EH.net is owned and operated by the Economic History Association with the support of other sponsoring organizations.
Poverty from the Wealth of Nations: Integration and Polarization in the Global Economy since 1760
Published by EH.NET (January 2003)
M. Shahid Alam, Poverty from the Wealth of Nations: Integration and
Polarization in the Global Economy since 1760. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000.
xv + 215 pp.$69.95 (hardcover), ISBN: 0-312-23018-4.
Reviewed for EH.NET by Pierre van der Eng, School of Business and Information
Management, Australian National University.
This book basically seeks to answer a question that has confounded many
authors: Why did the West become so much richer than the rest? Where David
Landes took more than 500 pages to address this question, M. Shahid Alam,
Professor of Economics at Northeastern University in Boston (USA), requires
just 180 pages of text. Of course it is possible to give a brief answer if you
keep it simple. Alam's answer is simple: today's less-developed countries
suffered from a lack of autonomy as a consequence of European imperialism since
the mid-eighteenth century. As colonies and dependencies, they were not allowed
to map out their own future, invest in education and infrastructure, and --
more importantly -- use trade barriers to pursue import-substituting industrial
policies on which to base their further industrialization and development.
There are some nuances, but that's basically it.
How does Alam arrive at this conclusion? Not by meticulously dissecting the
economic history of less-developed countries and the processes of colonization,
but by raking over some of the existing literature and by cranking
cross-country panel data in chapter 6 that seems to be the meat in this slender
publication.
The author is so taken by his thesis that every chapter, including the preface,
restates it at some stage in some form. For instance, the introductory chapter
is not a preamble to the issue that will be investigated and the hypotheses
that are to be tested, but is a summary of the rest of the book. Without having
read the substantiation in other chapters, a reader who expects an introduction
may find it hard to understand why Alam churns out one sweeping statement after
another, without substantiation or explanation. For instance: "...lagging
countries which were free [i.e., not colonized] and chose to resist the logic
of international integration -- to save, shore up and modernize manufactures,
enterprises and skills -- continued to industrialize, to grow and to narrow
their economic distance behind the advanced countries" (p. 5). It is unclear
which countries are meant, or whether any concrete examples actually fit this
typification. Perhaps Japan does, but does Mexico or Afghanistan?
Chapter 2 may be of interest to economic historians, because it surveys the
available literature on the history of global disparities in income and living
standards. For instance, Shahid Alam compares historical estimates of GDP per
capita provided by Bairoch and Maddison. Largely by accepting Bairoch's
estimates, he establishes that around 1760 per capita incomes in Western Europe
and the rest of the world were broadly comparable and that disparities have
increased since. The author omits a probing of the sources that led Bairoch and
Maddison to arrive at different estimates for the early nineteenth century. Had
he done this, he may not have accepted Bairoch's estimates for the early period
so readily.
Chapter 3 is an historical overview of the views of economists on international
trade and investment. The bad guys are Smith and Ricardo and 'orthodox
economists' who propagated the concept of comparative advantage, and the
benefits of free trade as ideology rather than science, oblivious of the
"growing polarization between advanced and lagging countries" (p. 66). The good
guys include List, Myrdal and Wallerstein who "identify with the interests of
the lagging countries" (p. 66).
Chapter 4 presents a taxonomy of sovereignty, outlining the characteristics of
his categories of sovereign countries, dependencies, quasi-colonies and
colonies. A curious twist is that the author prefers to leave countries such as
Australia and Canada (but not South Africa, which is characterized as a
'sovereign country') out of the taxonomy and out of the story, even though they
used to be colonies. His argument is that some colonies, and also the lagging
countries of Europe and South America, escaped this downside of colonization
because of what Alam considers as their racial and cultural affinities with
Western Europe. Hence, due to the racism that was rife in Western countries,
only countries without racial/cultural affinities were colonized and exploited.
Chapter 5 shoehorns countries and regions with lagging economies into this
classification: peripheral European countries and South America are sovereign;
dependencies are in Central America; Africa and Asia are (quasi) colonies. The
chapter provides dates to gauge the length of time since countries were
subjugated in some form by Western countries. It then hones in on the
suggestion that becoming a dependency or colony reduced the sovereignty of
using tariff policies and therefore protection of manufacturing industry.
Chapter 6 uses these categories, the length of colonization and other variables
to crank the cross-country panel data and statistically substantiate the thesis
with which the reader is by now already very familiar. Controlling for a range
of variables, the chapter demonstrates that a lower degree of sovereignty did
enhance the economic integration of a country into the world economy (measured
with the trade/GDP ratio) but not the levels of manufacturing industry
(measured with the share of manufacturing in GDP) and human capital formation
(measured with adult literacy rates and average years of schooling) in 1960 and
1980 or economic growth in general since 1870 (based on Maddison's data). Alam
even concludes that switching the status of colonies to sovereign countries
would have increased their annual growth rates by 1.59 percentage points (p.
158).
Chapter 7 is not a conclusion but an epilogue. The author compares two phases
of industrialization (1760-1950s and since the 1950s) to argue that the
conspiracy of the West continues. Most of the chapter is a repeat of earlier
chapters, but new are sweeping statements suggesting that since the 1980s
Western countries, led by the United States and assisted by the IMF, World Bank
and OECD, have crafted a new imperialism based on the 'Washington consensus' to
delay the process of manufacturing development in lagging countries and to
capture the markets and investment opportunities there.
Alam describes himself as a crusader against 'Eurocentrist' explanations of
underdevelopment. A bĂȘte noire is David Landes, who is dismissed as "the chief
defender of the Eurocentric faith" (p. xiii). In a twisted way, Alam seems to
be more Eurocentric than Landes. Unlike Landes, he makes no serious effort to
understand the past development problems of any less-developed country in
particular. Moreover, his book assumes that only Western Europe engaged in
colonialist pursuits. It says nothing about colonization by non-Western
European countries, for instance Russia's colonization of Siberia and Central
Asia, Japan's colonization of Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria, or China's
colonization of Mongolia and Tibet.
The tone of the book is defensive. It seems that Alam's crusade has been
fraught with difficulties, because the academic world does not subscribe to his
views and analysis. In the preface of the book, the author's recounts his
struggle to expose that "the social sciences" have justified and perpetuated
"Western hegemony" in understanding underdevelopment (p. xii). It mentions the
author's efforts in getting his papers, on which this book draws, published in
peer-reviewed established academic journals. He suggests that his views and
analysis were not accepted, presumably by the 'orthodox economists' who
determine editorial policies of journals. After receiving refusal after
refusal, he tried instead to get book publishers interested: "Predictably, they
offered a warmer welcome" (p. xi). At US$70 for a slender booklet, that may not
be surprising.
A major problem with the book is that Alam does not make an effort to write
history. His only discussion of historical developments serves the purpose of
establishing the date when colonization started or ended. The complex processes
of colonization and the economic histories of countries are simply reduced to a
few dummy variables that represent the time since independence until 1960 or
1980. A selected number of variables in those two years is assumed to represent
the outcomes of earlier decennia of colonization. They ignore that colonization
was largely a pre-World War II phenomenon, and that ex-colonies since felt the
economic impacts of World War II and independence wars, and, worse, the
consequences of poor economic management since independence, often exactly
because they tried to implement what the author perceives as the successful
strategy towards sustained economic growth: inward-looking, import-substituting
industrialization.
Consequently, implicit in Alam's analysis are various assumptions that are not
probed in any depth. For instance, the author implicitly assumes that, before
they were colonized, countries inhabited by non-European races were all heading
for industrialization, education, and economic growth, had it not been for the
West European colonization drive. This of course assumes that nation states
existed, which had enlightened national governments that were imbued with the
will and ability to further economic development through the kind of industrial
policies pursued by, say post-Tokugawa Japan. The book does not contain any
hint of counterfactual analysis to make this seem plausible. Of course, that
would have been a difficult task, as it requires detailed knowledge of the
areas that became colonized countries.
Still, the issue could have been addressed by contrasting the development
record of countries that never fell under colonial rule -- such as Ethiopia,
Afghanistan, Nepal or China -- with that of countries that did. In fact, Alam
could for that purpose have drawn on existing literature. For instance, Lloyd
Reynolds' (1983, 1985) extensive survey of the problems of underdevelopment
based on detailed scrutiny of secondary literature for individual countries
addressed this issue. Surprisingly, Reynolds' work is entirely missing in the
references of Alam's book. Why? Perhaps because Reynolds (1983, p. 957)
answered his question 'Would these areas have developed faster before 1950 if
they had been completely independent countries rather than colonies?' as
follows: 'There is no magic in independence.'
Anyone interested in simple explanations for economic underdevelopment will
like this book. It offers some new nuances, but basically confirms the view
that the West is to blame for the problems of underdevelopment in the world.
Anyone interested in a more profound understanding of such problems will find
this a frustrating book. It ignores the wide range of factors that play a role
in a holistic explanation of underdevelopment in the past and present: low
rates of capital formation, high population growth, low agricultural
productivity, low formation of domestic markets due to poor infrastructure
development, poor or rigid financial systems, internal political turmoil etc.
Except as variables in the regression, the book largely ignores the
idiosyncrasies of individual less-developed countries.
References:
Landes, David (1998) The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich
and Some So Poor. New York: W.W. Norton.
Reynolds, L.G. (1983) "The Spread of Economic Growth to the Third World:
1850-1980," Journal of Economic Literature, 21 (3), pp. 941-980.
Reynolds, L.G. (1985) Economic Growth in the Third World, 1850-1980. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Pierre van der Eng is Senior Lecturer at the Australian National University
and is currently visiting professor at Seikei University in Tokyo. Research
interests include various aspects of the economic history of Southeast Asia, in
particular Indonesia. Recent publications include "Food for Growth: Trends in
Indonesia's Food Supply, 1880-1995," Journal of Interdisciplinary
History (2000); "Indonesia's Growth Performance in the Twentieth-Century"
in Angus Maddison et al. (editors) The Asian Economies in the Twentieth
Century (London: Edward Elgar, 2002); and "Bridging a Gap: A Reconstruction
of Population Patterns in Indonesia, 1930-1961," Asian Studies Review
(2002).
