Session 8: International Order in Asia in the 1930s and 1950s

British Imperialism in Asia and Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1930s—1950s

Yoichi KIBATA (The University of Tokyo)

Looking back from the year 1943, Stanley K. Hornbeck, an Asian specialist in the American Department of State who wielded strong influence on American policy in East Asia, stressed the continuity in British attitude towards Japan from 1902 to the time of the Manchurian Incident:

> [T]roughout the period from 1902 to 1931 the British Government maintained and exploited "best friend" attitude toward Japan; and……in 1931 there was a substantial body of opinion among leading figures in the British Government and in British financial and commercial circles to the effect that Japan was the one country in the Far East that could be relied upon for maintenance of law and order, ……and that it might be to British advantage were the Japanese to occupy and to become preoccupied with Manchuria and thereby to be caused to refrain from efforts to enlarge their activities, interests, and still further in the Yangtze Valley and regions southward therefrom.[1]

Needless to say, 1902 was the year when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was formed. That Alliance, which became the lynchpin of the imperialist world order in Asia at the beginning of the twentieth century, was terminated after World War I largely as the result of strong pressure from the United States, which expressed strong opposition to its renewal in 1921.[2] The fact that Britain could not carry through its desire to continue the Alliance, which the Japanese side also wanted to be kept alive, signaled the relative decline of the British power in Asia. And the international system created in the wake of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the Washington Conference, i.e. the system under the nine-power treaty concerning China and the four-power treaty concerning the Pacific, made it clear that that a naked alliance between imperialist powers was no longer viewed as a legitimate instrument in international order.

Various factors in international relations began to transform as the result of World War I, and the abolition of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was nothing but an expression of this change. There are also grounds for arguing that the process of decolonization started in or at the end of World War I. But, as has been pointed out by many historians, the basic stance of British imperial policy did not change much. More than twenty years ago, John Darwin argued: "the more closely we inspect the response of the policy makers towards the novel difficulties that had afflicted the imperial system after 1917 the less satisfactory it becomes to portray their dispositions as a conscious preparation for the final act of dissolution."[3] And more recently, Peter Cain and A.G. Hopkins forcefully demonstrated that Britain continued harbour imperialist ambitions which were backed up by financial power.[4]

With such a view in mind, in this paper the author tries to throw light on an aspect of the continuity of British imperial policy by portraying British attitude towards Japan in the 1930s, especially in the period between the Manchurian Incident and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Then the paper briefly deals with British policy towards Japan after the end of World War II.[5] In contrast both to the continuity between the period of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the 1930s and to the arguments of some of the papers in this session, which emphasize the continuity of international order in Asia from the 1930s to the 1950s, the picture drawn in this paper will point to a clear change between the 1930s and the post-World War II period.

□□□

Among profound changes produced by World War I the most important factor that affected the imperialist world order was the rise of colonial nationalism. In Asia the force of nationalist movements in colonies or semi-colonies, especially that of China, Korea and India gained momentum as the result of the war. It should be remembered that these countries were the objects of colonial domination under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: the first Alliance in 1902 provided for the status quo in China and Korea, and the second Alliance in 1905 extended its scope to India.

It was the strengthening of nationalism in China that mattered most in Anglo-Japanese relations. British stance vis-à-vis rising nationalism was shown in the "December Memorandum" of 1926 which was issued after the upsurge of anti-British nationalism in 1925 and 1926. This memorandum stressed the importance of dealing with Chinese nationalist movements with sympathy and displayed Britain's readiness to recognize China's right to enjoy tariff autonomy. But, as Harumi Goto-Shibata aptly explained in her study of Anglo-Japanese relations in Shanghai in the 1920s, the objective of this new policy was not to retreat from China, but to retain Britain's vital interests in China by surrendering only what was considered to be of secondary or peripheral importance, and by pacifying nationalists.[6] In a letter to Lloyd-George Austen Chamberlain, the then British Foreign Secretary, explained the reason why it was imperative for Britain to preserve its position in China even by making such concessions: " You will understand all that would be involved for our position throughout the Far East, in India, Afganistan, Persia and even Turkey by a disaster at Shanghai."[7] What was at stake in China was not only British interests in China itself but also imperial influence of Britain in wider Asia.

Even after the turmoil in the mid-1920s was calmed, British fear about the possible damaging outcome of active Chinese nationalism died hard, and British policy towards Japan during and after the Manchurian Incident should be viewed first and foremost in the light of this concern about Chinese nationalism. In the course of the Manchurian Incident, Britain continued to show magnanimity towards Japan. Britain adopted a relatively firm stance to rein in Japanese activities during the Shanghai Incident in early 1932, but it was only a temporary reaction, and, once Japan's threat to Shanghai, where British economic interests were heavily concentrated, receded, Britain went back to the accommodating attitude towards Japan.

It was thought that, as long as Japanese activities did not directly do harm to British interests in China, Japanese power could be utilized for restraining Chinese nationalism. For example, even during the period of the Shanghai Incident Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, stated in a Cabinet meeting: "From the point of view of the security of the Settlement it appeared better that the Japanese should succeed than the Chinese."[8] To give another example, Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer, the Commander-in-Chief of China Station of the British Navy, wrote in 1933:

> We should admit that they [the Japanese] , as a great Eastern people, have every right to a line of commercial expansion in the direction of China…… We should realise that they are Orientals and know how to deal with the Chinese far better than we do. We are not so competent to instruct the Chinese Government how to restore order out of chaos amongst 400 million Chinese."[9]

Such a reasoning harks back to the function of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the heyday of imperialism. Under the Alliance Japan's cooperation as a non-European (Orientals!) imperialist power helped Britain to maintain its far-flung empire in Asia. Though Japan came out of World War I in a much stronger shape than the other powers, including Britain, expected, and began to show its desire to build an Asian empire even by infringing upon Europe-centered imperialist world order, the ruling circles in Britain continued to nurture the idea that Japanese activities could be utilized to buttress the imperialist order, in which Britain occupied the central position. This was not so much the defensive attitude of a retreating power as an undertaking to create a revised imperialist order in East Asia, using Japanese aggression in China as a factor to curb the further rise of Chinese nationalism.

In order to understand the historical meaning of British policy towards Japan at this juncture, it may be useful to consider the position of Indian nationalism in Anglo-Japanese realations. Nationalism in India was also gaining momentum around this period and the British government was displaying some gesture of concession which led to the new India Act of 1935. Unlike Chinese nationalists, Indian nationalists had yet little to fear Japanese aggression into their own country and there was marked tendency among some Indian nationalists to look to Japan as their friend or protector. This gave headache to British colonial administrators and the behaviour of Indian nationalists residing in Japan such as Rash Behari Bose was constantly kept under surveillance.[10] It was feared that a breach between Britain and Japan would lead to the strengthening of Japan's possible leading role in pan-Asiatic movements, which would further stimulate Indian nationalism.

In 1933 Hornbeck, whose observation was quoted at the beginning of this paper and who was watching closely from America Britain's attitude towards Japan, detected such a fear: "It is very commonly argued in England that a strong Japan bound to England by contractual obligations is necessary for the maintenance of Britain's position in India."[11]

This again brings us to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. As was mentioned earlier, the area of application of the Alliance was extended to India at the time of its revision in 1905 and Japan came to commit itself to the defence of British interests in India. Though Britain and Japan maintained friendly relations after the ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, there was no guarantee for Britain to expect Japan's taking side of Britain against Indian nationalism. It is noteworthy that Hornbeck at the same time pointed out: "The Tory element, with the Admiralty leading, in Great Britain keep bringing up the idea of renewing the Anglo-Japanese alliance. They ring the charges on the proposition, erroneous in fact, that Japan is the natural and the effective guardian of peace in the Far East." (emphasis in the original) [12]

□□□

In fact, after the end of the Manchurian Incident in 1933 several attempts were made by Britain to bring about much closer Anglo-Japanese cooperation, if not a new alliance. [13]

In 1934 Neville Chamberlain, the powerful Chancellor of the Exchequer in the British National Government, tried to conclude a non-aggression pact with Japan. This move was ardently supported by Sir Warren Fisher, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Treasury, and was pursued in spite of the reservation expressed by the Foreign Office, which feared that such a move would provoke adverse reactions in the United States, China and the Soviet Union. Though this attempt came to nothing in face of negative attitude of Japanese policy-makers, who were not ready to enter into an agreement which might impinge on Japan's freedom in international relations in Asia, especially in China, Chamberlain and Fisher did not give up their plan for building closer relations with Japan.

In 1935, with their strong backing, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, a currency expert at the Treasury, was sent to China to help currency reform there. The significance of this Leith-Ross Mission has been stressed by Cain and Hopkins in their British Imperialism as a clear case supporting the theory of gentlemanly capitalism.[14] Shigeru Akita rightly criticized their argument, pointing out that the part played by the Leith-Ross Mission was relatively less important in the process of Chinese currency reform than was suggested by Cain and Hopkins and the roles of China itself and of the United States should be taken into account more fully.[15] The fact that Leith-Ross's actual role in the currency reform of November 1935 was not so big was borne out by a contemporary observation by Arthur N. Young, who was in a position to watch closely the process of currency reform as a financial advisor of the Chinese government. In February 1936 he wrote to Hornbeck: "You can take it quite definitely that the program of reform was not devised by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross. The plan was completed before he reached China, to be put into effect when the situation was ripe for it. Of course his presence here was quite helpful in inducing the influential British community to fall in line with the plan."[16]

What should be stressed about the Leith-Ross Mission in the context of this paper was that it also embodied a further attempt to bring about a new form of Anglo-Japanese cooperation in China. Leith-Ross carried a proposal to Japan about an Anglo-Japanese joint credit to "Manchukuo", which could then be handed to China as compensation for the loss of "Manchukuo". This proposal elicited no positive response from the Japanese side, but in such a way Britain tried to maintain its influence in China in tandem with Japan through the de facto, if not de jure, recognition of "Manchukuo", a puppet state created by Japan as the result of the Manchurian Incident.

Chamberlain's line of thinking in promoting this kind of plan could be detected in a letter to his sister Hilda written in spring of 1935 after a meeting with leading British industrialists in China:

> I have been astonished to find what confidence they all have in the future of the China market. They are also unanimous in thinking that while Japan will certainly take her place as China's mentor if she thinks we don't care, we have only to assert ourselves a little and she will be quite ready to work alongside of us since there is room for both. China too would be delighted if we would show that we meant to retain our interests in her country and a good deal of discussion has already taken place between Chinese and British as to the advantages of joint action in the development of railways which has only failed to materialise because of the doubts about British policy…….I told the men of business that I could not say what would be done for them but they might rely on it that some decision would be taken.[17] (emphasis by the author)

The view that the further participation in the development of railways would be beneficial to British interests in China was not unique to Chamberlain, but it is noteworthy that he put much emphasis on this point and that he believed in the possibility of coexistence with Japan in China.

The same sort of reasoning was detected behind the dispatch of a trade mission by the Federation of British Industries in the autumn of 1934. This mission which was led by Lord Barnby visited Japan and "Manchukuo" with the intention of promoting British trade with "Manchukuo". The mission's overt aim was to probe into the chance of expanding British exports to "Manchukuo", especially the exports of capital goods. But just like the Leith-Ross Mission the Barnby Mission had a strong political character. When Sir Charles Seligman, a member of the Mission, met Sir Montagu Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England, before the departure of the Mission, Norman told him frankly that the Barnby Mission was political though dressed as industrial.[18] The Japanese government was well aware of this, and during the Mission's stay in Japan it tried to create the atmosphere that the Mission had a political task of promoting Anglo-Japanese rapprochement and symbolized British friendly stance towards the outcome of the Manchurian Incident. It should be added that recently published Japanese diplomatic records reveal that the Commercial Department of Japanese Foreign Ministry was receptive to the overture of the Barnby Mission and was rather ready to cooperate with Britain in "Manchukuo".[19] However, such an attitude did not prevail, and the Mission could not produce any positive results.

Both the Barnby Mission and the Leith-Ross Mission showed the close link of economic and political motives in British policy in East Asia. In the case of the former industrial interests occupied the central position, and in the latter, as was stressed by Cain and Hopkins, financial motivation to draw China into the Sterling Area was uppermost. Though propelled by different aspects of British capitalism, both missions embraced the same political purpose of achieving imperialistic cooperation between Britain and Japan in China on the basis of the changed power relationship after the Manchurian Incident.

□□□

Another interplay of economic and political motives on the British side surfaced immediately before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in an attempt to pursue what can be called "economic appeasement" towards Japan. This centred on the proposal to abolish the import quota system in the British empire, which had been laid down in 1934 to counter competition from Japanese goods, especially cotton products. For example, Sir Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, an economic specialist at the British Foreign Office, expected that the abolishment of the quota system would lead to an improvement in the political relationship between Britain and Japan.[20] Such a policy was actually recommended in the report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Policy at the beginning of June 1937, in which it was agreed: "the government should inform the Lancashire industry that they desire to see an arrangement made by which the Colonial textile quotas are replaced by a voluntary restriction of Japanese exports."[21]

It should be noted that this "economic appeasement" was closely connected to the consideration of keeping stability in the imperial order. When this quota system was introduced under a strong pressure from textile industries of Lancashire, severe criticism was voiced in some colonies, where the poorest classes would be badly hit by the exclusion of cheap Japanese goods, and colonial authorities feared the discontent in those areas would nourish anti-British feeling.[22] Being not so popular from the outset and resulting in the increase in Japanese textile export in the markets outside the British colonies, this quota system could easily be singled out as a cumbersome factor, the removal of which would soothe the Japanese and bring "moderate" pro-British elements in Japan to a more friendly position towards Britain.[23]

Opinions can differ as to the potential effect that such a policy might have had, for the outbreak of the war at the beginning of July 1937 prevented further discussion on this. But, given the fact that there were signs of increasing moderation on the Japanese side around this period, which was epitomized by the diplomacy of Naotake Sato, Foreign Minister in the cabinet headed by Senjuro Hayashi, and by the ascertainable inclination towards more conciliatory attitude towards China in the Japanese military,[24] it might be rash to belittle the meaning of this proposal. It seems that a change in Japanese attitude, if realized in actual policies, would have opened a way towards Anglo-Japanese cooperation in the manner which British policy-makers like Chamberlain desired: a state in which Britain would maintain and even expand its interests in China while securing friendly relationship with Japan. The "economic appeasement" might have assisted this process.

□□□

The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War marked the beginning of the Asian phase of World War II, and in face of extensive military campaign in China Britain was deprived of maneuverability to plan out imperialistic cooperation with Japan. Though there were attempts to appease Japan even after this period, they were not so much as endeavours to create a new imperialist order hand in hand with Japan as short-term reactions to Japanese military advance. It became increasingly clear during the course of the Sino-Japanese War that Britain had to follow the lead of the United States, which was emerging as the successor of Britain as the hegemonic power in Asia.

Britain's position in Asia was damaged severely in the Asia-Pacific War which ensued the Sino-Japanese War. Britain was given an enormous shock by the rapid defeat of its forces in Malaya and Singapore at the initial phase of the war. The critical situation forced the British government to concede to the demands of Indian nationalists and the Cripps Mission promised to grant independence to India after the war, only to invite further repulsion from the leaders of the National Congress who wanted immediate solution. In China Britain became virtually powerless and had both to relinquish its imperialistic rights and to give up the status as the predominant foreign power to the United States. To take an example, Sir Frerederick Maze was succeeded as Inspector-Gerneral of the Chinese Customs not by a British man but by an American in 1943. This post had always been held by a British and been the symbol of British influence in China.

□□□

The Asia-Pacific War for Britain was a war which was consistently fought in view of regaining its imperial interests and prestige. Though it was recognized that the complete recovery of the imperialist world order that collapsed in the course of two world wars was impossible, strenuous efforts were made to rebuild Britain's imperial position. The question to be asked is what sort of role Japan was expected to play in Britain's attempt to recover its ruling position in the post-war world.

The first thing which Britain undertook after the end of the war was to get back to its colonial territories as fast as possible. It must be stressed here that at the same time Britain helped France and the Netherlands to return to their respective territories, Indochina and Indonesia, and in this way tried to rebuild the colonial order in East Asia. In contrast to the British territories where there were no armed resistance against the return of Britain, France and the Netherlands faced powerful nationalist movements which had gained momentum during the war, and these colonial powers had recourse to armed forces in order to reestablish their colonial rule. In giving assistance to them Britain in turn had to depend on the help from other people. During the heyday of the imperialist world order, and as late as in the 1920s, Indian soldiers were widely used for such a purpose, but the change in the Indian situation now precluded this option. What is important in the context of this paper is that many "Japanese surrendered personnel" were used by Britain not only in Malaya but also in Indochina and Indonesia. Its scale was depicted by Lord Mountbatten, who directed the South-East Asia Command, at the time of his visit to Sumatra in April 1946:

> I of course knew that we had been forced to keep Japanese troops under arms to protect our lines of communication and vital areas…….but it was nevertheless a great shock to me to find over a thousand Japanese troops guarding the nine miles of road from the airport to the town.[25]

In Malaya they were made to work for various purposes, such as maintaining roads, preparing ground for farming and mending roads and railway systems for plantations.[26] In a situation, which transformed radically from that under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japanese people were in this way used by Britain to restore its imperial rule.

Britain could restore its rule in Southeast Asia, and it started to further consolidate its position there. We should bear in mind that the importance of Malaya and Singapore in the British imperial order after World War II increased much both in economic and strategic terms in the wake of the independence of South Asian countries, However, the situation in this region was far from stable. In Malaya Britain had to fight a costly war, which was called the "Emergency", against the guerrillas led by the Malayan Communist Party. The British policy makers also watched anxiously the situation in Indochina, where France was facing acute difficulties. In a meeting held in Singapore in November 1949 British representatives in Southeast Asia and the Far East discussed the possibility of a kind of "domino" phenomenon, in which a communist victory in Indochina would spread through Thailand and Burma to India, Pakistan and Malaya.[27] In order to prevent such a "domino" from taking place increased economic assistance to this area was thought to be necessary (hence the Colombo Plan), and Anglo-Japanese relations came to be viewed against such a situation. It is noteworthy that, though apprehensions about Japanese trade competition were still strongly held in Britain, such an idea as "Japan as a development agent in the British Malaya" started to emerge.[28]

To take an example of the discussion about Japan's role in Southeast Asia, in the autumn of 1951 shortly after the San Francisco Peace Conference, Malcolm MacDonald, who occupied the influential position as Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia, wrote to Kenneth Younger, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that it would be desirable to allow Japan to deepen its economic relations with Southeast Asia, where alongside with strong antipathy towards Japan people had desire to buy cheap Japanese goods and where Japan's role as the provider of capital goods was also becoming important.[29] This view was accepted by Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in the Conservative government which came into power in October. Eden admitted that Britain's negative attitude towards Japanese economic expansion in Southeast Asia would lead to "irritation of Asiatic opinion".[30] Sir Esler Dening, who was to take up the position of the first British Ambassador in Japan after the war, also concurred, arguing that it was necessary to adopt positive attitude towards Japanese economic activities in Southeast Asia "both in our own interests and in those of Anglo-American relations in the Far East generally."[31] It is to be noted here that the American government was beginning to pay more attention to Southeast Asia around this period as an area for providing raw materials to Japan and as a market for Japanese manufactured goods.[32] We can say that British eyes traveled from Southeast Asia, the epicenter of Britain's new post-war imperial order, to Japan, whereas American eyes traveled from Japan, the country occupying the pivotal position in the American cold war strategy, to Southeast Asia.

Thus during the period immediately after World War II it was in Southeast Asia that Britain sought Japanese cooperation. China, whose position was crucial in Anglo-Japanese relations in the days of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and in the 1930s, receded from the scene. This is not to say that the problem of China lost its importance, and, as was shown in the difference in attitude between Britain and America towards Chinese participation in the Japanese peace-making, China still loomed large in British policy in Asia. However, China had changed radically. With a view not to lose a foothold in the area where Britain had long enjoyed a ruling position, the British government recognized the new regime in China at the beginning of 1950, but it was no longer conceivable that China could be treated as an area for imperialist coexistence with Japan as was the case in the past.

It should also be noted that in Japan around the period of peace-making much attention was paid to South Asia, especially to India, as the most attractive area for Japanese external economic activities, given the difficulty of expanding its trade with China.[33] Though Britain still had strong economic ties with India, such a Japanese interest in India seems to have elicited no reaction on the part of British policy makers. Since India had already became independent, Britain no longer had to pay attention to Indian reaction to Japan.

□□□

In such a way British policy and attitude towards Japan after World War II clearly reflected the changed circumstances of the international order in Asia Pacific. When Japan started economic penetration into Southeast Asia in the late 1950s and the 1960s, Britain was largely in retreat. The decision in 1967 to militarily withdraw from "East of Suez" showed that the basic framework of the old Anglo-Japanese Alliance, i.e. maintenance of British imperial influence on the basis of military power, finally evaporated. In 1966 the British Foreign Office produced draft "guidelines for British policy towards Japan up to 1975", in which three key British interests vis-à-vis Japan were listed: that Japan should never again become a totalitarian power; that it should contribute to peace, stability and economic development in Asia; and that it should buy as many British goods as possible.[34] Though Japan's role in Asia was mentioned, Britain's interests were now concentrated on the last item, i.e. increase in Britain's own export to Japan. The days were gone when Britain tried to cooperate with Japan in Asia, whether in the form of imperialist cooperation in China during the period of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and in the 1930s or in the form of utilizing the manpower and economic power of Japan, which was no longer an imperialist country, in Southeast Asia after World War II.

---

[1] Memo. by Hornbeck, 30 August 1943, Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Archives, Stanford University, Box.181.

[2] The best account about the last phase of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance can still be found in Ian Nish, Alliance in Decline. A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-23 (London, 1972).

[3] John Darwin, "Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the Wars," The Historical Journal, 23-3 (1980).

[4] P. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000 (Harlow, etc., 2002), Pts.5-8.

[5] The part covering the 1930s largely overlaps my chapter ("Reasserting Imperial Power? --- Britain and East Asia in the 1930s") in Shigeru Akita, ed., Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History(Basingstoke/London, forthcoming)

[6] Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31 (Basingstoke/London, 1995), p.38.

[7] Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lloyd George, 19 January 1927, Lloyd George Papers, G/4/3/3, House of Lords Record Office.

[8] Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy. The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 (London, 1972), p.262.

[9] China General Letter No.8, 3 November 1933, ADM 116/2973, Public Record Office [PRO].

[10] For example see Clive to Simon, 8 November 1934, FO 371/18185, PRO. This is a detailed report about Indian activities in Yokohama, Tokyo, Osaka and Kobe. See also T. R. Sareen, Indian Revolutionaries, Japan and British Imperialism (New Delhi, 1993), Ch.1. Rash Behari Bose should not be confused with Subhas Chandra Bose, who played the key role in the Indian National Army during the Asia-Pacific War.

[11] Memo. by Hornbeck, 31 October 1933, Hornbeck Papers, Box.12.

[12] Ibid.

[13] For more detailed treatment of these attempts, see Yoichi Kibata, "Anglo-Japanese Relations from the Manchurian Incident to Pearl Harbor: Missed Opportunities?" in: Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata (eds.), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Vol.2, The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1930-2000 (Basingstoke and London, 2000), pp. 6-11.

[14] Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p.608.

[15] Shigeru Akita, "British Informal Empire in East Asia, 1880-1939: a Japanese Perspective," in: Raymond E. Dummett (ed.), Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism. The New Debate on Empire (London/New York, 1999), pp.147-152. See also Yutaka Nozawa (ed.), Chugoku no heisei kaikaku to kokusai kankei (Currency Reform in China (1935) and China's Relations with Japan, Britain and America) (Tokyo, 1981).

[16] Young to Hornbeck, 3 February 1936, Hornbeck Papers, Box.450.

[17] Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 6 April 1935, Neville Chamberlain Papers (Birmingham University), NC18/1/912.

[18] Robert A. Dayer, Finance and Empire. Sir Charles Addis 1861-1945 (Basingstoke/ London, 1988), pp.289-290.

[19] Nihon gaiko bunsho (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy), Showa Period, II-2-3 (Tokyo, 1999), No.201.

[20] Memo. by Ashton-Gwatkin, March 1937, FO 371/21215, PRO.

[21] Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Policy, 7 June 1937, FO371/21247, PRO.

[22] For example, see "Japanese Competition --- Imposition of Textile Quotas in Ceylon," CAB 24/249, PRO.

[23] Memo. by Beale, 6 April 1937, FO 371/20965, PRO.

[24] See Katsumi Usui, "Sato gaiko to Nitchu kankei" (Sato Diplomacy and Sino- Japanese Relations), in: Akira Iriye and Tadashi Aruga (eds.), Senkanki no nihon gaiko (Japanese Diplomacy in the Interwar Years) (Tokyo, 1984).

[25] Peter Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace. Mountbatten and South-East Asian Command, 1945-46 (Manchester, 1978), pp.225-226.

[26] See Yoichi Kibata, "Japanese Treatment of British Prisoners of War," in: Philip Towle/Margaret Kosuge/Yoichi Kibata (eds.), Japanese Prisoners of War (London, 2000), pp.146-147.

[27] Conference of H.M. Representatives Held at Bukit Serene, 2-4 Nov. 1949, CAB134/ 288, PRO.

[28] See Junko Tomaru, The Postwar Rapprochement of Malaya and Japan, 1945-61 (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan, 2000), p.70.

[29] MacDonald to Younger, 24 Sept. 1951, FO371/92642, PRO.

[30] Eden to MacDonald, 16 Nov. 1951, FO371/92642, PRO.

[31] Dening to Eden, 17 Dec. 1951, FO371/92642, PRO.

[32] William S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance. United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955 (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1984); Andrew J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam. Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[33] Hideo Kobayashi, Nihon kigyo no ajia tenkai (The Activities of Japanese Enterprises in Asia)(Tokyo, 2000), pp.2, 43.

[34] Chris Braddick, "Distant Friends: Britain and Japan since 1958 --- the Age of Globalization," in: Nish/Kibata (eds.), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Vol.2, p.279.