale	Union populaire française
Indépendants d'action populaire	Union républicaine
Indépendants républicains	Union républicaine démocratique
Non Inscrits	Union socialiste républicaine