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The History of Foreign Exchange | Book Reviews
Published by EH.NET (January 2006)
Classic Reviews in Economic
History Paul Einzig, The History of
Foreign Exchange. London: Macmillan, 1962. xvi + 319 pp. (second edition,
1970, xxi + 362 pp.) Review Essay by Lawrence H.
Officer, Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago. The
History of Foreign Exchange: A Provocative Classic Paul Einzig (1897-1973) was
both a financial journalist and an author of scholarly works. (A brief,
excellent biography of Einzig is Tether, 1986.) Einzig was a prolific
writer in both the popular press and academic realms. For two decades,
he contributed a regular, “Lombard Street,” column for the Financial
News (London). Later, he provided a weekly column in the Commercial
and Financial Chronicle (New York). Because of his popular writings,
academic economists have a tendency to discount Einzig’s contributions
to economics as a discipline. This reviewer feels compelled to refute
that tendency. Using a strict definition of
“book” -- excluding pamphlets, revised editions, works with similar
titles, translations from English into other languages, volumes written
solely in a non-English language, reports to governments or commissions,
working papers, works that are in only a handful of libraries, and unpublished
manuscripts -- this reviewer counted carefully (from the WorldCat database)
that Einzig was the author of fifty-seven different books -- a phenomenal
number. Of this total, one is Einzig’s autobiography and at most a
half-dozen could be construed as political treatises (judging by title).
This leaves fifty volumes as primarily economic in content. No doubt,
some of these volumes were written in haste and some are not particularly
technical. On the other side, Einzig’s books contain only his own
writings; not one is an edited volume. It is instructive to count
also the number of books produced by the seven other authors of 2006
Classic Reviews series. Allowing for edited as well as authored volumes
(but excluding works edited by others, and to which the author of interest
merely contributed one or more chapters), the number of books attributed
to each of the eight authors is listed below.
Source: WorldCat. See text. Certainly, Einzig’s total
number of books is phenomenal in comparison to any of the other authors.
In fact, incredibly, Einzig’s number of books exceeds even the total
number of the other seven authors. True, the table is purely quantitative,
not qualitative, in nature. And, true, unlike the other authors Einzig
was strictly a writer by profession. Nevertheless, by any standard,
Einzig was a prolific book author indeed. Further, Einzig published articles
in professional economics journals, even though he was not an academic
economist. The JSTOR database lists nineteen articles authored by Einzig
-- eighteen in the Economic Journal
and one in the Journal of Finance. These numbers are exclusive of
book reviews; JSTOR lists twelve by Einzig, of which six are in the
Economic Journal and one in the Economic History Review. The point of the above discussion
is that, although Einzig was neither an academic professor nor a government
economist, he should be taken seriously as an astute observer of contemporary
economic events, as an applied-economic theoretician, and as an economic
historian. One of his best books in the first category is International
Gold Movements (1929, 1931) -- invaluable to historians of the interwar
gold standard. His best work in the second category is The Theory of
Forward Exchange (1937), still useful to researchers of interest-rate
parity. Among other virtues, that book contains an excellent discussion
of selection of variables to test the theory, as well as data still
used in scholarly studies. In the third category, paramount is The
History of Foreign Exchange, the anatomy (including publication history)
of which is shown in Table 2.
Listing edition in catalogue. Source: WorldCat. a Reprint, with alterations. b
Japanese translation, by Asao Ono and Shunzo Muraoka. Einzig states, in the preface
to the first edition of the History, that his purpose is to produce
“a single book ... that would cover the entire history of Foreign
Exchange in all its main aspects from its origins to our days” (p.
xi in the second edition -- all references in this review are to that
edition). He remarks that nobody before had produced such a treatise.
It is fair to say that neither has anybody since done so. There have
been many books on the entire history of money as such, rather than
of foreign exchange, and a variety of books on foreign exchange for
particular currencies over a lengthy period of time or for a variety
of currencies over a particular era -- but no one other than Einzig
has produced a history of the foreign-exchange characteristic of currencies
for purportedly all currencies (of interest) and for all eras. From
probable international bills of exchange in Babylonia (twenty-first
century B.C.), to U.S. borrowing in the Eurodollar market (late 1960s),
Einzig succeeds admirably in conveying the flavor of foreign exchange. To cover systematically experience
of such breadth, Einzig divides his book into chronologically based
sections, as shown in Table 2. Part I deals with the Ancient Period
(primarily Greece and Rome, though also earlier civilizations), Part
II the Medieval Period, Part III the Early Modern Period (sixteenth
to eighteenth centuries), Part IV the Nineteenth Century (to World War
I), Part V 1914-1960, and Part VI (added in the second edition) the
1960s. To provide breadth systematically for each of these six eras,
Einzig instills discipline on his research and writing by dividing each
Part into four chapters: (1) foreign-exchange markets and practices,
(2) exchange rates, including crises and trends, (3) foreign-exchange
theory, and (4) exchange-rate policy. This schema greatly enhances the
value of the volume as a reference work. Part I includes an introductory
chapter, on the origins of foreign exchange; and the book includes a
general introduction and a general conclusion (the latter largely rewritten
in the second edition). Each chapter in Parts I-V (but
not Part VI) contains endnotes, which are purely bibliographical. There
is also an excellent bibliographical essay, termed “a selected bibliography”
-- and, in the second edition, this bibliography is extended to incorporate
the 1960s. Again the book is presented excellently as a reference volume.
This characteristic is helped by a good “index of names,” but the
subject index could have been more extensive. The author’s ambitious and
unique goal, the tremendous research effort (aided by the author’s
proficiency in several languages), and the systematic presentation of
the research results all make The History of Foreign Exchange a
classic in economic history. The caliber of the journals that reviewed
the History is indicative of that judgment. Of the five top general
journals in economics 1960s vintage (American Economic Review, Economic
Journal, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
and Review of Economics and Statistics), the three that reviewed books
(the first three stated) did in fact review the History. Two of the
top three journals in economic history at the time (Journal of Economic
History, and Economic History Review) reviewed the book. It is not
surprising that the third, Explorations in Entrepreneurial History
(the predecessor of Explorations in Economic History), did not review
the History, because of the then-narrow orientation of the journal.
(As for the Journal of European Economic History, it did not commence
publication until 1972.) Among major economics journals that engaged
in book reviews, only Kyklos elected not to review the History.
On the other side, American Historical Review, perhaps the top general-history
journal, did conduct a review. These reviews, together with
several others in outlets not specializing in history, are listed and
summarized in Table 3. The caliber of some reviewers is unusually high:
the economic historians J. R. T. Hughes, L. S. Pressnell, and Raymond
de Roover; and the international-economics specialist Arthur I. Bloomfield.
Most reviewers had very positive things to say about the History;
but they did not withhold criticism.
Note: All reviews are of the
first edition, except the 1971 Choice review. The most negative evaluation
is that of L. S. Pressnell, whose positive assessments are few, and
even these are negative assessments in disguise. Einzig did not hesitate
to respond to reviewers’ criticisms that he viewed as unfair or based
on incorrect facts. He had written a rejoinder to a review of his Primitive
Money (1949), this review appearing in the anthropological journal
Man. The editor of the journal published Einzig’s (1949) rejoinder
in condensed form, and, incredibly, wrote a reply to Einzig’s rejoinder
(rather than having the reviewer reply)! Einzig responded to Pressnell’s
criticisms, in the preface to the second edition of the History, stating,
quite correctly, that Pressnell’s review “amounted to little more
than a list of attacks, wasting very little time or space on trying
to justify, explain or illustrate his criticisms” (p. viii). Einzig
gleefully, and again correctly, castigates Pressnell for associating
paper credit with inflation/deflation in Ancient Rome, whereas in fact
there was no paper money and inflation took the form of coinage debasement.
Einzig then writes:
In fairness to Einzig, he did
meet the criticism of some reviewers that “the chapters dealing with
modern developments were ‘too sketchy’” (p. vii), by producing
a second edition with the addition of Part VI. However, Einzig disagreed
with the criticism that “the chapters dealing with earlier periods
were unnecessarily long,” and therefore did not condense these chapters
(or otherwise alter them substantively) in the second edition. The present
reviewer agrees with this decision; for the existing literature on foreign
exchange is heavily oriented to recent periods. Einzig’s work on earlier
periods fills a definite void. Turning to this reviewer’s
impressions of the History, consider each Part in order. For
the Ancient Period, there is lack of everything: data, writings on theory,
definitive information about markets and about rationales for policy.
Einzig acknowledges that he has “to make bricks with very little straw”
(p. 7). There is much conjecture on Einzig’s part, albeit his presentation
generally makes sense. He shows knowledge of both the classical literature
and modern treatises on these times, and does as much as he can with
snippets of information. Einzig’s definition of a
true foreign-exchange transaction (involving coins of both domestic
and foreign parties) is acceptance by tale rather than by weight. He
suggests that this first occurred in the fifth or sixth century B.C.
As for the use of bills of exchange in foreign-exchange transactions,
Einzig speculates that this could have arisen even earlier. There is
discussion of depreciation and debasement of coinage, including the
observation that the debasement of Roman coins had the effect of India
ceasing to accept them. Einzig emphasizes that foreign trade was inflexible
and, in particular, inelastic with respect to the exchange rate. He
notes that exchange-rate information for this era is not only scarce
but also complicated, due to the existence of trimetallism (three monetary
metals: copper, silver, gold) and symmetallism (electrum: gold/silver
alloyed coins). Einzig is careful not to overstate
the role of foreign exchange in theory and policy. Debasement of coinage
in Rome was generally done to finance budget deficits rather than to
correct balance-of-payments deficits. The same is true for Greek devaluations
and debasements. The purchasing-power-parity (PPP) theory of exchange
rates cannot be discerned in Ancient writing. The reason given again
is the inelasticity of foreign trade, with tremendous differences in
prices of goods across countries (due to both high transport costs and
high profit margins). On the other side, exchange control was the policy
of Sparta and of Egypt (under Ptolemaic and Roman rule), with Plato
the intellectual champion of such a policy. Exchange control existed
in the Roman Empire in connection with the accumulation of exchange
as tribute to be transferred to Rome. Considering the Medieval Period,
Einzig observes that “manual exchange” (exchange of domestic for
foreign coin) began to give way to bills of exchange in an evolutionary
process. He makes much of the fact that international bills (because
they involved exchange risk) were a means of circumventing the anti-usury
laws of the Church. He is impressed with medieval foreign-exchange theorizing,
which arose in the context of whether exchange rates concealed interest,
and discerns a variety of theories (or harbingers of theories) of exchange-rate
determination in the Scholastic writings: demand and supply, exchange
risk, cost-of-production, money-supply, balance-of-payments, and PPP.
Exchange control over bills was less strict and less pervasive than
over coins, because the Church required freedom of transferring funds
emanating from Papal collections. For the Early Modern Period
(sixteenth-eighteenth centuries), Einzig provides a good discussion
of the gradual transition from medieval to modern practices. He notes
that Thomas Gresham (of “Gresham’s Law” fame) made the first known
computation of a specie point (the English gold-import point from Flanders)
in 1558. Einzig outlines the history of the British, French, Dutch,
German, Spanish, Swedish and Russian exchange rates (each relative to
other currencies) during this period. The Early Modern Period witnessed
the first true exchange-rate theorizing, meaning “a deliberate analysis
of cause and effects of Foreign Exchange movements and the role of Foreign
Exchange in the economic system” (p. 138). Salamancan (Spanish) writers
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are credited with the money-supply
theory and the purchasing-power theory of the exchange rate; but (as
Einzig states) it is unclear whether they meant the entire money supply
(coinage) in circulation or the supply merely in the foreign-exchange
market for the purchase of foreign bills. The Salamancans did not develop
the balance-of-payments (or trade-balance) theory of the exchange rate;
this was done by English writers, such as Gresham and Mun. The Malynes-Misselden-Mun controversy
is judged to be “one of the most important controversies in the history
of Foreign Exchange theory” (p. 142); but only one page is devoted
to this controversy. Malynes, who here had a speculation theory of the
exchange rate, lost the debate; Mun’s view that the exchange rate
and specie flows depended on the trade balance became preeminent. Yet
elsewhere Malynes theorized the price specie-flow mechanism, but Einzig
does not acknowledge this accomplishment. Nor does Einzig mention that
“Malynes has all the ingredients for the PPP theory and comes ever
so close to exhibiting the theory for both fixed and floating rates”
(Officer, 1982, p. 258). Schumpeter (1954, p. 737) also judges that
“Purchasing-Power Parity theory, or some rudimentary form of it ...
can ... certainly be attributed to Malynes.” Regarding policy in the Early
Modern Period, Einzig mentions various alternatives to exchange control: 1. A uniform tax on exchange
transactions -- temporarily imposed in England in 1586, after exchange
control was abandoned. Not noted by Einzig, the idea was resurrected
(but not implemented) during the period of “dollar surplus” in the
1960s. 2. Official pegging of exchange
rates. This was done by fixing the price of foreign coins in domestic
coins. The pegging was adjustable, that is, the price was changed periodically. 3. Official intervention in
the foreign-exchange market, for example, by requiring exporters to
sell their foreign exchange to the government at unfavorable rates.
This is actually a form of exchange control. Creation of an exchange
equalization account, that would have enabled intervention similar to
the Bretton Woods system and the managed float that followed it, was
advocated by Gresham and others, but did not occur. 4. Altering mint parities.
This was often done to induce a net inflow of specie, rather than to
affect exchange rates as such. 5. Changing or suspending seigniorage
on coinage. This affected specie points and therefore the exchange-rate
spread. Once seigniorage was abolished (as in England in 1666), this
policy lost its mechanism. Regarding the Nineteenth Century,
Einzig writes that “the advanced paper currency inflation in France
during the Revolution and the fluctuation of the inconvertible pound
during the period of suspension may be regarded as the first meaningful
experience in Foreign Exchange movements under inconvertible paper currency
systems” (p. 171). This statement is incorrect on two counts: First, nothing is said about
the experience of China, where paper was invented and paper money first
issued. At times, paper money circulated together with coined money,
and at times the paper money was inconvertible. It is known that Chinese
coins circulated in foreign countries in the fifteenth century and probably
earlier (see, for example, Bernholz, 2003, p. 56). There must have been
implications for exchange rates, if only for “manual exchange” (domestic
for foreign coin). True, little if any information on such foreign exchange
exists. Yet that deficiency did not stop Einzig from making conjectures
about foreign exchange in the Ancient Period! Second, several pages are devoted
to the Bank Restriction Period (the inconvertible pound in 1797-1821,
also called “the bullionist period”), in both empirical (exchange
value of the pound) and theoretical (bullionist-controversy) aspects.
Indeed, Einzig writes: “the so-called ‘bullionist’ controversy
... was probably the most important Foreign Exchange controversy for
all time” (p., 202). However, he makes no reference at all to an earlier
“bullionist period,” the Swedish inconvertible paper currency and
floating exchange rate of 1745-1776. China was the first country to
introduce paper money; but Sweden was the first to issue banknotes.
In fairness to Einzig, the Swedish experience was not generally known
until “rediscovered” by Eagly (1963, 1968, 1971). Nevertheless,
Einzig could have incorporated this important experience in the second
edition of the History, but he chose not to do so. This reviewer also takes exception
to Einzig’s view that “technical devices” to discourage the outflow
or encourage the inflow of gold were undertaken predominantly by countries
(such as France and Germany) other than the three (Britain, the United
States, Holland) that “with really narrow gold points were ... on
a really effective gold standard” (p. 173). Regarding the latter three
countries, Einzig states only that the Bank of England adopted such
devices during the Boer War, and mentions nothing about U.S. use of
these policies. In fact, both the Bank of England and U.S. Treasury
engaged in extensive “direct manipulation” of gold points for much
of the classical gold-standard period (see Clark 1984; Officer 1986,
1996, chapter 9). For the period 1914-1960, Einzig
reports the great change in foreign-exchange policy: from minimal government
interference with free foreign-exchange markets over the century since
the end of the Napoleonic Wars, to official intervention the rule rather
than the exception. Exchange control, which had lapsed into disuse,
was resurrected. Correspondingly, PPP theory had been almost entirely
forgotten during the century of relative stability of the major exchange
rates. Now the theory was restated, with great vigor and dogmatism,
by Gustav Cassel. Supported by major economists, such as John Maynard
Keynes (who later withdrew his support) and A. C. Pigou, the theory
would never again be ignored. Discussion of the 1960s, reluctantly
included by Einzig as an additional part in the second edition of the
History, is not particularly impressive, in part because a single
decade does not warrant the space given to it in a study stretching
over several millennia. Einzig compares the only occasional and isolated
foreign-exchange crises of the 1815-1914 century to the multitude of
crises decade after decade since. The prevalence of foreign-exchange
crises continues to this day! In his concluding chapter,
Einzig predicts that an abandonment of the fixed-rate system of Bretton
Woods (which was often discussed in the literature, but had not yet
happened at the time of his writing) would only be temporary. “It
would not take very long for most Governments to realise the grave disadvantages
of the currency chaos resulting from their ill-advised decisions to
de-stabilise their exchanges. Sooner or later they would return to the
system of stability, as their forerunners did each time they were forced
to abandon it in the past” (p. 348). Einzig expresses that view from
the perspective of four thousand years of exchange rates! The creation
of the euro -- fixed exchange rates par excellence, which replaced multiple
national currencies with one supranational currency -- provides partial
validation of Einzig's prediction. Time will tell whether the present
float, or rather managed float, between the various currencies of the
developed world (euro, dollar, yen, pound, etc.) will also be succeeded
by a renewed fixity of exchange rates. That event would make Einzig's
prediction impressive indeed. Einzig was well-known as a proponent of
fixed as distinct from floating exchange rates; but his prediction that
any lapse from fixed rates would only be temporary is a positive statement,
not a normative one. Einzig was well-known as a
proponent of fixed as distinct from floating exchange rates; but his
prediction that any lapse from fixed rates would only be temporary is
a positive statement, not a normative one. Einzig observes, with disdain,
the “obscurantist presentation” of modern foreign-exchange theory
and the widening gap of this theory from foreign-exchange policy. He
writes: “No contribution to Foreign Exchange Theory expressed in terms
of mathematical economics has added anything of substance to the subject
that could not have been added to it without the use of mathematics”
(p. 322). This statement is not quite the same as the more-common view
that “any legitimate theory that is expressed mathematically can also
be exposited verbally.” Einzig is consistent, for there is not one
mathematical symbol in the History! If there is any general weakness
of the History, it is the absence of tables and charts of exchange
rates, mint parities, and specie points. Einzig is aware of this limitation;
he writes:
It is fair to say that economic
historians have performed much work of this nature since the publication
of the History. The History of Foreign Exchange
has great limitations as well as great strengths. It is an impressive,
but also a controversial and provocative, work. Undoubtedly, though,
it deserves to be called a classic. References: Bernholz, Peter. Monetary
Regimes and Inflation: History, Economic, and Political Relationships.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003. Clark, Truman A. “Violations
of the Gold Points, 1890-1908.” Journal of Political Economy 92
(October 1984): 791-823. Eagly, Robert V. “Money,
Employment and Prices: A Swedish View, 1761.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 77 (November 1963): 626-36. Eagly, Robert V. “The Swedish
and English Bullionist Controversies.” In Robert V. Eagly, ed., Events,
Ideology and Economic Theory. Detroit: Wayne State University Press,
1968: 13-31. Eagly, Robert V., editor, The
Swedish Bullionist Controversy. Philadelphia: American Philosophical
Society, 1971. Einzig, Paul. International
Gold Movements. London: Macmillan, first edition, 1929, second edition,
1931. Einzig, Paul. Primitive Money
in Its Ethnological, Historical and Economic Aspects. London: Eyre
and Spottiswoode, 1949. Einzig, Paul. “Primitive
Money: A Rejoinder” (with Editor’s Reply). Man 49 (November 1949):
132. Einzig, Paul. The Theory of
Forward Exchange. London: Macmillan, 1937. Officer, Lawrence H. “The
Purchasing-Power-Parity Theory of Gerrard de Malynes.” History of
Political Economy 14 (Summer 1982): 256-59. Officer, Lawrence H. “The
Efficiency of the Dollar-Sterling Gold Standard, 1890-1908.” Journal
of Political Economy 94 (October 1986): 1038-73. Officer, Lawrence H. Between
the Dollar-Sterling Gold Points: Exchange Rates, Parity, and Market
Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Schumpeter, Joseph A. A History
of Economic Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. Tether, C. Gordon. “Einzig,
Paul.” In Lord Blake and C. S. Nicholls, eds., The Dictionary of
National Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Lawrence H. Officer is Professor of Economics at the University of Illinois at Chicago and Editor, Special Projects, EH.Net. He is a specialist in international economics and monetary history. His recent journal publications include “The U.S. Specie Standard, 1792-1932: Some Monetarist Arithmetic,” Explorations in Economic History (2002) and “The Quantity Theory in New England, 1703-1749: New Data to Analyze an Old Question,” Explorations
in Economic History (2005). Officer is a recurrent contributor to the
“How Much Is That?” section of EH.Net. Copyright (c) 2006 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net; Telephone: 513-529-2229). Published by EH.Net (January 2006). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://eh.net/BookReview.
Copyright © 2006 by EH.NET. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and EH.Net. For other permission, please contact the EH.NET Administrator (admin@eh.net; telephone 513-529-2229; fax: 513-529-6992). Published by EH.NET Jan 20 2006 All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://eh.net/bookreviews/. CitationLawrence H. Officer, "Review of Paul Einzig, The History of Foreign Exchange." EH.Net Economic History Services, Jan 20 2006. URL: http://eh.net/bookreviews/library/officer |
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