People and cities: economic horizons beyond the Hellenistic polis
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Introduction

The Greek poleis (city states) of the Hellenistic period offer an important focus for studying economies of Mediterranean not least because they are one of the most widespread organisational and institutional centers of population and perhaps one of the key foci for human activity. Economic activity was organized on multiple social and institutional planes and while the polis (city state) was not the only form of organization it offers a significant window through which to observe economic organization and governance. For that reason this topic should be of wider interest to historians of other periods here in Columbus this weekend.

Historians, whether they are familiar or not with research in ancient economies, should know that there has been a lot of work and major development in the way the economies of the ancient Greek and Roman world have been approached. For the Hellenistic era (a period often formally located between the death of Alexander the Great, 323 BCE and the battle of Actium 31 BCE) our appreciation of the economies of the Hellenistic poleis has been enhanced by the fundamental studies by Alain Bresson (2007-2008, and 2015). His work offers a dynamic approach that contextualizes in a theory-friendly way the economies of Hellenistic cities. He builds on evidence that is epigraphical (inscriptions), numismatic (coins), and archaeological, in addition to the other more familiar written sources. The epigraphical and written evidence has provided the foundation for Leopold Migeotte’s (2014) new monograph, over 700 pages long, Les Finances des cités grecques. It offers a rich survey of the institutions of the Greek poleis of the Classical and Hellenistic eras. These authors differ in their intellectual destinations. Bresson is at pains to address issues of economic growth, exchange, production, as well as regulation, mobility, and institutional analysis. He makes considerable use of New Institutional Economics. Migeotte has traditionally adopted a much less theory-led approach. His earlier studies have collected epigraphical dossiers on borrowing (1984) and public subscriptions, the Greek institution known as epidosis (1992). It is building on such material, and asking questions more familiar perhaps to economic historians of other periods that Bresson has brought to Greek economies important insight.

Such new visions take us further and allow for greater comparison within and beyond the Hellenistic world. The Greek polis offers a unique opportunity to review long-term economic developments. These important nodes, the poleis, present a concentration of producers, consumers, and agents intrinsic to the integration of Hellenistic economies. The polis offers us a lens through which to see adaptation within the political economy over time. Several poleis provide sufficient date to ask questions over the longue durée that facilitate longer-term analysis of economic governance.

The changing economic and political contexts of the Mediterranean and beyond saw many communities adapt to shifting environments. Our focus on the Hellenistic world is a convenient laboratory in which to test how the polis adapted in a period which
witnesses two major series of political transformations in the shape of the flourish of Hellenistic monarchies and the rise of the Roman Empire. Greek poleis had developed institutions — legal, social, and political mechanisms — that enabled the community to engage in, and exploit, as best as possible the economic and political contexts of the period. Just how these communities governed themselves, and precisely how they developed which mechanisms depended considerably on the scale and regional context in which they existed. The flourish of evidence for many Greek poleis offers an enhanced insight into aspects of polis life for which there is typically less evidence from the sixth and fifth centuries BCE.

It is in this context therefore that three snapshots are offered: first, continuities and changes; second, institutions (trade and governance); and third, the human glue, people, mobility and networks.

1. Degrees of Continuity and change: commerce and coinage

First, change in the Hellenistic era was not necessarily linear. Continuities and changes punctuate the life-stories of Greek poleis and are not equally perceptible over time and space though the Hellenistic period. Different Greek poleis confronted a shifting variety of pressures. The superficial homogeneity of the Greek polis belies the complexity of the myriad of push/pull forces and interactions among and beyond the poleis. Micro-regional variation, as stressed by Horden and Purcell (2000) in their landmark study *The Corrupting Sea*, defines specific ecological contexts within which poleis existed (economically). But the disruptions brought about by major political events also provide evidence for the mentalities of the poleis and the strategies deployed to accommodate and adjust within the shifting Mediterranean world. Considerable disruption in the economic environment was frequently brought about by other powers. The polis typically had little or no control over events. Poleis were often little more than observers, participants, or victims. But what the Hellenistic period demonstrates was the complex array of mechanisms and institutions that poleis developed and honed to integrate themselves within this changing world.

Two different sets of evidence can be present some insight into the nature of change and continuity. Bresson’s paper indicates how commerce in the Hellenistic period in the Mediterranean was increasing based on the number of shipwrecks. The data suggests Mediterranean sea-borne trade intensified. His chart is based on Wilson’s review of shipwreck data, evidence that is now available from the OXREPS web-site (a project collating archaeological data for the Economy of the Roman Empire). The ships are typically of low tonnage. The chart shows a dramatic increase in shipwreck evidence in the mid-Hellenistic period (c. 200 BCE onwards), increasingly steadily through to the early imperial era. The OXREPS data allows us to bore down into some details and the following charts draw on this data to provide more precise observations (see Figure 1): although the absolute numbers are small, a closer look at the data that relates to the Aegean, mainland Greece and western Asia Minor regions echoes the more general data of the first graph.
Vessels whose origin is ostensibly in the Aegean basin are increasing through the Hellenistic period. Although a more detailed study is desirable one may well equate such a shift with the intensification in movement of commodities. The shift in the evidence is quite significant from the early fourth century through to the mid-Hellenistic. The degree of change from the early Hellenistic to the later Hellenistic indicates a doubling in intensification.
A slightly differently shaped graph (see Figure 2) is found when looking at wrecks in the Aegean basin as opposed to those with Aegean origin. The increase through the Hellenistic is visible but the increase remains steady. The evidence of ships of an Aegean origin in the previous graph suggest, if the chronological evidence is taken at face value, that one might equate the demise of the Macedonian Kingdom at the hands of Roman military power and the resulting relative peace of the second half of the second century BCE as a time of greater commercial activity. The three graphs all demonstrate a common theme: intensification and therefore perhaps growth in some aspects of the economies of the regions where Greek poleis are most densely distributed.

It is perhaps an oversimplification to equate war and peace with times of economic depression and economic prosperity (although ancient sources can be found that make that equation). The multiple and often prolonged warfare that affected the Greek poleis of the Aegean basin looks, from this reading to have dampened some aspects of economic development but possibly have encouraged others. The Roman Civil War of the second half of the first century affected much of mainland Greece; the Mithridatic War of the 80s was disastrous for some cities but not all. At the same time, the intense military operations and logistical demands may have maintained stimuli for some areas of the economy, or at least for some of its agents. The military operations of the first century BCE would not have affected all regions equally at all times. The link between military and economic activity has been used to explain coin production to which we turn next.

The Hellenistic Kings and the growing Roman Empire had an enormous impact on the Greek poleis. The production of coinage gives some indication of the different scales of polis operations from those of the Hellenistic Kings and Rome. It is widely believed that coin production is closely related to military operations and was required to meet military payments.

The table at Figure 3 is based on De Callatay’s estimates of annual die use for a variety of powers, both Royal and poleis, for the period from c. 400 BCE to the end of the Hellenistic era. What is remarkable is the large discrepancy between the Alexander issues and everything else. The injection of coinage into the money supply in the third quarter of the fourth century BCE was considerable. Second, Greek poleis typically produced a low output of coins. The coinage of Athens and Rhodes are exceptionally large. Many numismatists have tried to separate the economic function of coinage indicating that its use as payment for military operations should be considered as a separate function from that of coinage serving more mundane day-to-day transactions.
Clearly the economies of Greek poleis varied. The commercial interests of Rhodes were considerable. In the Hellenistic period, Athens produced large quantities of stephanophoroi (New Style) coinage in the second century BCE. Both communities experienced different kinds of economic change. A closer look at the output of Rhodian dies confirms the importance of the island’s activity. After the initial boom that marked the synoecism of Rhodes in 408 BCE. De Callatay suggests that the peak at the turn of 200 BCE reflects the island’s engagement in “contemporary wars,” building on the idea of a link between coinage and military action. The output he suggests is significant but probably not sufficient to suggest that there was a complete dependence on the local coinage for a fully monetized economy: the output of coins at Athens is proportionately higher and suggests a much greater circulation and the intense use of Athenian silver coinage.
The penetration of coinage into Greek poleis is considerably varied and the role played by Hellenistic Kings could have a positive and negative impact. In some regions, it becomes clear that it is the Hellenistic Kings who introduced considerable change. In De Callatay’s recent study of the neighboring regions of Pontos and Bithynia (in the Black Sea Area of modern Northern Turkey), the production of silver and bronze coinages by cities reflects considerable change (Figure 4).

**Figure 4 Mints and coin production in Pontos and Bithynia (from De Callataý 2011, fig. 2).**

The number of poleis that issue bronze coins in the Pontus region is transformed in the period after 120 BCE: significant civic silver issues (but no bronze) in this region are known at Sinope and Amisos before 120 BCE and a limited number of Royal silver issues. But after 120 BCE although no silver and bronze civic issues are known, a considerable flourish of Royal silver and bronze issues (the latter ostensibly in the name of the cities) appear as a result of Mithridates (VI) Eupator.

Like the Hellenistic Kings, Rome too had an impact on coinage among the Greek poleis. For some time, the general view has been that Rome interfered very little with Greek coin production. Roman denarii are rarely found in circulation among Greek poleis until the second half of the first century BCE (Giovaninni 1978). Both Crawford (1985) and Kinns (1987) have demonstrated the very slight impact of denarii on the coinage of Greece and Asia Minor. But De Callataý asks how Roman soldiers were paid if not in denarii and
looks to evidence of Roman influence on local Greek coinage as an indication that Rome’s military presence not only affected coin production but may in fact have been directed by Rome. De Callatay’s proposals require further thought and it is not clear to me yet that historians have considered the impact of his proposals. For example, De Callatay points to the four years’ production of Athenian stephanophoroi (126/5-123/2 BCE) that are found largely in the Northern Aegean. His suggestion is that the coinage was required (by Rome) to pay for soldiers in service in the region. De Callatay suggests a direct interference by Rome in the Athenian mint and its production (De Callatay 2011, 77): the output and destination of the coinage was determined by Rome, he has argued, and the Athenian mint was responding to Roman demands. My impression is that De Callatay sees the coin output of cities less as a purely economic operation of the cities and more as part of wider politico-economic manipulations of the Hellenistic powers whether they be the Kings or Rome.

The two examples, the Pontos/Bithynia region and the example from late second century BCE Athens both indicate the value of the numismatic data and the possible influence of the larger political powers, Hellenistic Kings and Rome. Whether we view poleis as subjected to decisions by these authorities or not, what we see clearly is that change was never absent. And yet the archaeology of the shipwreck data presents another strand of information that shows a rise in the movement of commodities by sea in the Hellenistic era. I have used the archaeological evidence for shipwrecks and coinage to indicate a broad spectrum of changes (and continuities) in how we may approach the economies of the Hellenistic polis. In line with current thinking it is useful at this higher level of abstraction to use vocabulary and concepts that allow us to see poleis operating within a wider network of relationships. Within this nexus these poleis were often competing with each other to establish and consolidate relationships that would benefit themselves. So we turn now to consider these poleis more closely.

2. Poleis as nodes

The poleis are often seen as mere pawns in a more complex game with strategies beyond their own individual interests. But if we take more of a polis-based perspective we can ask different questions: how does the polis respond to changing circumstances? How does the polis operate? How does the polis exploit or avoid opportunities and dangers respectively?

One of the drawbacks of the higher, satellite-level histories is that the great powers are seen as all-powerful; such studies deploying the poleis-as-pawn scenario present poleis as mere ciphers. The polis-level approach allows a more nuanced understanding. The interactions between poleis and Kings and Rome become, when viewed from the level of the polis present a different perspective: multiple and simultaneous requests, presentations, demands, complaints, entreaties, and diplomatic manoeuvring proliferated in a dynamic way between competing poleis and the Kings and Rome. Statements that Rome effected an increase in coin output at Athens by interfering in their numismatic production do little to help us understand the diplomatic, political, and institutional realities that we must consider if such an operation had played out. Nor does this rather
straightforward judgement give much scope for the economic complexities and issues of governance that the polis would have confronted in such a scenario.

Quite frankly, the polis-approach to Hellenistic economies is necessary simply to present alternative narratives to those that dominate much of the discourse deployed by modern commentators/historians.

An example from literary source material offers an example. We can see clearly from the Greek historian Polybius that the interactions between competing poleis and Hellenistic powers and Rome were all too apparent within the complex relations of poleis, Kings and Rome. This literary evidence of constant interchanges between Hellenistic poleis and the greater powers is precisely echoed in the epigraphical record.

In the second century BCE, Polybius (Appendix 1) presents a scenario in which it is Athens who demands from Rome the Aegean islands of Delos and Lemnos. This was not in his presentation a spontaneous Roman decision but a response to one of the many requests that we seem to have to envisage as part of the diplomatic to-and-fro that characterizes so well Hellenistic history. The presentation here is one that sees the polis seeking out a development for its own benefit; most books see the same event as a grandiloquent gesture on the part of Rome.

The decisions made about Delos were ill-received by Rhodes who made presentations to Rome (Appendix 2). Astymedes’ representation was not the first made by Rhodes. Precisely how much historical fact there is in the precise points made here in the speeches recorded by Polyibus is not really my point. The issue I am trying to press is that the frequent representation of poleis in these matters only as passive objects affected by Rome distorts the realities of Hellenistic history. For the poleis were making decisions that demonstrated that their own choices could also contribute to the complexities within the dynamics of the Hellenistic world. The Rhodian Astymedes’ speech to the Senate at Rome reinforces the island’s negotiations with Hellenistic powers in its own interactions over time. The perspective of the polis sees a world in which the competing nodes of the poleis are part of a game. They are not mere pawns. They have agency. And as such their own role, interest, and self-presentation (especially in the epigraphical record) can be used to construct a different narrative of the economies for this period.

The literary evidence for the economic centre of Delos is well-known but it is worth noting the agency that the later writer Strabo recognized (see Appendix 3): “The Athenians, after having taken the island, paid equal attention to the affairs both of religion and of commerce.”

Let us take a polis perspective, and look at Athens as an economic node. Its coinage output in the third century (see Figure 5) is interrupted in the early decades. There seems to have been little opposition to Kroll and Nicolet-Pierre’s observation that the mid-third century heterogeneous coinage is issued by Athens. The coinage of Hellenistic Athens is transformed considerably from the third century issues presented here to what becomes the dominant coinage of Greece in the second century, the stephanophoric or
Figure 5: Athenian coinage of the third century BCE (tetradrachms; obverse on first line and below the reverse of four examples)

Figure 6 The Athenian New Style coinage (stephanophoric issue) of the second century BCE (illustrated here is BMC 286).

new-style coinage of Athens (Figure 6). Although there is no complete agreement about the dating of the coinage, there does seem to be considerable support for seeing this “New style” coinage as having some relationship to Athens’ recovery of Delos and Lemnos. This chart (Figure 7) records the change in the number of dies used to produced this type of Athenian coin in the second century and can be used therefore to indicate the volume of that coinage. Output varies over time and increases from the 160s to the 140s. Change is not instant and how Athens exploited Delos for its own benefit is almost certainly a story that will be seen evolving over time in the middle third of the second century.
Figure 7 Output based on numbers of dies used to produce Athenian new style coinage
(from Bresson 2006 figures 1 and 2)

*Figure 1 – The production of Attic tetradrachms from 164/3 to 90/89
(number of obverse dies per period of 3 years – data below)*

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*Figure 2 – The production of Attic tetradrachms from 164/3 to 90/89
(number of dies per year)*
In central Greece, Athenian stephanophoric coinage becomes a widely accepted issue. Its adoption at Delphi (Appendix 4) suggests an enforcement of Athenian coinage in the Greek world that was more successful than the efforts to the same end that were undertaken by the Athenian empire in the fifth century. Where are we on thinking about the Athenian economy? Surely this decision at Delphi marks a high point in the economic history of the Athenian polis? Its economic capital seen through its coinage has reached new heights. But little is made of this in our history books because the second century is of little interest to those studying the Greek polis. Rome and the Hellenistic Kings are all powerful. And this is at best a side show for most histories. And yet from the perspective of the economy of the Athenian polis something very significant is happening.

Just how Athens was benefiting from the newly acquired island of Delos where it was, on Rome’s demand, unable to impose sales taxes and customs duties? And how was Delos linked to the growth of the stephanophoric coinage? If we understand that the polis could extract revenue from insisting on exchanging incoming coin for its own local coin and charge an agio (Greek – epikatallage), a fee on converting coins, as has been argued by Bresson, then we may perceive one of several ways in which the polis was skilled in drawing revenues from the economic environment in which it located itself. Precisely this kind of operation is what can be envisaged at another polis, Sestos (see Appendix 5). And this is what is proposed for Athens. Transactions on Delos required the conversion of other coinage into Athenian stephanophoric issues. The growth of this coinage then may well reflect the increased ability to grow trade through Delos. If we offer this kind of scenario for the middle third of the second century, we can certainly see how decisions made by poleis about their own welfare had a direct impact on the economies of the Aegean.

The conclusion is clear: as economic nodes, Greek poleis in the Hellenistic period had far more agency than has been hitherto claimed. If we are to explore the poleis of this period then this theme will be one that can be developed. Yes the Kings and Rome were powerful, but poleis had and made choices. Their own agency comes into consideration.

3. People, motivations, mobility and networks

Now that we have re-established the agency of the poleis, our next step in this final section is to consider the players, the people, the human glue that held together these economic ties. In this long-run economic game our identification with poleis as nodes must not detract from the human element that made the agency of the polis a reality.

Consider this passage (Appendix 6) from the Athens in the 180s BCE. The honorific decree, now numbered as IG ii1 1292, is for Kephisodoros, a senior political figure whose contribution to the polis is part of an unblemished career, free from corruption. Important measures of his successful political life are his critical roles as a financial official. The Treasurer of the Stratiotic Fund is the principal financial official at Athens throughout the
Hellenistic period: his term in this position is one of the highest moments of his career. Similarly the two terms of office as Treasurer of the sitonic fund (the text should date the archon of Apollodorus to 204/3 and Proxenides is 203/2) belong to the upheavals on the eve of the Second Macedonian war which saw Rome and her allies confront the Macedonian Kingdom (and its allies).

If this is not already a significant indication of the central value of economic-related office holding, then the value judgements on Kephisodoros’ contributions to law-making that was of benefit “for the harmony of all Athenians” and also his advice on “revenues of monies that were equal and fair” underline the central role that individuals could be seen to play in shaping the economic welfare of the community. Kephisodoros illustrates the role played by individuals, here as officials of the polis, in the economic governance of the polis.

The values that are presented as worthy of honor relate to the economic welfare of the city, indeed of all Athenians. These are considerations that the polis holds dear. But so too are its revenues. And these forms of income for the city have under Kephisodoros’ guidance been well judged, fair and equal. Certainly there is much more work to be done on polis revenues for this is an operation that, at the polis level raised issues of exploitation and inequality but also produced income that the polis could redistribute in ways it saw fit. Such concerns of course are a constant in complex human organizations.

The role of law is also seen as an important tool. And in our next passage, laws are seen as tools of constraint. In Appendix 7 Bruno Helly’s important new presentation of one of a series of fascinating inscriptions from Hellenistic Thessaly offers important insights into the whole nexus of interrelationships that characterize the main point I am trying to make in this paper.

What we have here is a record of the tax agreements that Athens has enjoyed with the Thessalian polis Larisa. The decree here from the second half of the second century recalls earlier agreements between the communities, the earliest Helly dates before 205 BCE (at line 54), the later post-196 BCE agreement at lines 15ff) and the current one is the most recent (lines 1ff). The second decree (lines 22ff) is perhaps slightly better preserved. Two points are worth making.

Firstly, in terms of agency, the role of the specific individuals whom the Athenians have sent, Laches and Ergochares, are singled out for praise. Now one can read such records as typical of the period but one can also take these records at face value. For the individuals that the city sends out whether Laches and Ergochares to Larisa (compare the Rhodian envoy, Astymedes, whose mission to Rome in the 160s BCE appealed against the Roman treatment of Delos), could and did make a difference. When it comes to considering a political career, such as that of the Athenain Kephisodoros, then involvement in operations such as those undertaken by his compatriots Laches and Ergochares will have contributed to the overall service to the polis that is under consideration. One has only to look to the publication at Claros in Asia Minor (mod. Turkey) of the honorific decree of
Menippos to see how such actions mount up and over a lifetime allow an individual to demonstrate a career of public service.

If the individuals provide the connections between the poleis as here, what is remarkable is how the polis can effect adjustments to improve their political and economic relations. The Athenians send an embassy to Larisa in search of improved tax relations regarding the export of grain from Thessaly to Athens. The people of Larisa will help: they will reduce the tax imposed on such operations from 5% to 1% but their laws prevent them from granting complete immunity. This is a wonderful detail: it gives us insight into how negotiations between communities integrated individuals into the dialogue. This is not a surprise. But the decree also demonstrates how the poleis sought both to enhance their economic positions on the one hand (Athens) and to protect themselves on the other (Larisa). A law preventing complete ateleia (tax-free status i.e. immunity from tax) is observed as operating at Larisa and preventing the polis from granting such immunity. But compliance constrains Larisa’s actions but nevertheless see the city reduce the export tax to the perhaps the lowest possible level without infringing the law as they lower the tax to be raised from 5 to 1%. Laws are therefore of importance. The Athenian Kephisodoros was complemented on his work on the revenues, that they be lawful/just and equal. The institutions of the polis were developed by the community to protect itself. They were observed but can be changed. Kephisodoros worked to present laws that enhanced the harmony of all Athenians. Larisa wishes to help out Athens but chooses not to change its laws to do so.

The networks between Larisa and Athens had been established for some time and were to some extent institutionalised. But maintaining or refining these inter-state networks required individuals. And these individuals provide us with important lines to follow in the sources. Their movements can leave traces such as those left by Laches and Ergocharis. These are individuals who operate at the highest level of the polis. Although they are not the only ones they are often the easiest to see.

Conclusion:

As such poleis were therefore vulnerable to the movement of such individuals both in and out of the community. Precisely how therefore the polis engaged its members through its governance was of central importance to the management of the economy. People provided contacts, networks, and diplomacy, that enabled the community to link itself into the world beyond the polis. The analysis of such networks has been brought to the ancient world and in some instances can be used as a framing concept that allows historians to view the function of people and their agency within the economies of the Hellenistic period (Malkin, Constatkopolou and Panagopoulou 2011). And the analysis of movements is also critically important. Movement in the Hellenistic period was complex, often pendular (Moatti and Kaiser 2007). Both spatially and temporally, movement varied. People could engage in long and short distance. But as economic agents all people could move or stay put. Whilst economic rationalism may not have motivated all movement, economic reasoning may well have been a factor (Oliver 2011).
The people of the poleis played a crucial role in communicating to Rome and Royal courts alike. Greeks were sent to Kings and to Rome, as ambassadors, as sacred envoys, as educators, as intellectuals as well as artists. But people also moved as soldiers, as potential workers, as manufacturers.

I have tried in a series of three lines of enquiry to explore aspects of change and continuity through shipwreck and coinage; then I have tried to repackage familiar evidence concerning the polis in terms of the agency of the community; finally, I have tried to demonstrate the role of people, and how their own agency operates within the framework of the polis and beyond. This is a good moment to be exploring the economies of the Hellenistic polis: a lot of work is happening but more remains to be done. The polis provides a useful tool for looking at economic governance and can inform us about developments over the longue durée.
References and bibliography

Gauthier, Ph. 1999. 'Symbola athéniens et tribunaux étrangers à l'epoque hellénistique', BCH 123: 157-74
Herman, G. 1980-81. ‘The ‘Friends’ of the early Hellenistic rulers: servants or officials?’ Talanta 12:13-103-49
Appendix 1. Delos (Polybius 30.20.1-7)

“The first object of the Athenian embassy was the restoration of Haliartus; but when they met with a refusal on that point, they changed the subject of their appeal and put forward their own claim to the possession of Delos, Lemnos, and the territory of Haliartus. No one could properly find fault with them for this, as far as Delos and Lemnos were concerned, for they had of old laid claim to them; but there is good reason for reproaching them in respect to the territory of Haliartus. Haliartus was nearly the most ancient city in Boeotia; had met with a heavy misfortune: instead of endeavoring in every possible way to restore it, to contribute to its utter annihilation, and to deprive its dispossessed inhabitants of even their hopes for the future, was an act which would be thought worthy of no Greek nation, and least of all of the Athenians. They open their own territory to all comers; and to take away that of others can never appear consonant with the spirit of their State. However, the Senate granted them Delos and Lemnos. Such was the decision in the Athenian business.”

Appendix 2. Impact on Rhodes (what benefits for Athens?) (Polybius. 30.31.1-18)

“The Senate next called in the Rhodians and heard what they had to say. When Astymedes entered, he adopted a more moderate and more effective line of argument than on his former embassy. He omitted the invectives against others, and took the humble tone of men who are being flogged, begging to be forgiven, and declaring that his country had suffered sufficient punishment, and a more severe one than its crime deserved. And then he went briefly through the list of the Rhodian losses. "First, they have lost Lycia and Caria, which had already cost them a large sum of money, having been forced to support three wars against them; while at the present
moment they have been deprived of a considerable revenue which they used to draw from those
countries. But perhaps," he added, "this is as it should be: you gave them to our people as a free
gift, because you regarded us with favor; and in now recalling your gift, because you suspect and
are at variance with us, you may seem only to be acting reasonably. But Kaunos, at any rate, we
purchased from Ptolemy's officers for two hundred talents; and Stratonikeia we received as a
great favor from Antiochus, son of Seleukos; and from those two towns our people had a revenue
of a hundred and twenty talents a year. All these sources of revenue we have surrendered, in our
submission to your injunctions. From which it appears that you have imposed a heavier penalty
on the Rhodians for one act of folly, than on the Macedonians that have been continually at war
with you. But the greatest disaster of all to our State is that the revenue from its harbor has been
abolished by your making Delos a free port; and by your depriving our people of that
independence by which the harbor, as well as other interests of the States, were maintained in
suitable dignity. And it is easy to satisfy yourselves of the truth of my words. Our revenue from
harbor dues amounted in past years to one million drachmai, from which you have now taken one
hundred and fifty thousand; so that it is only too true, gentlemen of Rome, that your anger has
affected the resources of the country. Now, if the mistake committed, and the alienation from
Rome, had been shared in by the entire people, you might perhaps have seemed to be acting
rightly in maintaining a lasting and irreconcilable anger against us; but if the fact is made clear to
you that it was an exceedingly small number who shared in this foolish policy, and that these
have all been put to death by this very people itself, why still be irreconcilable to those who are in
no respect guilty? Especially when to every one else you are reputed to exhibit the highest
possible clemency and magnanimity. Wherefore, gentlemen, our people having lost their
revenues, their freedom of debate, and their position of independence, in defense of which in time
past they have been ever willing to make any sacrifices, now beg and beseech you all, as having
been smitten sufficiently, to relax your anger, and to be reconciled and make this alliance with
them: that it may be made manifest to all the world that you have put away your anger against
Rhodes, and have returned to your old feelings and friendship towards them."

Appendix 3. Prosperity from Delos increases after 146 BCE (Strabo 10.5.4)

“Although Delos was so famous, yet it became still more so, and flourished after the destruction
of Corinth by the Romans. For the merchants resorted thither, induced by the immunities of the
temple, and the convenience of its harbor. It lies favorably for those who are sailing from Italy
and Greece to Asia. The general festival held there serves the purposes of commerce, and the
Romans particularly frequented it even before the destruction of Corinth. The Athenians, after
having taken the island, paid equal attention to the affairs both of religion and of commerce. But
the generals of Mithridates, and the tyrant, who had occasioned the detection of (Athens from the
Romans), ravaged it entirely. The Romans received the island in a desolate state on the departure
of the king to his own country; and it has continued in an impoverished condition to the present
time. The Athenians are now in possession of it.

Appendix 4. The acceptance of Athenian New Style Coinage in Greece: Delphi (CID IV 127
= translated by Austin 2006² no. 252; 115-100 B.C.)
When Polyon was archon at Delphi, on the thirteenth of the [month] of Daedaphorius, it was resolved by the Amphictyons who came to Delphi, that all the Greeks should accept the Athenian tetradrachm for four drachmas of silver. If any of those who live in the cities, whether foreigner, citizen or slave, whether man or woman, does not accept or give in payment (the Athenian tetradrachm) as has been prescribed, the slave shall be scourged by the magistrates and the free man shall be fined 200 drachmas of silver. The magistrates in the cities and the agoranomoi shall [give] help in collecting from those who disobey the resolution the [specified] sum of money; half of the sum collected shall belong [to the person who brought] before the authorities the offending person and the other half shall belong to the city. If the magistrates [who hold office in] the cities or at the national festivals do not give help to those who bring [the offenders] before [them], they shall be tried before the Amphictyons [after an] investigation [has been made] in accordance with [the] laws of the Amphictyons. [Likewise] if the money [changers who operate in the cities] and at the national festivals do not obey the resolution, it shall be permitted [to anyone who wishes to bring them before the] magistrates; any (magistrate) who [refuses to give help to persons who bring (offenders before them)] shall be prosecuted [in the same way as] is specified [against the other magistrates]. Each of the bieronmonones shall bring a sealed copy of the resolution [to] his own city, and [the secretary] shall send [(copies of) the decree to all the Greeks, and inscribe it at] Delphi on the treasury of the Athenians [in the sanctuary of the god, and similarly at Athens on the acropolis so that all] may know what [arrangements the Amphictyons] have made [in this matter].

Syll.3 729; PItker I (1964), no. 13

Appendix 5. Agio = epikatallagê at Sestos (OGIS 339 lls. 43-47 = IK 19 (Sestos) no. 1; translation Austin 20062 no. 257). Cf. IG xii 5, 817: Delos for Timon of Syracuse, early C2; see Sosin 2002 citing also Theophr. Char. 30.15 and IG IV2 103 lls 40-43.

when the people decided to use its own bronze coinage, so that the city's coin type should be used as a current type and the people should receive the profit resulting from this source of revenue, and appointed men who would safeguard this position of trust piously and justly, Menas was appointed and, together with his colleague in office, showed suitable care, as a result of which the people, thanks to the justice and assiduity of these men, can use its own coinage.
Appendix 6. Honorific decree for Kephisodoros (PA 8353): *IG ii² 1292 lls. 7-17 (184/3 BCE)*
= Ag. xvi 261 = Moretti, *ISE I* no. 33

“Since Kephisodoros has applied continuous goodwill to the People at every moment and been in active in politics for thirty years without blemish and without bribery; and he has shirked no toil nor risk for the sake of common benefit, and in respect of all other services undertaken that the People have appointed him to, he has served as Treasurer of the Stratotic Fund well and cherishing fame and has undertaken the Treasurership of the *Sitonic* fund as the third officer in the year of Apollodorus (203/2) and in the year of Proxenides (203/2); and he has established laws advantageous for the *homonoia* of all Athenians and advised on revenues of monies that were equal and fair.”

Appendix 7. Thessalian decrees granting tax reductions to Athens on the exportation of grain from Thessaly (2nd century BCE; Helly 2008: revised version of *IG IX* 2, 506)

Translation adapted from, and based on, Helly’s text/translation:

Decree A (line 11) “The Larisaean people decided - - - l the prices …”

Decree B (lines 22ff.) “Since among those ambassadors that have been chosen by the Athenian people there are present here Laches and Ergochares and (25) they have given over the decree concerning the exportation of grain, in view of the fact that before the Athenians have granted numerous privileges to the *koinon* of the Thessalians and to the Larisaean people (28) and since on many occasions [ - - - ] the tax on the 20th *(eikoste; 5%)* among the Greek cities [ - - ] and having accepted that the tax on the 100th *(ekatoste; 1%)* has been granted by the (31) Larisaean people [ - - two lines - - ] and the exportation [ - - ]. (34) The Larisaean people decided to praise the l Athenian people for the good disposition that exists among them in relation to [ - - (and for having chosen good ambassadors?) - - ] l (37) from among the good men and true. And in respect of the good will and friendship to the Thessalians and the Larisaean polis that has existed from earliest times, that there exist for them (i.e. the Athenians) (40) the right to export grain (?) in accordance with what is said in the law concerning? the taxes on grain [ - - - ] and the decisions that have been made by the *koinon* of the Thessalians [ - - - ]. (43) Since the Larisaean polis although she is well disposed to return the current situation to what existed before cannot do so. The laws prevent the granting of absolute *ateleia*, (46) but instead of the 1/20th tax (5%) on exported produce, it grants them a tax at 1/100th (1%) . . . .”

[Decree C: pre-205 BCE; Decree B: post-196 BCE; Decree A: 140-130 BCE].

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