Patronage Politics and the Development of the Welfare State:

Confederate Pensions in the American South[*]

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Abstract

Beginning in the 1880s, southern states introduced pensions for Confederate veterans and widows. They continued to expand these programs through the 1910s and 1920s, while states outside the region were introducing cash transfer programs for workers, poor mothers, and the elderly. We explore why southern states prioritized Confederate pensions over other aid to the poor. Using legislative documents, application records for Confederate pensions, and county-level census and electoral data, we argue that political considerations guided the enactment and distribution of these pensions. Confederate pensions programs aimed to increase support for Democratic candidates in poor, rural areas of the South.

1 Introduction

Between the end of the Civil War and the Progressive Era, U.S. states enacted legislation to provide cash transfers to the needy. Such programs included Workers' Compensation for men who were disabled due to accidents on the job, Mothers' Pensions for poor mothers with dependent children, and Old Age Pensions for the elderly. While states in the North were often the early adopters of such programs, by the 1920s, nearly every state outside the South had passed aid legislation and had begun administering cash transfers. However, most southern states did not administer aid to mothers, workers or the elderly – even in rare cases when legislation was passed – but instead enacted programs that awarded pensions to Confederate veterans and widows. These programs were typically enacted during the late 1880s and early 1890s, but southern state legislatures continued to expand them through the 1910s and 1920s. In this paper, we explore the political factors that encouraged southern states to enact, expand, and fund military pensions instead of the welfare programs that were common in other states during this era.

A primary contribution of this paper is to offer the first cross-state accounting of the determinants of Confederate pension legislation and distribution. More broadly, this study offers new insight into the economic history of income redistribution in the region. The history of welfare legislation in the South poses a challenge for our understanding of the economics of redistributive policies. A leading explanation for southern states' reluctance to adopt the types of welfare programs typical to other parts of the county is that the political process in the South was essentially captured by white rural elites. Alston and Ferrie (1993) argue that paternalism – in which workers trade loyalty to their employer for nonmarket goods such as old-age assistance without an explicit contract – reduced turnover costs and increased work effort in cotton agriculture. They argue that rural elites in the South actively blocked the adoption of welfare programs because these programs would have disrupted the paternalistic employment contracts they had with their workers. This explanation is at odds with most contemporary accounts of redistributive policies, which typically argue that popular preferences for such policies guide their adoption [Alesina and Giuliano (2009)]. We argue that

Confederate pension programs provide a bridge between these different views. We show that southern state legislatures enacted Confederate pension laws during periods of widespread demand for income redistribution; however, the distribution of these pensions within states indicates that elite preferences likely guided the implementation of these programs as well.

There is an existing literature on the political economy of welfare programs enacted during the early 20th century outside the South. Skocpol (1992) argues that the passage of Mothers' Pensions, which were state welfare programs for women with dependent children prior to 1935, were the result of the increasing ability of women's clubs, who were united across social class, to press for aid.[1] Fishback and Kantor (1998) explore the adoption of Workers' Compensation Laws across states and show that employers and insurance companies, as opposed to just employees, significantly gained from the law's passage because they were able to pass the costs of higher post-accident compensation on to workers by lowering wages.[2] Even when aid programs were passed, cash transfers were often not administered in the South. Notable examples[3] include Missouri's Workers' Compensation law, which the state passed in 1919 but then did not fund until 1926 [Fishback and Kantor (1998), p. 49].

In this paper, we analyze the factors that led southern state legislatures to enact Confederate pension legislation, and we assess the county-level determinants of the distribution of pension funds. We do this with newly compiled data on pension legislation and individual pension applications. While other studies have discussed Confederate pension programs in individual states,[4] this is the first large, cross-state analysis of the causes Confederate pension legislation. Moreover, it is the first study to use a large sample of individual pension applications to explore the geography of Confederate pension applications within states. We find that the share of a state's congressional vote going to populist third party candidates

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[1]Skocpol (1992) makes a similar argument for the passage of the Invalid Pensions Act of 1890, which dramatically expanded pension provision to over 90% of veterans by 1890.

[2]Workers benefitted because they had difficulty purchasing desired levels of accident insurance in the period [Fishback and Kantor (1998), p. 3].

[3]With regard to Mothers' Pensions, many southern states enacted legislation to provide pensions but never actually awarded any cash transfers to poor mothers. For example, Arkansas passed a program in 1917 but never provided aid to the poor (source: http://individual.utoronto.ca/shari_eli/historymp.html)

[4]See Blanck and Millender (2000) and Rogers (1999) for a discussion of the program in Virginia; Green (2006) for a discussion of Florida; Gorman (1999), Short (2006) and Young (1982) for a discussion of Georgia. Glasson (1918) surveys the legislation surrounding Confederate pension programs in the South up to 1918.

significantly predicts the passage of new pension legislation. Within states, we find that pension applications come disproportionately from counties in which a Democratic candidate has lost ground to a Republican. In addition, pension applications in Texas were less likely to be rejected if the applicant came from a county with a close congressional race for the Democratic candidate. We also find that pension applications tended to come from poorer, predominantly agricultural counties populated by white, smallholding farmers; however, counties with many pension applications also tended to have a large black minority.

Our findings suggest that existing accounts of the history of southern welfare are incomplete. Populist candidates gained vote share during periods of economic distress for farmers, when standard economic models would predict that preferences for redistribution were high [Alesina and Giuliano (2009)]. As such, our results suggest that southern legislatures *did* respond to pressure from voters to enact income redistribution programs; however, these programs took the form of military pensions. Still, the fact that these welfare-like programs were only available to white ex-Confederates, and that applications came predominantly from counties in which the Democratic congressional majority was challenged by (largely black) Republican voters, indicates the importance of elite preferences in guiding policy during this period. Thus, our work does not contradict existing arguments regarding the differences in the evolution of the welfare state in the South when compared with other regions, but instead offers new information about *how* southern elites maintained political power. In general, our findings offer a more nuanced view of the development of the welfare state in the South.

This paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 provides a background on veterans' pension systems during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as well as a discussion of the southern political landscape in the period; Section 3 provides a discussion of data gathered; Section 4 explains the empirical strategy; Sections 5 and 6 present and then discuss our results; and Section 7 concludes.

2 Historical Background

2.1 Civil War Military Pensions

During the Civil War, the federal government passed the General Law of 1862 that allowed Union Army veterans and their dependents to apply for pensions if their illnesses or injuries were shown to be the result of their war experience. Then, in 1890, Union Army veterans could receive pensions for any illness or injury that left the veteran unable to undertake manual labor (for a review of Union Army Pension legislation, see Glasson [1916]). By 1900, 95% of Union Army veterans were collecting benefits of a little over $12 per month on average – an amount that is roughly equivalent to 50% of a farmer's monthly earnings in the period. The receipt of Union Army pensions has been shown to increase the likelihood of retirement [Costa 1995], to facilitate the movement of veterans to less crowded living arrangements [Costa 1997], and to decrease morbidity and mortality rates [Eli 2013]. With regard to widows of Union Army soldiers, the pension has been shown to lower the rate of remarriage by 25% [Salisbury 2014]. Therefore, the Union Army pension system – America's first wide-scale entitlement program – led to profound demographic shifts.

Confederate veterans, however, were never allowed access to pensions from the federal government. Instead, individual southern states enacted their own pension systems. While the Democrats had largely regained control of state legislatures by 1876, they did not start passing pension legislation in earnest until the mid 1880s. Most existing work explains the emergence of Confederate pension laws by the fact that Confederate veterans and widows could not access Union Army pensions, taking for granted that southern states would step in to fill this gap. Other work points to the elevated social position of Confederate veterans and widows in the South to explain why these states were willing to fund these programs.

Details of the passage of Confederate pension legislation are summarized in table 1. States differed in terms of precise eligibility requirements; however, features common to all state programs are apparent. Pension programs typically included a means test, a residency restriction, and a remarriage prohibition for widows, although there is considerable cross-state variation in the nature of these restrictions. For example, the original pension law passed in Texas in 1899

required applicants to have been Texas residents since 1880, while North Carolina, Mississippi and Virginia merely required applicants to be state residents at the time of application. Pension amounts different substantially by state, ranging from a low of $15 per year in Georgia to a high of $300 per year in Tennessee. While many states initially required applicants to have been injured or widowed during the war, by the turn of the century most pension programs functioned essentially as welfare for Confederate veterans and widows. Much like the Union Army pension, southern pension programs had evolved to cover all veterans and widows in need.

Although Confederate pensions were substantially less generous than the Union Army pension, expenditure on these programs comprised a significant fraction of state budgets [Gorman (1999); Short (2006); Ratchford and Heise (1938)]. Figures (1) and (2) report the number of pension applications filed in each year, as well as the percentage of state expenditures allocated to pensions, separately by state. These figures indicate that these programs were widely taken up, with thousands of new applications filed form each state in most years. Data on fractions of state budgets allocated to pensions comes from southern state treasurers' annual reports.[5] Again, these figures indicate that states spent significant quantities of money on these programs, typically peaking at between 10 and 20 percent of the budget during the first two decades of the 20th century. It is notable that spending on Confederate programs peaked while northern states were introducing other cash transfer programs.

The administration of Confederate pension programs was fairly uniform across states. Claims were evaluated first at the county level, by designated county pension boards. After being reviewed locally, claims were submitted to a state pension board which reviewed them a second time and rendered a final judgement on the merit of each case. After approval by the state board, the state treasurer would issue a warrant for each claim on the treasury. So, while initial adjudication of pension claims was done at the county level, pensions were paid out of a central pension fund. Pension legislation typically introduced a new tax to fund the pension programs.

Consider, as an example, the pension law in Alabama. From 1899 onward, claims were

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[5]These reports are taken from HathiTrust's online collection of annual reports of state treasurers.

assessed by a county board of examiners, appointed by the governor, and consisting of one "practicing physician of good standing in his profession" and one Confederate veteran "of good moral character" [Codes of Alabama (1907), S1998]. The Alabama pension law states the following rules for the operation of these county boards of examiners:

> Upon the first Monday in July in each year, the county board of examiners shall meet at the county seat of their respective counties and open an office for the examination of applicants for pensions under this chapter. They shall give due notice by publication in some newspaper in the county or by posting at the courthouse door of the county and five other public places for three weeks, ahead of the time and place of their meeting. They shall keep their office open for the examination of applicants from nine o'clock a.m. until four o'clock p.m. on week days for the first ten days after the first Monday in July, after which they may keep open for such a time as may be necessary to examine the applications filed with them (SS2003-2005).

During these office hours, county boards would "subject [applicants] to an oral and physical examination" (S2010), and render a decision about the merit of each claim. Then, the county board would submit all claims to the state pension board for additional review (SS2011-2013). The state board of examiners consisted of a physician and two ex-Confederate soldiers appointed by the governor (S2000), and they met to review claims in Montgomery beginning on the second Monday in August every year (S2006). Application materials for approved claims were retained by the state auditor, which he would use to create a detailed record of pensioners (S2018); however, "all applications rejected by the board shall be returned to the county board of examiners, who shall file them with the judge of probate of the county, to be kept for future reference" (S2019). The pension was funded by "a special tax of one mill on each dollar of the taxable property of the state" (S2031).

There is some evidence of corruption among county pension boards from the historical record. The 1897 state auditor's report from Alabama complains about local adjudication practices:

This effort of the State to aid these worthy men is being sadly abused. Applications are allowed in a great many instances that should be rejected. The Boards of Examiners, in some counties, do not appreciate their trust. They grant applications that they know are based upon false statements, thereby diverting this sacred fund from its proper course. They should feel that every cent improperly allowed is taken from a pittance that is intended for a worthy Confederate soldier *who is not able to make* a living for himself (Alabama State Auditor 1897, p. 23).

Blanck and Millender (2000) also discuss the often arbitrary power that elected county judges wielded in distributing pensions in Virginia.

2.2 Post-Civil War Politics in the South

By the mid 1870s, the Democratic party had largely regained control of southern politics. Voting in the South cut primarily along racial lines, with white voters supporting Democrats and black voters supporting Republicans (Ayers 1992). Legislative efforts to disenfranchise black voters in the South during this period, including poll taxes and literacy tests, are well documented [Alston and Ferrie (1993); Wright (1986)]. While the majority of white southerners voted Democrat during this period, the party was dominated by rural elites from the Black Belt – the portion of the South in which plantation style agriculture was common. Alston and Ferrie (1993; 1999) argue that Democratic congressmen viewed these elites as their core constituency, and acted explicitly in the best interests of this group. While the Democrats certainly held a majority of the white southern vote during this period, they were at risk of losing ground to third parties.

Populist agrarian movements were a significant presence in the South during the years following the Civil War. Beginning in Texas during the 1870s, the Farmer's Alliance had become an important political force in state legislatures by the late 1880s and early 1890s (Woodward 1951). This movement gained popularity among farmers in the face of falling agricultural prices and a perceived lack of power in their dealings with the banks and railroads (Ayers 1992). As Woodward (1951) notes, with exception of Virginia, the majority of the

populist vote came from small, poor, white farmers. He quotes one account of the movement in Alabama that characterizes it as "an effort of the masses of the white to free themselves from the rule of the black-belt Democratic party of the old slave-owning type" (p 247). Moreover, populist movements in the South during this period seemed to directly threaten Democratic votes: "The leading conservative paper of Texas described the Populists of that state as solid, native white stock 'sober and earnest from first to last' and estimated that 90 per cent of them were 'ex-democrats whose standing in the party was formerly as undisputed' " (Woodward 1951, p 247). Maintaining vote share among smaller white farmers at risk of voting for populist candidates would have been an important political objective for southern Democrats.

3 Data

We combine state-level information on the passage of Confederate pension legislation, individual pension application records, and county-level census and election returns data. Data on the passage of Confederate pension laws by state legislatures is compiled from primary and secondary sources,[6] and is summarized in table 1. Individual pension data consists of indexes to Confederate pension applications, which are available online from southern state archives.[7] In recent years, complete collections of Confederate pension files have been made publicly available through genealogical websites such as ancestry.com and familysearch.org. These files are indexed, either in hard copy or at state archive websites. We have obtained these indexes for ten states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, Tennessee, and Virginia.[8] Mississippi and the Carolinas have existing records, but they are not indexed in machine readable form. Information that can be gathered from these indexes varies by state. In general, the index will indicate the name of the applicant, the type of

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[6]Secondary sources include Glasson (1918), Gorman (1999), Green (2006), Short (2006), and Rodgers (1999). Certain legislative dates are collected by browsing images of pension application materials available at ancestry.com or familysearch.org. Other primary sources include texts of pension legislation taken from published state statutes.

[7]Pension applications from Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Tennessee are collected from the website of each state's archives. Pension applications from Alabama, Virginia, and Georgia are collected from ancestry.com. Pension applications from Texas are collected from both the Texas state archive and from ancestry.com.

[8]Oklahoma is largely not usable, because these indexes do not contain county of application.

application (veteran or widow), and the county of application. In some cases, the indexes contain additional information, such as year of application, details of the soldier's military service, and the outcome of the pension application. Table 2 lists the number of pension applications indexed, separately by type as well as decade. All indexes that we have collected report whether the applicant is a soldier or a widow except for Florida; all indexes report the year of application except Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.

We combine data on Confederate pension laws and applications with county-level census data from Haines and ICPSR (2010) and county-level data on federal election returns from Clubb et al (2006). We use the county-level census data to determine characteristics of counties from which Confederate veterans and widows applied for pensions, i.e. population, race composition, prevalence of farming, farm ownership structure, and value of agricultural output. We use the election returns data from 1876-1922 to determine the fraction of the congressional vote that went to Democratic, Republican, and third party candidates. We group all third party candidates into a single category, which includes significant parties whose congressional vote share is specially demarcated in our data: the Greenbacks (1876-1886), Union Labor (1888-1890), Populists (1890-1898), Socialists (1902-1922), Progressives (1912-1922), and Farmer-Labor (1918-1922). While these were clearly different parties, they were generally left-leaning and appealed to lower income farmers and laborers. The election returns data contains information on federal and not state politicians; however, federal and state voting behaviour was closely linked during this period (Ayers 1992), so we view congressional voting patterns as a good proxy for voting patterns at the state level.[9]

4 Empirical Approach

Were are interested in establishing (i) how voting patterns affected program passage; and (ii) how voting patterns and other county characteristics affected the distribution of pension funds within states. To determine how voting patterns affected program passage, we construct a panel of southern states, beginning in 1876 and ending in 1922, which we use to estimate the

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[9]An explicit comparison of state and federal voting patterns is forthcoming.

following:

$$L_{s,t} = \alpha + \beta V_{s,t} + \delta_t + \theta_s + e_{s,t} \tag{1}$$

Here, $L_{s,t}$ is equal to one if state s passed an original piece of pension legislation between election years t and $t + 2$, and $V_{s,t}$ is a measure of voting patterns from the election in year t in state s. The parameter δ_t is an election year fixed effect, and θ_s is a state fixed effect. We measure voting patterns in four ways: congressional vote shares for Democratic, Republican, and third party candidates, as well as the squared deviation of democratic vote share from one half. The latter measure is meant to capture close races for democrats: the closer this measure is to zero, the closer the race.[10] We measure voting patterns in several ways: vote share from the most recent election, an average of vote share in adjacent elections, and including lagged and future vote share. We do this to capture the possibility that legislatures responded to election results with a lag, or that legislatures responded to current public sentiment reflected in future election outcomes.[11] States exit the sample after they have passed an initial piece of pension legislation.

Our second aim is to characterize the way political and other characteristics affected the distribution of pensions. Understanding where pensions were targeted allows to understand some of the political considerations that guided policymakers' decisions to enact and fund these programs. To examine the political determinants of pension allocation, we construct a panel of counties, beginning in the election year immediately prior to initial program passage, and ending in 1922.[12] We use this to estimate the following:

$$N_{c,s,t} = \alpha + \beta V_{c,s,t} + \phi_t + \chi_c + e_{c,s,t} \tag{2}$$

[10]A similar measure is used in Eli (2014) to show that Union Army pension awards were greater in congressional districts with close races for Republican candidates.

[11]While accurately forecasting election results during the late 19th and early 20th centuries was difficult, attempts were made at polling. Some newspapers conducted straw polls in which thousands of questionnaires were sent out and the responses tallied, although these polls were often biased. Rhode and Strumpf (2004) show that presidential betting markets during this period did a surprisingly good job of forecasting election outcomes prior to 1940.

[12]We have plans to expand this sample to include later years. While no state enacted an original piece of pension legislation after the 1920s, applications were still being filed in relatively large numbers until the 1930s. However, the bulk of pension applications were filed prior to 1920.

Here, $N_{c,s,t}$ is the number of pension applications filed in county c of state s between election years t and $t+2$. We construct this variable from our pension index data. The variable $V_{c,s,t}$ is a measure of voting patterns in county c of state s in election year t; ϕ_t is a year fixed effect; and χ_c is a county fixed effect. In addition, we estimate a version of the model with state-year fixed effects to distinguish the effects of voting patterns on within-state distribution of pension applications from any statewide effects of voting patterns on the passage of legislation expanding access to pensions. We use the same voting pattern measures used to estimate equation (1).

In addition to political variables, we examine other county-level determinants of the distribution of pensions within states. We examine the effect of race composition, the prevalence of farmers, the ownership structure in agriculture, and the value of agricultural products. Because these variables are only available at 10 year intervals, we estimate this as a cross-section using values from the 1880 or 1890 census. Using the 1880 census allows us also to look at the effect of average wealth, occupational income, and occupational income inequality on the number of pension applications to come from a given county. We estimate:

$$N_{c,s} = \alpha + \gamma X_{c,s,d} + P_{c,s,d} + \theta_s + e_{c,s} \tag{3}$$

Again, $N_{c,s}$ is the total number of applications filed from county c in state s; $X_{c,s,d}$ is a matrix of county characteristics of interest in decade $d \in \{1880, 1890\}$; $P_{c,s,d}$ is the county's population decade d; and θ_s is a state fixed effect. We include population as a control in every specification because we the number of applications from a given county to be mechanically correlated with the county's population.

The only pension outcome variable that is broadly available is the number of pension applications; however, we have additional information on the outcome of pension applications from Texas. Specifically, the index to the Texas pension files indicates whether a given claim was rejected or not. This allows us to test whether political variables impacted the outcome

of an individual pension application. We estimate the following equation:

$$R_{i,c,t} = \alpha + \beta V_{c,t} + \psi(t) + \chi_c + e_{i,c,t} \tag{4}$$

The variable $R_{i,c,t}$ is an indicator equal to one if a claim by person i from county c who applied between years t and $t + 2$ was rejected; $V_{c,t}$ is a voting measure from county c in year t; $\psi(t)$ is a function of time; and χ_c is a county fixed effect. For $\psi(t)$, we use a quartic in time as well as year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the county-year level.

5   Results

Table (3) contains estimates of equation (1). Democratic vote share does not appear to significantly affect the passage of new pension legislation, nor does the distance between Democratic vote share and one half. However, the vote share of Republican and third party candidates does have a significant effect on the probability of enacting a new pension law. According to the estimate from column (1) of panel (B), a 10 percentage point increase in average third party vote share increases the probability that a state enacts pension legislation by 9.7 percentage points. The larger coefficient on the mean third party vote share over two consecutive elections suggests that legislatures may have responded to the popularity of third party candidates with a lag, and that legislatures responded to anticipated popularity of third party candidates in upcoming elections. Column (5) of panel (B) indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in average Republican vote share decreases the probability that a state passes new pension legislation by 7.1 percentage points.

These results suggest that state legislatures were responding to increases in the popularity of third party candidates when they passed Confederate pension legislation. It is important to point out that, because we do not have time-varying data on other potentially important state-level characteristics, we are unable to pin down the precise mechanism by which third party vote share affects pension legislation. It may be that democratic state legislatures felt threatened by the popularity of alternative candidates. However, it is also true that the third

party candidates with most influence during this period tended to gain popularity in times of economic distress, particularly on the farm. As mentioned above, these were typically populist parties. State legislatures may have been responding to this economic distress, or a desire among voters for redistributive policies, rather than a perceived political threat. Republican vote share might negatively affect the likelihood of passing new pension legislation if Republican popularity is negatively correlated with sympathy for Confederate veterans, or if Republican legislators were less likely to vote for Confederate pension laws.

Tables (4) and (5) estimate panel regressions of the number of pension applications in a county on a county-level vote share measure, using states for which year of application is available in our pension index data. In columns (1)-(4), year fixed effects are included, and in columns (5)-(8), state-year fixed effects are included. Third party vote share has a significant positive effect on the number of pension applications in a county when only year fixed effects are included; however, this effect vanishes when state-year fixed effects are added. This indicates that state-level events, like the introduction of a law expanding pension access, drive the relationship between third party popularity and pension applications at the county level.

Democratic vote share, the squared deviation of Democratic vote share from one half, and Republican vote share all significantly affect the distribution of pension applications, and this is robust to the inclusion of state-year fixed effects. When state-year fixed effects are included, a 10 percentage point increase in Democratic vote share decreases the expected yearly number of applications from a given county by 0.35, and a 10 percentage point deviation of Democratic vote share from 50% decreases the expected yearly number of applications by about 0.1. Conversely, a similar bump in Republican vote share tends to increase the expected number of applications by 0.37. Given that the mean number of applications to be filed in one county-year is less than 20, these are relatively sizeable effects. Figure (3) plots predicted applications against Democratic and Republican vote share, based on a regression of number of applications on a quartic in vote share for each party (separately), including county and state-year fixed effects.[13] Consistent with tables (4) and (5), this suggests that number of

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[13]This quartic is jointly significant at the 1% level for Democrats, and at the 10% level for Republicans.

applications is maximized in counties in which Democrats and Republicans both have close to one half of the vote.

Table (6) contains results from regressions of the number of pension applications in a county on county-level characteristics, measured in 1890 (panel A) and 1880 (panel B). Squared explanatory variables are included when there is evidence of a nonlinear relationship between these variables and pension application rates. There is a nonlinear relationship between urban concentration and pension applications: the number of pension applications increases with the fraction of a county's population living in an urban area, until this fraction reaches about one third. Then, the number of pension applications declines with urban concentration. Pension applications are significantly more likely to come from agricultural communities. There is a nonlinear relationship between the fraction of a county's population that is black and pension applications: application rates increase in black percentage until this reaches around one quarter, and then it declines. Similarly, there is a nonlinear relationship between pension applications and farm ownership structure: application rates increase in the fraction of farms that are owner-occupied until this fraction reaches about one half, then it starts to decline. Applications tend to decline in average farm size and in farm output per acre. Panel (B) additionally shows that applications are more likely to come from counties with less wealth per capita and more unequal occupational income distributions.

Finally, tables (7) and (8) contain estimates of equation (4), using data from Texas. Columns (1)-(4) of table (7) tells a similar story to table (4). Applicants were more like have claims rejected when Democrats had done well in the last election, or when the election was not close for Democrats. However, this finding does not survive the inclusion of year fixed effects instead of a quartic in time. Columns (1)-(4) of table (8) indicate that applicants from counties in which a third party candidate did well during the last election are less likely to be rejected, while Republican candidates do not appear to have much of an effect on the outcome of a pension application. These results suggest that political considerations factored into the pension review process; however, the effects are sensitive to the inclusion of year fixed effects. A possible explanation for this is that Texas counties moved in parallel with one another, in

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terms of both rejection probabilities and political outcomes. If the relationship between rejection and voting patterns is really a state-level phenomenon, it cannot be identified separately from a year fixed effect. Indeed, figure (4) plots the squared deviation of Democratic vote share from one half (panel A) and third party vote share (panel B) against the application rejection rate at the state level. These state-level measures clearly track one another in a way that is consistent with our findings.

6   Discussion

The results suggest that southern legislatures passed pension laws in response to popularity of third party candidates. Table (3) clearly demonstrates that this is true of initial pension legislation. Similarly, table (5) shows that total pension applications increase at the county level following an increase in the popularity of third party candidates; however, this effect does not survive the inclusion of a state-year fixed effect. This is consistent with states introducing legislation that expands access to pensions in response to third party popularity, rather than the within-state distribution of pensions responding to the popularity of these candidates.

The results clearly suggest that, within states, pensions were funnelled toward counties in which Democrats were threatened, usually by Republicans. Tables (4) and (5) show that total applications from a county increased following a poor performance by the Democrats, or a Democratic vote share close to one half; these tables also show that applications increase after a strong showing by the Republican candidate. Unlike the findings for third party candidates, these results are robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects, which means that they cannot be explained by legislation being passed in response to the relative popularity of Democrats or Republicans. Because Confederate veterans rarely voted Republican, it may be that pension applications were solicited to increase turnout among Democratic voters.

We believe that, when county and state-year fixed effects are included, the number of applications filed from a county reflects effort on the part of local authorities to distribute pensions to that county. This is due to the nature of the pension application and review process, described in section (2). Claims were heard at fixed times during the year by county

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pension boards, who exercised tremendous influence on the outcome of an application [Blanck and Millender (2000)]. After initial review, applications would be forwarded to the state pension board for further evaluation. In many cases, pension applications were only forwarded to the state board if the county board approved them. For example, the Arkansas pension law indicates that application materials were forwarded to state boards "when said board is satisfied with the justness of the claim made by the applicant" [Acts of Arkansas (1891), Act XCI S3]. Thus, county boards could influence the number of applications in two ways: (i) by restricting or expanding access to the board itself during the designated time for hearing pension applications; (ii) by being more or less conservative in the decision to forward an application to the state pension board. Because our pension application records are comprised of collections at state archives, they can be presumed to be comprised of records forwarded to or retained by state pension boards.[14]

This interpretation of our results is supported by our finding that the probability of a pension claim being rejected is related to the performance of Democratic and third party candidates in Texas. Unless people filed truly illegitimate claims in larger numbers after a Democratic failure or a third party victory, these findings must indicate that applications from such counties were treated more favourably for political reasons.

The geographic distribution of pension applications also suggests that these pension programs were politically motivated. We show that pensions typically went to places inhabited by poor farmers, with a minority but non-zero black population, and where farms were mostly (but not entirely) owned. Some of these findings can likely be explained by the geographic distribution of Confederate veterans themselves, as an examination of 1910 census data demonstrates. Table 9 contains results from a regression of an indicator for Confederate veteran status on a series of 1890 county characteristics, using the entire population of the South. This table demonstrates that Confederate veterans in the South typically resided in agricul-

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[14]Even in states in which all applications (whether approved by the county board or not) were forwarded to the state board for secondary review, only accepted pension claims were ultimately retained. If the county board's decision had a substantial bearing on the ultimate outcome of a pension application, we are still less likely to observe the record of an applicant rejected at the county level in these state collections. As such, we view our count of applications at the county level as a noisy measure of the number of approved applications at the county level.

tural areas with smaller farms. The finding that pension applicants came from places with less productive agricultural land is likely due to the fact that the pension was means tested. However, the finding that pension applications were increasing in the black percentage of a county's population (up to about one third) cannot be explained by the locational patterns of Confederate veterans. Instead, this result is highly consistent with our political findings, particularly that pension applications increased after a county's Democratic candidate lost ground to a Republican. Taken together, we believe that our results offer strong evidence that Confederate pensions were employed to consolidate support for Democratic candidates who were threatened by black Republican voters.

7   Conclusion

This paper offers the first large, multi-state analysis of the introduction and dissemination of Confederate pensions in the southern United States. We show that these pensions were widely taken up and funded while states outside the region were passing and funding other types of welfare legislation. Most significantly, we show that the passage of pension legislation is significantly associated with increases populist congressional vote share, and that pensions were distributed to counties in which Democratic candidates were in close races with Republican candidates.

These findings offer a new perspective on the welfare state in the American South. The current literature on this subject posits that rural elites stopped southern legislatures from adopting welfare programs during the early 20th century. This does not fit with our understanding of the economics of welfare policy in a democracy; moreover, it raises the question of how Democrats were able to maintain power in the region if they only catered to a small number of constituents. Our results suggest that legislators in the region did indeed respond to popular demand for welfare-type policies by enacting and funding Confederate pensions. However, the particulars of these programs show that elite preferences mattered greatly. Once enacted, Confederate pensions appear to have been another tool employed by southern Democrats to restrict the influence of black voters at the ballot box. We believe

this study offers new insight into the way in which disparate groups interact in order to shape public policy.

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8 Tables and Figures

Table 1: Timeline of Confederate Pension Legislation

State	First Law - Veterans	First Law - Widows	First welfare-type pension law[1]	Eligibility - Veterans	Eligibility - Widows	Income/Property restrictions	Residency restrictions	Amounts
Alabama	1899 [2]	1899 [2]	1899 [2]	Unable to work due to permanent disability, illness or age. Not a deserter.	Not remarried. Husband not a deserter.	Income < $300 per year; Property < $400	Alabama Resident prior to January 1, 1899	$50-$100 per year[3]
Arkansas	1891	1891	1901	Unable to work due to disease or injury sustained in service. Not a deserter.	Husband did not desert and died during the war. Not remarried,	Indigent	Resident of Arkansas for 1 year	$25-$100 per year
Florida	1885	1885	1899	Injured during military service	Husband killed as direct result of military service. Not remarried.[4]	Property < $1000[4]	Resident of Florida prior to January 1, 1875. [4]	$30-$150 per year[4]
Georgia	1885 [5]	1890	1893	Permanently injured in the service	Married during husband's service. Husband died as result of service. Not remarried.	-	Resident of Georgia prior to October 26, 1886.	$15-$100 per year
Louisiana	1898 [6]	1898	1898	Honorably discharged. Unable to earn a living.	Married to soldier who died before June 1, 1865. Husband died from wounds contracted in the service.	Indigent	Resident of Louisiana for 5 years prior to filing if soldier served in Louisiana regiments; otherwise, resident for 15 years.	Up to $96 per year
Mississippi	1888	1888	1890	Unable to work due to war wound. Enlisted in Mississippi regiment.	Husband died as a result of the war. Husband enlisted in Mississippi. Not remarried.	Indigent (1890 ammendmnet)	Resident of Mississippi	$75-$125 per year for specific injuries; remaining fund distributed evenly to pensioners.[7]
North Carolina	1885	1885	1901	Incapacitated by wound received in service.	Husband died as a result of the war. Not remarried.	Income < $300 per year; property < $500	Resident of North Carolina.	$25-$100 per year
South Carolina	1887	1887	1896	Disabled as a result of service.	Husband died in service. Not remarried.	Financially needy	-	-
Tennessee	1891	1905	1905	Honorable character; unable to work due to war wound	-	-	Resident of Tennessee for 1 year	$100 - $300 per year
Texas	1899	1899	1899	Over 60 years of age or disabled as a result of service	Married prior to 1866; not remarried	Indgent	Resident in Texas since 1880	up to $96 per year
Virginia	1882	1888	1902	Unable to work due to injury; Not in receipt of other state or federal aid; not resident in soldier's home	Not remarried	Income < $300 per year; Property < $1000 per year	Resident of Virginia	$30-$60

1 Refers to a pension law that does not require recipient to have been wounded or killed during the war.

2 Date of first annuity offered to Confederate veterans and widows. The Alabama legislature offered one time payments to wounded soldiers and widows as early as 1881 (with welfare-type eligibility requiremets in 1891)

3 Amounts as of 1901

4 From text of law ammended in 1889.

5 First cash transfer program. A program for providing veterans with artificial limbs existed from 1877.

6 First cash trasfer program. Serveral programs providing artificial limbs or land grants to veterans existed from the 1880s.

7 Amounts from code of 1906

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics from Pension Index Data

State	Number of applications by type			Number of applications by decade				
	Total	Veteran	Widow	1880-89	1890-99	1900-09	1910-19	1920 and later
Alabama	40,324	20,294	20,030	2,571	12,495	11,656	6,848	6,715
Arkansas	27,012	12,889	13,696	348	2,147	11,521	8,441	4,457
Florida	12,856	-	-	0	1,042	7,118	1,116	1,214
Georgia	63,151	36,515	26,636	2,524	15,069	17,849	14,392	12,441
Kentucky	4,675	2,411	2,264	0	0	0	3,997	671
Lousiana	18,477	9,366	9,111	-	-	-	-	-
Oklahoma	8,003	4,028	3,975	-	-	-	-	-
Tennessee	27,516	16,228	10,942	-	-	-	-	-
Texas	58,642	29,441	29,201	3	6,188	12,227	17,761	14,893
Virginia	47,229	28,513	18,716	3,579	2,106	23,724	7,907	9,913
Total	307,885	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 3: Effect of Voting Patterns on Passage of Original Confederate Pension Legislation

Panel A. Pensions applications and Democratic vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Political variable:		Democratic vote share				(Democratic vote share - 0.5)^2		
Dependent variable:				=1 if pension law introduced				
Vote share: last election	0.212			0.426	0.654			1.271
	(0.445)			(0.482)	(1.004)			(1.067)
Vote share: mean, last two elections		0.338				0.661		
		(0.571)				(1.280)		
Vote share: mean, last + next election			0.599				0.991	
			(0.663)				(1.385)	
Vote share: two elections ago				0.021				-0.216
				(0.430)				(0.947)
Vote share: three elections ago				-0.029				0.144
				(0.423)				(0.883)
Vote share: next election				0.687				0.927
				(0.525)				(1.007)
Vote share: two elections in future				0.700				1.065
				(0.473)				(0.947)
Constant	0.102	0.094	0.078	-0.405	0.214	0.273	0.406	0.464
	(0.299)	(0.426)	(0.504)	(0.552)	(0.190)	(0.237)	(0.284)	(0.278)
Observations	100	98	96	92	100	98	96	92
R-squared	0.362	0.382	0.395	0.430	0.363	0.381	0.392	0.410

Panel B. Pensions applications and non-Democrat vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Political variable:		Third pary vote share				Republican vote share		
Dependent variable:				=1 if pension law introduced				
Vote share: last election	0.965*			0.900	-0.706*			-0.810**
	(0.530)			(0.561)	(0.392)			(0.386)
Vote share: mean, last two elections		1.624*				-0.918*		
		(0.852)				(0.526)		
Vote share: mean, last + next election			1.963*				-1.040*	
			(1.148)				(0.599)	
Vote share: two elections ago				0.714				-0.035
				(0.593)				(0.363)
Vote share: three elections ago				0.558				-0.138
				(0.581)				(0.365)
Vote share: next election				0.455				-0.948**
				(0.565)				(0.438)
Vote share: two elections in future				-0.556				0.248
				(0.521)				(0.425)
Constant	0.079	0.116	0.253	0.245	0.456*	0.541**	0.728**	0.935***
	(0.200)	(0.244)	(0.295)	(0.465)	(0.230)	(0.261)	(0.309)	(0.288)
Observations	100	98	96	92	100	98	96	92
R-squared	0.389	0.411	0.414	0.456	0.388	0.406	0.415	0.483

Note: Sample period is 1876-1922, and all states exit the sample after passing initial pension legislation. All regressions include state and year fixed effects.

Table 4: Effect of Democratic Vote Share on Distribution of Pension Applications

Panel A. Pensions applications and Democratic vote share

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Total pension applications by county and year				
Vote share: last election	-8.805***			-7.662***	-3.519**			-5.796**
	(1.795)			(2.710)	(1.585)			(2.416)
Vote share: mean, last two elections		-1.982				-1.432		
		(1.731)				(1.510)		
Vote share: mean, last + next election			-12.575***				-4.473**	
			(1.966)				(1.755)	
Vote share: two elections ago				7.038***				2.690
				(2.712)				(2.461)
Vote share: three elections ago				-0.301				-5.504**
				(2.574)				(2.339)
Vote share: next election				-9.879***				-6.711***
				(2.767)				(2.435)
Vote share: two elections in future				-8.767***				-3.305
				(2.846)				(2.554)
Constant	-0.330	-7.675*	1.324	6.464	1.551	-0.166	5.814***	12.047***
	(6.009)	(4.171)	(3.936)	(12.216)	(1.754)	(1.659)	(1.792)	(3.904)
FE's	year	year	year	year	state-year	state-year	state-year	state-year
Observations	7,721	9,275	8,582	4,939	7,721	9,275	8,582	4,939
R-squared	0.267	0.249	0.260	0.298	0.527	0.526	0.523	0.522
Number of unique counties	776	827	795	532	776	827	795	532

Panel B. Pensions applications and (Democratic vote share - 0.5)^2

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Total pension applications by county and year				
Vote share: last election	-21.098***			-21.247***	-9.700***			-18.318***
	(3.614)			(5.281)	(3.259)			(4.803)
Vote share: mean, last two elections		-6.628*				-1.195		
		(3.743)				(3.358)		
Vote share: mean, last + next election			-26.009***				-10.039***	
			(3.970)				(3.626)	
Vote share: two elections ago				13.390**				11.123**
				(5.236)				(4.806)
Vote share: three elections ago				4.365				-3.509
				(5.089)				(4.645)
Vote share: next election				-20.531***				-12.832***
				(5.217)				(4.757)
Vote share: two elections in future				-23.776***				-2.875
				(5.220)				(4.799)
Constant	-4.076	-8.283**	-5.671	-3.318	-0.374	-1.061	3.964***	2.195
	(5.806)	(3.947)	(3.624)	(11.533)	(1.388)	(1.312)	(1.294)	(2.439)
FE's								
Observations	7,721	9,275	8,582	4,939	7,721	9,275	8,582	4,939
R-squared	0.268	0.249	0.260	0.301	0.527	0.526	0.523	0.522
Number of unique_county	776	827	795	532	776	827	795	532

Note: Sample period is 1876-1922. States included in sample are those with both application year and county data available: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Texas, Virginia. States do not enter sample until they have passed an initial piece of pension legislation. All regressions contain county fixed effects. Columns (1)-(4) contain year fixed effects, and columns (5)-(8) contain state-year fixed effects.

Table 5: Effect of Republican and Third Pary Vote Share on Distribution of Pension Applications

Panel A. Pensions applications and third pary vote share

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Total pension applications by county and year				
Vote share: last election	9.904***			7.670**	-0.262			-1.081
	(2.503)			(3.320)	(2.309)			(3.121)
Vote share: mean, last two elections		1.544				1.782		
		(2.640)				(2.495)		
Vote share: mean, last + next election			14.636***				3.137	
			(2.985)				(2.783)	
Vote share: two elections ago				-1.818				-0.902
				(2.980)				(2.897)
Vote share: three elections ago				-0.614				2.058
				(2.641)				(2.716)
Vote share: next election				12.811***				2.998
				(3.846)				(3.595)
Vote share: two elections in future				22.910***				-1.798
				(4.005)				(3.706)
Constant	-8.746	-9.487**	-8.896**	-12.155	-1.323	-1.117	3.563***	-0.774
	(5.756)	(3.905)	(3.592)	(11.366)	(1.363)	(1.306)	(1.247)	(2.357)
FE's	year	year	year	year	state-year	state-year	state-year	state-year
Observations	7,721	9,275	8,582	4,939	7,721	9,275	8,582	4,939
R-squared	0.266	0.249	0.259	0.301	0.526	0.526	0.522	0.519
Number of unique_county	776	827	795	532	776	827	795	532

Panel B. Pensions applications and Republican vote share

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Total pension applications by county and year				
Vote share: last election	3.643**			3.435	3.683**			6.159***
	(1.789)			(2.607)	(1.574)			(2.280)
Vote share: mean, last two elections		1.390				0.853		
		(1.795)				(1.573)		
Vote share: mean, last + next election			6.611***				3.433*	
			(2.024)				(1.800)	
Vote share: two elections ago				-2.342				-0.616
				(2.503)				(2.216)
Vote share: three elections ago				2.958				3.313
				(2.314)				(2.135)
Vote share: next election				3.601				5.779**
				(2.663)				(2.328)
Vote share: two elections in future				-1.837				4.100*
				(2.729)				(2.440)
Constant	-8.971	-9.452**	-10.232***	-13.752	-1.904	-1.058	1.825	-4.991**
	(5.761)	(3.901)	(3.613)	(11.471)	(1.426)	(1.303)	(1.286)	(2.421)
FE's	year	year	year	year	state-year	state-year	state-year	state-year
Observations	7,721	9,275	8,582	4,939	7,721	9,275	8,582	4,939
R-squared	0.265	0.249	0.257	0.293	0.527	0.526	0.523	0.521
Number of unique_county	776	827	795	532	776	827	795	532

Note: Sample period is 1876-1922. States do not enter sample until they have passed an initial piece of pension legislation. All regressions contain county fixed effects. Columns (1)-(4) contain year fixed effects, and columns (5)-(8) contain state-year fixed effects.

Table 6: Effect of 1880 and 1890 County Characteristics on Distribution of Pensions

Panel A: 1890 county characteristics

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				Total Number of Applications			
% Urban	405.722***						549.012***
	(130.692)						(132.432)
% Urban ^2	-569.802***						-540.154***
	(188.652)						(183.940)
% Black		516.577***					369.923***
		(113.407)					(124.794)
% Black ^2		-995.173***					-820.406***
		(147.473)					(176.394)
% Families in farming			189.042***				215.809***
			(40.887)				(49.814)
% Farm owners				1,398.909***			391.201
				(200.107)			(257.765)
% Farm owners ^2				-1,199.937***			-481.097**
				(176.850)			(214.591)
Average farm size					-0.005*		-0.003
					(0.003)		(0.003)
Value of farm output per acre						-15.894***	-7.828**
						(3.699)	(3.986)
County population	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.013***	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	158.621***	156.856***	59.025*	-219.163***	170.075***	184.896***	20.416
	(24.287)	(29.046)	(33.452)	(62.918)	(24.347)	(24.445)	(95.803)
Observations	1,009	1,009	1,000	1,000	987	987	987
R-squared	0.448	0.481	0.454	0.469	0.441	0.450	0.507

Panel B: 1880 county characteristics

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
					Total Number of Applications					
% Urban	504.284***									677.030***
	(173.593)									(183.973)
% Urban ^2	-647.881**									-601.484**
	(255.926)									(283.910)
% Black		520.955***								177.772
		(123.533)								(139.476)
% Black ^2		-1,022.158***								-599.640***
		(161.000)								(185.668)
% Families in farming			240.894***							125.644
			(46.118)							(85.635)
% Farm owners				1,707.391***						846.278***
				(245.557)						(291.393)
% Farm owners ^2				-1,262.779***						-709.458***
				(191.961)						(223.879)
Average farm size					-0.008**					-0.059***
					(0.004)					(0.015)
Value of farm output per acre						-9.811***				-3.220
						(3.032)				(4.294)
Wealth per capita							-0.216**			-0.164
							(0.093)			(0.112)
Mean occupational income								93.198***		45.280
								(30.378)		(62.870)
Mean occupational income ^2								-2.600***		-1.610
								(0.876)		(1.805)
Standard deviation of occupational income									20.354***	34.159***
									(4.803)	(8.619)
County population	0.012***	0.013***	0.013***	0.012***	0.012***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	165.422***	166.308***	52.944	-381.147***	175.630***	187.827***	207.599***	-658.949**	11.805	-613.605
	(26.719)	(31.666)	(34.488)	(84.034)	(26.493)	(26.794)	(29.992)	(268.760)	(45.978)	(551.244)
Observations	998	998	997	964	979	964	947	997	993	941
R-squared	0.379	0.413	0.390	0.398	0.372	0.373	0.371	0.379	0.384	0.466

Note: State fixed effects included in all regressions.

Table 7: Effect Democratic Vote Share on Pension Application Outcome: Texas

Panel A. Texas rejection rate and Democratic vote share

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Pension claim rejected				
Vote share: last election	0.110***			0.091***	0.012			-0.007
	(0.019)			(0.021)	(0.019)			(0.020)
Vote share: mean, last two election		0.102***				0.050**		
		(0.023)				(0.023)		
Vote share: mean, last + next ele			0.071***				0.018	
			(0.025)				(0.024)	
Vote share: two elections ago				-0.014				0.043**
				(0.022)				(0.020)
Vote share: three elections ago				0.043**				0.017
				(0.021)				(0.019)
Vote share: next election				-0.027				-0.007
				(0.019)				(0.019)
Vote share: two elections in future				0.031				-0.014
				(0.025)				(0.022)
Constant	-34.448***	-42.219***	-43.072***	-15.268	0.065***	0.055**	0.067***	0.053
	(8.260)	(7.573)	(8.206)	(10.545)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.036)
Year controls	nonlinear time trend	nonlinear time trend	nonlinear time trend	nonlinear time trend	year fixed effects	year fixed effects	year fixed effects	year fixed effects
Observations	36,731	38,971	36,982	32,318	36,731	38,971	36,982	32,318
R-squared	0.019	0.017	0.018	0.021	0.031	0.029	0.031	0.034

Panel B. Texas rejection rate and (Democratic vote share - 0.5)^2

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Pension claim rejected				
Vote share: last election	0.202***			0.152***	0.023			-0.010
	(0.031)			(0.035)	(0.033)			(0.034)
Vote share: mean, last two election		0.185***				0.089**		
		(0.041)				(0.039)		
Vote share: mean, last + next ele			0.127***				0.021	
			(0.044)				(0.042)	
Vote share: two elections ago				0.004				0.073**
				(0.036)				(0.033)
Vote share: three elections ago				0.094***				0.046
				(0.036)				(0.032)
Vote share: next election				-0.023				-0.010
				(0.031)				(0.030)
Vote share: two elections in future				0.101***				-0.014
				(0.038)				(0.036)
Constant	-33.227***	-43.431***	-42.739***	-14.119	0.071***	0.081***	0.079***	0.062***
	(8.143)	(7.358)	(8.245)	(10.508)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Year controls	nonlinear time trend	nonlinear time trend	nonlinear time trend	nonlinear time trend	year fixed effects	year fixed effects	year fixed effects	year fixed effects
Observations	36,731	38,971	36,982	32,318	36,731	38,971	36,982	32,318
R-squared	0.019	0.017	0.018	0.022	0.031	0.029	0.031	0.034

Note: Sample period is 1899-1922. All regressions contain county fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level.

Table 8: Effect Republican and Third Party Vote Share on Pension Application Outcome: Texas

Panel A. Texas rejection rate and third party vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent variable:				Pension claim rejected				
Vote share: last election	-0.144***			-0.151***	-0.016			0.017
	(0.023)			(0.027)	(0.022)			(0.024)
Vote share: mean, last two elections		-0.101***				-0.021		
		(0.027)				(0.026)		
Vote share: mean, last + next election			-0.171***				-0.060**	
			(0.030)				(0.028)	
Vote share: two elections ago				0.023				-0.010
				(0.023)				(0.023)
Vote share: three elections ago				0.068***				-0.004
				(0.026)				(0.024)
Vote share: next election				-0.033				-0.075***
				(0.028)				(0.024)
Vote share: two elections in future				-0.025				0.057
				(0.036)				(0.036)
Constant	-22.364***	-40.770***	-27.918***	-1.257	0.077***	0.092***	0.088***	0.070***
	(8.621)	(7.823)	(8.593)	(10.740)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Year controls	nonlinear time trend	nonlinear time trend	nonlinear time trend	nonlinear time trend	year fixed effects	year fixed effects	year fixed effects	year fixed effects
Observations	36,731	38,971	36,982	32,318	36,731	38,971	36,982	32,318
R-squared	0.019	0.017	0.019	0.021	0.031	0.029	0.032	0.034

Panel B. Texas rejection rate and Republican vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent variable:				Pension claim rejected				
Vote share: last election	-0.021			0.011	-0.002			0.004
	(0.020)			(0.022)	(0.019)			(0.021)
Vote share: mean, last two elections		-0.014				-0.028		
		(0.023)				(0.021)		
Vote share: mean, last + next election			0.033				0.017	
			(0.027)				(0.024)	
Vote share: two elections ago				0.012				-0.020
				(0.019)				(0.018)
Vote share: three elections ago				-0.076***				-0.008
				(0.019)				(0.016)
Vote share: next election				0.063***				0.043**
				(0.022)				(0.019)
Vote share: two elections in future				-0.075**				-0.002
				(0.030)				(0.024)
Constant	-54.104***	-58.109***	-51.365***	-33.891***	0.073***	0.091***	0.080***	0.063***
	(7.619)	(6.706)	(7.599)	(9.697)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Year controls	nonlinear time trend	nonlinear time trend	nonlinear time trend	nonlinear time trend	year fixed effects	year fixed effects	year fixed effects	year fixed effects
Observations	36,731	38,971	36,982	32,318	36,731	38,971	36,982	32,318
R-squared	0.018	0.016	0.018	0.021	0.031	0.029	0.031	0.034

Note: Sample period is 1899-1922. All regressions contain county fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level.

Table 9: Locational Patterns of Confederate Veterans in the South: 1910

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dependent Variable:				=1 if Confederate Veteran			
% Urban	-0.004*						0.002
	(0.002)						(0.002)
% Urban ^2	0.001						-0.004
	(0.003)						(0.003)
% Black		-0.005**					-0.004
		(0.002)					(0.003)
% Black ^2		-0.001					-0.003
		(0.003)					(0.003)
% Families in farming			0.004***				0.003**
			(0.001)				(0.001)
% Farm owners				0.015***			0.002
				(0.004)			(0.005)
% Farm owners ^2				-0.012***			-0.003
				(0.004)			(0.004)
Average farm size					-0.000		-0.000
					(0.000)		(0.000)
Value of farm output per acre						-0.000**	0.000
						(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.009***	0.011***	0.007***	0.004***	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Observations	239,616	239,616	239,469	239,469	239,153	239,153	239,153
R-squared	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001

Note: Results from regressions of an indicator for Confederate veteran status on 1890 county characteristics. Sample consists of all persons residing in the South in 1910, from the 1% IPUMS sample; there are 1,123 Confederate veterans in this sample. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure 1: Confederate Pensions by State: Spending and Applications

Figure 2: Confederate Pensions by State: Spending and Applications

Figure 3: Relationship between Vote Share and Predicted Number of Pension Applications

Note: Based on regressions of total number of applications at the county-year level on a quartic in vote share for each party separately. Regressions include county and state-year fixed effects. Predicted effects are at the mean year and state.

Figure 4: Voting Patterns and Pension Rejection Rate: Texas

Panel A. Squared Democratic Vote Share

Rejection rate
(Democrat vote share − 0.5)^2

Panel B. Third Party Vote Share

Rejection rate
Other vote share