

The 17th-Century Japanese Diaspora: Questions of Boundary and Policy

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Introduction

In the period between the 1580s and the 1630s Japan sent several hundred vessels into Southeast Asia to participate in trade there. The size of this undertaking was unprecedented in the country's history. The maritime context in which it occurred can be defined by three developments: a suspension of direct trade between China and Japan in the 1550s, the arrival of European traders in Asian waters, and a resurgence of Chinese trade into Southeast Asia. Earlier trade between Japan and China had been in two forms: private trade, meaning mostly pirate activity carried out by what were called "Japanese pirates" (wakō) who were actually often Chinese attempting to circumvent China's maritime restrictions, and officially recognized trade based on governmental agreements between the two countries. This last form collapsed as a result of violent competition for the permits which the trade required. In the aftermath of this collapse the Portuguese arrived in East Asia and acted as an intermediary carrying goods between China and Japan, which meant primarily an exchange of Chinese silk for Japanese

silver. They were later joined by the Spanish (in the Philippines), the English and the Dutch. In 1567 China removed a ban on private trade to the south which had the effect of making Southeast Asia a meeting place for both Asian and European maritime enterprises. The Japanese initiated their overseas expansion partly to take advantage of this entrepôt function of Southeast Asian ports where they could exchange their exports for Chinese goods exported there. That enabled them to circumvent the Chinese ban on direct China-Japan trade.

This era of expansion that produced a widespread Japanese diaspora came to an end in the 1630s when the Tokugawa bakufu, the central government of Japan since 1603, issued a series of edicts, traditionally characterized by the term seclusion but more recently described as “maritime prohibitions,” that among other measures included a ban on overseas travel and a refusal, after a certain interval, to allow Japanese abroad to return to Japan.¹ These edicts thus set up limitations on overseas Japanese communities that in effect created a “boundary” in thematic terms to their experience. How we characterize the Japanese diaspora depends in part on its relationship to the seclusion policy. Conversely, our interpretation of that policy should be affected by the conditions of the diaspora.

In recent decades the study of seclusion has focused on issues of policy (the sequence of bakufu decisions on foreign relations), perception (how Japanese intellectuals viewed Japan’s position in the world), and trade (the expansion of foreign trade after the 1630s). The general consensus is that the bakufu’s measures in restricting overseas travel conformed to those of many other East Asian countries, especially China. Furthermore, as the decades wore on, Japanese intellectuals did not perceive their country as being “closed,” but rather viewed the policy of maritime prohibitions as helping to secure a peaceful environment among East Asian countries.

Finally, as trade continued to grow after the 1630s, the regulatory measures of that decade appeared simply as part of a sequential process rather than firm indications of new policy directions.² These interpretations, of course, differ substantially from earlier conclusions that Japan's banishment of Iberian traders signified a condition of seclusion. Nevertheless, recent scholarship has not fundamentally incorporated into its interpretive perspective the experience of Japanese who traded abroad either on vermillion-seal voyages or as emigrants.

Our consideration of the Japanese diaspora essentially involves three phases: *expansion* from Japan into Southeast Asia lasting from the late 16th century through to the mid-1630s; *integration* into the local communities from the 1630s to roughly the 1660s, and *absorption* into these societies from the 1670s onward, as incidence of intra-Japanese marriage declined. The characterization of each of these phases raises issues of boundary, that is, whether the Japanese abroad conform to standard definitions of diaspora.³

In the phase of expansion before the 1630s the Japanese communities in Southeast Asia seem to have been more vertically linked to Japan than horizontally associated with one another. That linkage, being part of Japan's expansion, might invalidate their status as a diaspora insofar as diaspora are not regarded as part of a state's expansion. On the other hand, they did have important functional connections with the commerce and administration of the states where they resided, activities that are typical of diaspora.

In the second phase, that of integration, which followed the implementation of the seclusion policy in the 1630s, the overseas Japanese expanded on their roles in their communities. No longer part of the Japanese state's expansion – they were cut off from Japan and Japan itself was no longer expanding – they conformed to standard diaspora experience.

There were, however, important variations from that standard. First, one definition, employed by Philip Curtin, terms a diaspora “a nation of socially interdependent, but spatially dispersed communities.”⁴ Second, a characteristic diaspora usually retained ties with its homeland.⁵ It could thus replenish itself by emigration either from the state from which it originally emerged or from other parts of its existing dispersed community. The post-1630s Japanese diaspora in Southeast Asia probably met neither of these two criteria. The primarily vertical linkage to Japan before the 1630s likely made it harder for them to draw on inter-community ties after seclusion. Furthermore, unlike the experience of overseas Chinese, there were no “periodic new waves of emigration”⁶ from Japan. Under the seclusion policy there was basically no ethnic home territory from which it could draw.

Although relations between the overseas Japanese and the homeland had largely been cut after the 1630s, some tenuous connections remained in the form of financial and commercial ties through intermediaries and sporadic correspondence with aging relatives in Japan.⁷ In the third phase of absorption even these links seem to have disappeared. Within Southeast Asia itself, although some data suggest the communities retained substantial resilience for several decades following the 1630s, in general, with their relatively small numbers, they appear not to have followed a strategy of autonomous growth but instead allowed themselves gradually to be absorbed into the local society. Whereas individual Japanese entrepreneurs became integrated into Southeast Asian societies after the 1630s, by the 1660s their offspring were for the most part of mixed blood. Given that outcome, it is reasonable to conclude that even though the overseas Japanese met sufficient criteria to be termed a diaspora, their experience as such ultimately proved abortive.

In the context of the seclusion policy, at least with respect to those who left Japan in the 1630s, the diaspora can be viewed as the product of an expulsion. The phenomenon of specific social groups (as opposed to simply ethnic communities) being expelled from countries has recently been the subject of an increasing comparative analysis. Benjamin Kedar has used the term “corporate expulsion” to characterize “the banishment of an entire category of subjects *beyond the physical boundaries of a political entity.*” What “differentiates corporate expulsion from other types of displacement” is, says Kedar, “the applicability of expulsion orders to a category of persons, rather than to specific individuals.” Banishment of this kind, the rationale for which was the presumed danger they represented to their home society, “was deemed to be permanent.”⁸ Kedar suggests that a Japanese proclamation of 1614 aimed at the expulsion of Christians may have been influenced by similar actions in European countries against Catholic priests.

If “expulsion” can be thought of as a partial model for the Japanese case, a possible comparison might be the expulsion of Jews and Moors from Spain subsequent to the Christian reconquest. Changes in commercial policy accompanying the transition from Islamic to Christian rule suggest both social and economic parallels with Japan’s case. Earlier Muslim rulers in Spain had sought to promote international trade as a source of profit, but their Christian successors, partly because of papal restrictions against trading with Muslims, were more inclined toward regulation.⁹ Like some Islamic governments, the bakufu also sought to profit from trade during and after the 1630s, but its policies encompassed dimensions of expulsion and increased regulation.

Nevertheless, the Jews and Moors were not only religiously but also ethnically distinct

from the surrounding population in Spain. While a religious expulsion of Christian leaders was part of Japan's seclusion policy, in contrast to the Spanish case, there was really not, in any general sense, a separate *ethnic* expulsion resulting in a diaspora. On a more specific level, however, there was also a gender dimension in that the Japanese wives of Western traders, and their children, were expelled. The distinction between ethnicity and gender here is, of course, blurred in the offspring of the mixed marriages. The "foreignness" of these children makes ethnicity at least a part of the characterization of the diaspora.¹⁰

In a broad sense, however, in these comparisons religion represents a similarity and ethnicity a contrast, that is, in both cases the religion of the expellees was different from that of the home country. However, their ethnicity was different in the case of Spain but the same in the Japanese case. If we were to seek an inverse analogy, where the ethnicity was the same but where the "religion," or its modern functional equivalent, ideology (with its accompanying military danger) was different, an example would be the "White" Russians, the counter-revolutionary forces who sought to overthrow the new Soviet ("Red") government after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Following their defeat anywhere from one to two million left Russia, departing either through fear or expulsion, thereby being characterized, respectively, as either émigrés or expellees.¹¹

The common element in the Russian and Japanese cases, then, is that the ethnicity of the expellees and the home country was the same. If we break down the components of the White Russian emigration, however, certain contrasts may be made with Japan. First, on a macro level, the comparative scale of the White Russian emigration was far larger, constituting perhaps two percent of the Russian population, while the Japanese diaspora probably never exceeded 0.04

percent of Japan's population. The religious, ideological, and military component was, however, similar in that many left Japan after defeat in the early 17th-century battles. A comparison at the entrepreneurial level would be thin at best. Although there were many émigré Russian entrepreneurs, just as there were many Japanese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia, Japanese could remain in Japan in the 17th century as entrepreneurs without the same level of restrictions imposed in the Soviet Union. Religious suppression constituted a common element in the two cases, but the portion of émigrés leaving Russian for religious reasons was far lower than among those who left Japan in the 17th century.

While the religio-ideological factor offers useful comparisons, as in the Russian case, religion itself cannot be a sufficient characterization for the generation of the Japanese diaspora because not all who went abroad were Christians.¹² Ultimately such characterization must be judged against the sequence of events and how they affect the interpretation of expulsion. As Anthony Reid has noted, the concept of expulsion is one of the defining roots of diaspora, particularly through the biblical passage referring to the Lord removing "into all the kingdoms of the earth" those whom he had smitten.¹³ Nevertheless, the expulsion model, while certainly suggestive, has obvious limitations in its applicability to Japan. Most historical diaspora have arisen after either a growing awareness of a threat to well being or a specific expulsion order. In the movement of Japanese abroad, those leaving for political and religious reasons conform to this pattern. However, there was a twenty-year gap between the anti-Christian edict of 1614 and the crucial measures of the 1630s. These decisive measures of state were issued *after* the departure of emigrants. Many Japanese abroad, who were prevented from returning because of the edicts of the 1630s, were at that time being *kept* out rather than being *forced* out. The

decisions of the 1630s, then, perhaps constitute less an expulsion than a closing, meaning that many Japanese abroad, at least those who were not Christians, were technically not expellees. What is unusual about the Japanese diaspora, then, is the reversal of the common sequence when the policy precedes the departure. In Japan, to an extent, the departure preceded the policy.

The Diaspora

A great variety of Japanese went abroad in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. There were three major categories of emigrants. First, some whose voyages were part of the vermillion-seal ship business had commercial experience before their departure from Japan. However, probably most of those who ended up in Southeast Asia lacked that experience before their arrival. Their development as an entrepreneurial minority within Southeast Asia was a form of adaptation to a new lifestyle. A second category was the Christian refugee, that is, the Japanese Catholics fleeing persecution under the increasingly repressive policies of the Japanese authorities toward Christianity in the early 17th century. Many of these settled in Manila. The third consisted of mercenaries or political exiles from the unification wars that had culminated in the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600 in which Tokugawa Ieyasu was victorious. Many of these exiles were also veterans of the Korean wars of the 1590s and carried their military lifestyles into the new towns they were creating. This category also included many rōnin, that is, samurai who had lost their master. As a daimyō, losing in the unification wars did not inevitably mean losing status. Many who were on the losing side had their domains reduced in size. They retained their status but were placed in a category of tozama (meaning “outside”) daimyō. Others, however, were dispossessed. When that happened their samurai automatically lost their status and thus

became rōnin. These were the exiles who constituted the mercenary groups. The bakufu's fear of the disruptions they might cause was one of the considerations behind the seclusion policy.¹⁴ Apart from these three main categories, there were many others who settled abroad. These included laborers, crew members of foreign vessels, servants (many served the Spanish in Manila), bondsmen, and slaves.¹⁵

On a broad macro level, the principal role of the diaspora was to participate in the entrepôt trade of Southeast Asia, exchanging imports of Chinese silk for Japanese silver. However, this is not the easiest route to describing the Japanese entrepreneurial activities there. One reason for this is that the principal silk exporting area in the region was Tonkin. Because of its rulers' concern about the Japanese mercenaries importing weapons, they discouraged the development of a full-scale Japan town there. What we can learn about the diaspora lies more in the commodities in which they traded, the positions they held in the local administration of commerce, and their functions as intermediaries (before seclusion) between the vermilion-seal vessels and the local economy.

One of the institutional arrangements designed to handle the business of foreign merchants in Southeast Asian countries was the port master, or syahbandar. This was an office held by a foreign merchant usually to service his own community. The identity of many of the Japanese who served in this post in the numerous Japan towns in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Siam is known. In some ports, however, where the Japanese seem to have held a dominating hold over the local economy, the Japanese syahbandar may have played a more general role in local port administration.¹⁶

Certainly Japanese entrepreneurial residents played a crucial role in the smooth and

productive operation of the Japan-local trade. In the case of Hoi An in central Vietnam, when a vermilion-seal vessel arrived its merchant crew would report to the chief of the Japan town and local authorities. They would then notify the king who would retain some of the cargo, especially copper and copper coins, and then issue a discharge for the remainder of the cargo. The Japan town chief was also involved in the inspection of the ship. Japanese residents participated in the local government's selection of goods for purchase, and they transported and sold to the public the rest of the cargo. Purchasing of local products for the return voyage of the vermilion-seal vessels was also carried out by Japan town residents. In Manila, where there were many Japanese shops, Japanese residents sold the cargo of the Japanese ships. As a result of these activities, some Japanese residents became very influential.¹⁷

Although the Japanese did not develop a large town in Tonkin, it was a major destination for Japanese ships. One of the most active Japanese traders there was Wada Rizaemon, who had been one of the Christians exiled to Macao. After working in the raw silk trade in Quang Nam as a representative of a Portuguese vessel he moved to Tonkin where he became a member of the emperor's staff. Wada also dealt in raw silk and silk fabrics and imported copper coins.¹⁸

Japanese had an important role in Siam in both military and commercial spheres. The key military figure was Yamada Nagamasa. He had an army of 700 Japanese under his leadership which played a decisive role in a Siamese civil war and aided in suppressing rebellion. Through this support for the king, Yamada gained high official rank, and he also served as head of the Japan town. The most important commercial function performed by Japanese in the Siamese capital, Ayuthia, was the handling of deerskin. Their position in this trade was strong enough that the competing Dutch had to rely on them as brokers. When the

large Japanese military population there, which provided service to the Siamese king, was off duty, it too participated in the deerskin trade. One resident, Itoya Taemon, who apparently had ties with Nagasaki traders, established such a large position in the deerskin purchasing and brokerage business that he became head of the Japanese town.¹⁹

Although the principal activity of the Japanese in the Southeast Asian towns covered here was probably handling the vermilion-seal ship business, they were obviously heavily involved with local commerce and government administration in these towns. These functions, as well as their military role, demonstrate that they had an important connection with the political systems in the countries where they resided. Activity of this kind is usually considered typical of classic diaspora. In particular, the Japanese role in Southeast Asia has many similarities to the functions performed by Armenians in 17th century Iran where the profits from their silk trade provided support for the government there.²⁰ In general, then, even though the overseas Japanese were part of Japan's own expansion, they also possessed certain characteristics of a diaspora in the years prior to seclusion.²¹

The Seclusion Policy

Debate remains about whether the edicts governing trade, which, in addition to the banning of overseas travel and the ending of the vermilion-seal voyages, included the expulsion of the Portuguese in 1639 and the confining of overseas²² trade to Nagasaki in 1641, should be thought of as having a collective meaning, as expressed in the term "seclusion." Ronald Toby calls them "more properly a series of memoranda and orders."²³ Even if that view is regarded as a form of reductionism, it is hard to find an alternative characterization. Nagazumi Yōko

suggests that “there is no consensus to replace the still widely-used term sakoku [seclusion] with another, less anachronistic term.”²⁴ Given that uncertainty, I am employing the term seclusion in this paper more out of convenience than of commitment to an older view.²⁵

Certainly today there is a general consensus about its motives, namely, that it was implemented to enhance the security and legitimacy of the Tokugawa regime, and that goal entailed excluding the daimyō from independent access to foreign trade and showing that the bakufu had established its control over that trade. “Control,” however, did not mean that there was a single uniform set of measures applied to the outside world. On the contrary, Japan had a distinctive policy for virtually every country or area with which it traded. There were far more Chinese than Dutch ships coming to Nagasaki, and while the Dutch were kept under strict control in Deshima, the artificial islet in Nagasaki harbor, the Chinese, until 1689, were free to reside in Nagasaki with few restrictions.

Furthermore, in the evolution of trade management over the first four decades of the 17th century, elements of “process” were almost as important as those of “policy.” One such element was bureaucratization. In the early decades of the century trade administration in Nagasaki was rather informal and personal. Zen monks, who had close ties to the shōgun, prepared the vermilion-seal permits and the Nagasaki magistrates who had authority over trade there were often daimyō who were also close associates of the shōgun.²⁶ By the 1630s Nagasaki magistrates were usually retainers (hatamoto) more subordinate to the upper levels of the bakufu bureaucracy. They imposed more regulation over the issuance of vermilion-seals by requiring an addition certificate (hōsho) beginning in 1631. The degree to which this process had become bureaucratized is indicated by the fact that the formal edicts of the 1630s regarding overseas

trade were sent to the Nagasaki magistrate without any separate, formal notification to the daimyō, that is, through normal administrative, rather than political, channels.²⁷ This suggests that the measures taken relative to seclusion were part of a long process of political evolution and not the product of sudden decisions in the 1630s.

These matters of policy and process are viewed in recent historiography as examples of normal statecraft as contrasted with a paranoid anti-foreignism. This view, however, often overlooks the details of the actual physical implementation of the seclusion policy. Enforcement of this policy was carried out through a form of coast guard consisting of corvée labor conscripted from domains close to Nagasaki. In one case in 1647 when two Portuguese ships came to Japan, a contingent of over 50,000 was assembled at Nagasaki to confront them. This compares favorably to the 110,000 soldiers who actually fought at Sekigahara in 1600, the most decisive land battle in Japanese history.²⁸

Reactions on this scale, indeed displaying a sense of paranoia, form an interesting contrast to the bakufu's purposeful disconnection from the Japanese abroad. After the 1630s the Japanese diaspora was left on its own with no protection by governments in Japan. That environment has an important bearing on how we characterize the Japanese in Southeast Asia. As part of a working definition, Jonathan Israel has argued that diaspora are essentially stateless and are neither protected by a state nor part of a state's expansion.²⁹ On the basis of these points, the Japanese communities in Southeast Asia after the 1630s would qualify as a diaspora.

This concept of "no-state protection," however, also has at least some connection to both the motivation for seclusion and the overseas experience before the 1630s. One of the reasons for the suspension of the vermilion-seal voyages was the bakufu's fear that they might be

attacked by the Spanish, who had been forced out of Japan.³⁰ Even before the 1630s, though, the bakufu offered no physical protection to the vermilion-seal ships. They were left unarmed on the grounds that retaliation against any attacker would come through suspension of trade privileges at Nagasaki. As long as Japan remained open to trade with Iberian nations, that policy was a sufficient deterrent. Was it, however, a policy of “state protection?” If not, then based on Israel’s definition, the Japanese abroad might be characterized as a diaspora even before the 1630s. It would, however, probably be more accurate to view the bakufu’s policy as diplomatic rather than military protection, still enough, in other words, to argue that there was indeed a form of protection extended to the Japanese community insofar as the vermilion-seal vessels could be regarded as integral to the community’s existence prior to the 1630s. In that sense the suspension of their voyages would be regarded as a necessary condition for the community’s transition into diasporahood.

The elimination of direct contact between the diaspora and Japan itself does not, however, appear to have lessened trade between Southeast Asia and Japan. Recent historiography has stressed Japan’s relative openness to trade within the framework of its maritime prohibitions and, through a comparative approach, has sought to demonstrate their similarity to the policies of other Asian countries. For example, the Chinese were the only Asians allowed to trade through Nagasaki, but Siam carried on trade with Japan in the 17th century after the seclusion edicts not directly but through ships handled by Chinese merchants (tōsen). To a degree, however, that was a preferred option, for the Siamese government, like the Tokugawa, discouraged their own merchants from operating overseas.³¹ Furthermore, from the perspective of some Koreans, Japan’s policy appeared quite liberal. Korea, of course, could

trade through its land border with China, but its maritime policies were more restrictive than Japan's. By the mid-18th century some Korean reformers who favored contact with the West looked favorably on Japan's trade administration through Nagasaki precisely because of its openness to the West through the Dutch.³² In asking whether Japan's policies converged with those of China, I would draw more of a distinction between Japan's maritime prohibitions and the various dimensions of the Chinese tribute system which included policies on maritime prohibitions on which the Japanese ones were modeled. While the intent of these policies in the two countries may have been similar, their results were not. The waxing and waning over the centuries of these Chinese policies did not prevent the substantial diaspora into Southeast Asia of Chinese who defied them. There was nothing in Japan's experience after the 1640s that resembled the flow of Chinese abroad. Compared to Japan, southern China was more like a sieve.

Another way of assessing Japan's seclusion policy is to place it within longer-term national and global patterns of protectionism and regulation. For example, even before seclusion there was a regulatory component to the issuance of vermilion-seal licenses in that the ships had to have at least partial Japanese crews.³³ This requirement, of course, was one of the components of mercantilist policies adopted in Japanese shipping subsidies of the late 1890s.³⁴ These programs, in turn, explicitly borrowed from the English Navigation Acts which had been abolished in the 1840s. From a global comparative perspective, it is interesting that the English Acts, which sought to promote British shipping, came into effect in the 1650s roughly fifteen years after Japan shut down its own overseas shipping.

From the domestic Japanese perspective, the edicts of the 1630s can be seen as one phase

in a long wave of policy measures stretching from the initial prohibition against daimyō acquiring red-seal permits in 1612 through the prohibition of silver exports in 1668 to regulations against Chinese shipping in the 1680s and the explicit adoption of import substitution measures in the 1720s. Collectively, these measures affirmed policies of protectionism, regulation, and government assertions of control. The edicts can also be viewed as part of a long regulatory cycle. Over the past four centuries there have been several such cycles in Japanese economic history, with certain points in the cycles being characterized by phases more oriented to less restrictive economic measures, that is, freer trade.

If the edicts were thus a series of measures occupying a phase in a longer pattern of cycles, they should not be regarded as a variable, that is, initiatives leading the economy off into a new or unprecedented direction. This proposition, at face value, would appear to support the revisionist view that also sees these edicts as consistent with long-term Japanese policies and not being opposed to trade itself in the 1630s. On the contrary, my argument could open the way for a new perspective on seclusion that might undercut the thrust of the revisionist contentions. If the edicts were not a variable in Japanese economic history, then their full significance cannot be evaluated by reference to their purely economic content. The revisionist argument is that the edicts did not “close” Japan because trade continued unabated, and in fact increased in volume after the 1630s. This, however, is logically inconsistent with the above proposition, for seclusion cannot be assessed simply on the basis of trade.³⁵ Indeed, the key element in the several-centuries-long discussion of seclusion is not *trade* but rather *people*, that is, the controls on the movement of people in and out of the country, or the regulations governing who should be the carriers of Japan’s trade.

From this perspective, for the bakufu to have allowed further commercial expansion into Southeast Asia with the potential of developing links with the powerful Japanese figures within the diaspora active in the affairs of local states would have, by implicitly recognizing the legitimacy of their continued activity there, partially nullified the hegemonic meaning of the battles of Sekigahara (1600) and Osaka (1615) through which the Tokugawa gained and consolidated their power. Sanjay Subrahmanyam has commented on the tendency in the 17th century of Asian states allowing a form of elite immigration where foreigners from outside the region came to occupy important posts in their administration. He concludes that Japan was the most reluctant to permit this.³⁶ However, numerous Japanese in the diaspora were among the elite that served Southeast Asian countries. The key point here is that these were not at all representative of Japan's political leadership at the time. Indeed, many were former opponents, even enemies, of the bakufu. The bakufu may well have feared these diaspora figures. If so, the momentum toward seclusion may have been directly proportional to the growth in the influence of the diaspora within Southeast Asia.

The role of these bakufu opponents also reinforces the proposition that the overseas Japanese could be considered a genuine diaspora even before the 1630s. An overseas community that is protected by the state of its homeland is not usually considered a diaspora. However, these opponents had broken their association with Japan. They were, in a sense, stateless and were not part of the expansion of the Japanese state.

The Post-Seclusion Diaspora

The suspension of the vermilion-seal ships and the ban on overseas travel by the bakufu

cut the Japanese diaspora's direct physical ties with Japan. Nevertheless, as distinct communities they were able to sustain their commercial enterprises in Southeast Asia for several decades. These years were marked by substantial changes in the context of trade in the area. One major shift involved a range of territorial and policy matters involving China and Japan. Another change, related to the withdrawal of the vermilion-seal ships, was in the identities of the carriers of the key commodities traded in the area.

The question of territory and policy can be divided into two periods: the 1630s to the 1660s and the 1660s to the 1680s. During the first of these periods the absence of Japanese ships and the disruptions in China's trade during the collapse of the Ming dynasty gave the VOC an extra advantage in the trade between Japan and Southeast Asia. That these years marked the peak of Dutch hegemony was in no small part due to the financial success of the VOC's position in Japan.³⁷ In 1649, for example, the VOC had net profits of 709,603 guilders in Japan, well above the level of their other posts in Asia. Profits from Taiwan and Persia, the only other factories that could be considered large, were, respectively, 66 percent and 46 percent of the Japan figure. To protect their position in Japan, the Dutch remained vigilant in trying to dissuade other Asian countries, such as Siam, from establishing links to Japan.³⁸ As many have observed, however, Dutch strength in these years was built on developments beyond their control, the seclusion policy in Japan and the wars in China. As an offshoot of these wars, the Ming-loyalist Cheng family took over Taiwan in 1662, expelling the Dutch from the position they had used to dominate the silk and silver exchange within Asia. Then, in the late 1680s China removed its own ban on overseas private trade. It was about this time, when the renewed Chinese maritime dominance in the South China seas forced a further Dutch retreat, that

references to the Japanese diaspora as distinct entrepreneurial communities seem to fade away.³⁹

In the shift in the identity of commodity shippers after the implementation of the seclusion policy, one noticeable trend is the continued participation, even if indirect, of the diaspora in Japan's trade. Much of the trade of Japanese towns in Southeast Asia, previously handled by the vermillion-seal ships, was now taken over by the VOC ships. The silk trade best illustrates this. Because of disruptions in China and competition from the Cheng family, the Dutch had to find new sources of silk to ship to Japan. In the early 1640s they succeeded through connections with the Japanese community in Tonkin which controlled much of that area's export trade. The silk they obtained there and shipped to Japan enhanced their capacity to export silver from Japan until later in the decade when price increases of silk within Tonkin undercut the trade. However, in the 1640s the Tonkin raw silk trade had accounted for one-third of the profits earned by the VOC's Nagasaki station.⁴⁰ With regard to Japanese exports, probably much of the export cargo carried by the vermillion-seal ships was dispatched directly to Japanese importers in the towns of Southeast Asia. Following the maritime restrictions of the 1630s, these importers, such as copper dealers in Cochin China, switched to Japan-based Dutch suppliers. In the case of silver, the two largest export carriers through to the late 1630s were the vermillion-seal ships and the Portuguese. As Chinese and Dutch ships took over their cargo in the 1640s, similar supplier-importer relationships likely changed.⁴¹

Another dimension of economic activity that straddled the pre- and post-seclusion eras and that in some respects created linkages between internal Japan and the external diaspora was foreign financing. This took several forms. One was investment by Japanese in the trade of the Portuguese and the Dutch. A second, lending by diaspora Japanese, seems to have been focused

primarily on the communities where they resided. A third involved the diaspora in international ventures within Southeast Asia. And finally, some of this financing may have sustained links between the diaspora and Japan after the 1630s.

The analytical space I am trying to occupy on this issue is the connection between financing and both the diaspora experience itself and its relationship to seclusion. In that sense, lending by Japanese merchants based in Japan to Portuguese or Dutch enterprises seems irrelevant. However, during this period money was flowing in many different directions, often without any national focus and between groups with close linkages horizontally within Southeast Asia and vertically from there to Japan or Chinese merchants trading through Nagasaki. This overall context provides some necessary background to the diaspora experience in financing.

At least since the 1610s Japanese had been financing Portuguese trade. The substantial risks relating to natural disasters or piracy coupled with the potential for huge profit enabled the Japanese to charge high interest rates, often in the 25-30 percent range, but sometimes even higher. Even the Macao municipal government had a large debt to Japan, while the overall Portuguese debt to Japanese exceeded that to any of its other Asian operations. Consistent with these close financial connections are suggestions that after 1635 there was a flood of new Japanese money into Portuguese trade coming largely from former vermilion-seal ship investors that financed a surge in Portuguese imports until the Portuguese were expelled in 1639. Even after that the Portuguese may have continued their trade temporarily by lending to Chinese merchants trading with Japan.⁴² Also, the Japanese had sustained a long-term pattern of investing in the VOC trade, although by the 1630s the identity of the investors had shifted from port merchants and Western daimyō to bakufu-related figures. In specific cases in the late

1630s, when the Dutch were still stationed in Hirado, Japanese merchants lent money to the VOC to pay Chinese merchants in Taiwan for imported goods destined for Japan.⁴³

Investment activity within the diaspora seems to have been most prominent in Vietnam. This was an area where the diaspora had a strong influence over the local economy and where the competition between Chinese and the Dutch created the need for Japanese services. One of the leading Japanese merchants in Tonkin, Wada Rizaemon, apparently invested in both VOC and Chinese ships. In Quang Nam a 1637 Dutch report showed Japanese merchants investing heavily in Chinese ships and making large profits exceeding 15,000 taels. In the late 1630s the Dutch seem to have had a difficult time increasing their dealings with the Japanese because of the close ties the latter had already established with Chinese merchants. In Central Vietnam resident Japanese had shipped goods to Nagasaki through Chinese junks. In Tonkin, according to Dutch suspicions, Chinese operations were being financed by Chinese residents of Nagasaki who had borrowed from Japanese merchants.⁴⁴ This last example, which involves a continuing linkage between capital within Japan and commerce in Southeast Asia, is interesting in the light of other accounts that suggest Japanese in the diaspora continued to send wealth back to Japan.⁴⁵

If transfers like this did occur, it is not clear whether the bakufu was aware, or on what grounds they might have tolerated the practice. However, it would have been consistent with their intelligence-gathering activities and a liberalization of family correspondence in 1656. It would also, with respect to the seclusion debate, strengthen the proposition that in the economic sphere Japan was still relatively open.

These financial activities of the diaspora were, of course, based on the capital they had accumulated in the years before the suspension of the vermilion-seal ships. Although the

suspension of their voyages removed a large portion of the diaspora's business, for some time they were able to maintain their capital by performing other business functions and utilizing their position in the local economy. For example, in Siam many Japanese worked for the Dutch, who had taken over the profitable leather trade with Japan. Heads of the Japan towns as well as other leading businessmen were in fact large-scale brokers of deerskin, sharkskin, and sappanwood. They also supervised laborers who sorted out, took care of, and packaged these goods. Many Japanese were engaged in brokering and selling other goods such as lead, tin, and rice.⁴⁶ Another way Japanese merchants survived in the post-seclusion environment was to act as agents between the Dutch and local authorities. For example, in central Vietnam in the late 1630s, the chief of the Hoi An Japanese town, Hiranoya Rokubee, served as port administrator, having been appointed to that position by the Nguyen ruler. At the same time he was acting as an agent for the Dutch.⁴⁷

Since the diaspora Japanese still participated in the lucrative trade with Japan by investing in or consigning export goods to Dutch and Chinese vessels, it is not surprising that they were also engaged in regional shipping within Southeast Asia. For example, in 1654 Wada Rizaemon, the influential Tonkin businessman, took part in negotiations with the Governor of Luzon for the conclusion of a Tonkin-Manila navigation and trade treaty. In Siam the chief of the Japan town in Ayuthia between 1642 and 1671, Kimura Hanzaemon, was also a large-scale tin merchant who engaged in Southeast Asian regional trade. Between 1633 and 1663 the number of voyages undertaken by diaspora ships from Ayuthia to other Southeast Asian ports is reported to have been about twenty. Diaspora vessels visited Luzon, Taiwan, Manila, and Cambodia.⁴⁸

Demographics & Family

Despite the success of this entrepreneurial diaspora for several decades following seclusion, the Japan towns experienced a rather rapid decline in the last third of the century. Their eventual withering away probably had less to do with any lack of commercial opportunity than the fundamental failure to reproduce themselves. Before that decline set in, however, their numbers had held up rather well through the 1650s. In Hoi An there had been 80 Japanese households in 1633. Late that year a fire gutted much of the town, but it was rebuilt and by 1651 there were still 60 households. The Japanese in Manila were at one point much more numerous, reaching a peak of about 3,000 residents in the early 1620s. However, following the suspension of the vermillion-seal ships their numbers fell more quickly than those of other towns. By 1637 there were only 800, compared to 2,000 Spanish residents, and 200,000 Chinese, but they also seem to have survived longer than Japanese in other towns. In a rather suggestive incident in 1767 about 60-70 were deported back to Japan. That would seem contrary to Japan's ban on return from abroad, but the rationale may have been their rejection of Christianity.⁴⁹ Ayuthia was the most military-oriented of the Japan towns with the presence of Yamada Nagamasa and his roughly 800 followers, who made up perhaps four-fifths of the population. When Yamada was reportedly killed in 1630 the town was annihilated. But it was reconstructed shortly thereafter because of previous Japanese involvement in the deerskin trade. By 1637 it had grown to about 300-400 residents.⁵⁰

Most of the key historical diaspora, whether of Jewish, Islamic or Parsee background, have been characterized by strong religious traditions that provided cohesion to their

communities. Their particular form of Christianity played a similar role for Armenian and Greek diaspora. The Chinese did not possess a similarly distinctive religion, but their extended family system provided some of the same functional supports as religion. In contrast to the above examples, the fact that the Japanese lacked both a single orthodox religious tradition and an extended family system may have some bearing on the failure of the overseas Japanese to perpetuate themselves as a long-term diaspora.

The principal reason for the eventual decline of the Japanese Southeast Asian towns was the relatively small number of Japanese women who went overseas. In a rough survey of the Japan towns, Iwao Seiichi estimated that there were 23 men to every 7 women.⁵¹ In this context, as long-term Japanese residents tended to marry local women, over the decades the towns lost their Japanese identity. The situation in Batavia was slightly different because that city had never been a port for the vermillion-seal ships. Japanese came to Batavia primarily as employees of the Dutch whom they had served in Japan. This is borne out by data on their origins. At least half of all Japanese in Batavia came from either Hirado or Nagasaki, the Dutch posts in Japan. However, this figure rises to 88 percent if the category for emigrants whose origins was unclear is omitted. These emigrants originally came to Batavia as laborers or reinforcements for the Dutch military. They were mostly unmarried men, but since many women came as well, the sex ratio was only 2-to-1, making Japanese women proportionately more numerous than in the Japan towns. When the emigrants had completed their terms of employment with the Dutch they remained in Batavia and entered various occupations involving agriculture or commerce. As a community less dependent on the vermillion-seal vessels than the

Japan towns, it did not suffer as much from the suspension of those voyages.⁵² Nevertheless, although it may have retained its identity longer, the same marriage dynamics eventually undermined it. At its peak the Japanese population in Batavia numbered around 300-400. The number of Japanese who married in Batavia between 1618 and 1659 was 106, but only 11 marriages occurred between Japanese. Most marriages took place on a multi-ethnic basis.⁵³ This pattern places the overseas Japanese at the opposite extreme to the Parsees, who survived as a distinct entrepreneurial diaspora in Asia by following an intra-group marriage strategy.⁵⁴

In all of the Japanese diaspora there was clearly a variety of marriage types. Quite possibly that of Japanese men marrying Japanese women constituted a minority. There were, of course, many Japanese women who married Western men in Japan and who were forced to leave with their husband and children in the context of the seclusion policies. Other Japanese women married Southeast Asian men, but because of the sex ratio among Japanese, the most common pattern was that of Japanese men marrying Southeast Asian women. What is of particular interest in all of these marriage types is the contribution to trading activity in Asia made by the wives or the daughters of these marriages. It is often assumed that the Portuguese retained certain advantages within Japan because so many of them had Japanese wives. Many sources portray women as interpreters, bookkeepers, traders, brokers, and moneylenders.⁵⁵

One interesting case was the wife of Wada Rizaemon, the key Japanese trader in Tonkin. Known at the time as Ursula, she was a translator-interpreter who served also as an agent for the Tonkin emperor. When the Dutch entered the Tonkin silk trade in the late 1630s, they employed Ursula as an agent and interpreter, which in that case meant translating from Portuguese to Vietnamese. Wada himself, of course, had continued to trade with Japan subsequent to

seclusion. One of the sources of his capital was Ursula's mother, who had an account from which Wada drew about 1,000 taels a year to transport commodities to Japan aboard Dutch ships. In this sense, Ursula's mother was an agent in the trade between the diaspora and Japan.⁵⁶

Another key Japanese woman was a pious Catholic who married Constance Phaulkon, a talented Greek who had handled negotiations over Siam's deerskin exports to Japan and who became a key adviser to King Narai. Phaulkon was killed in a succession dispute in 1688, but his Japanese wife survived him and eventually became the head of the royal kitchen staff.⁵⁷

These final examples of female entrepreneurship stand by themselves as a sufficient conclusion to this paper. If Japanese women of such talent could not return to Japan, then whatever the revisionist historians have said, Japan was closed. Of course, there may be some who would argue that the Tokugawa bakufu saw pious Catholic women as functionally equivalent to what centuries later Western governments would view as communist subversives or religious terrorists. This view might even invite the conclusion that Japan, in its seclusion policy, got it right after all. I would differ. Look at it this way: Wada's mother-in-law was a good capitalist.

¹ The following political categories are important for the background to this paper: (1) bakufu: This was the term for the government of Japan before 1868. It was technically a military government, but in real terms Japan was, before the 1850s, probably less militarized than any major country in the world. The bakufu directly controlled about one-quarter of all the land in the country (based on assessed yield), including major cities, ports, and mines. (2) shōgun: The leader of the bakufu. (3) daimyō: The daimyō were technically vassals of the shōgun. Each daimyō was the lord of a domain. In the 17th century there were about 300 domains in the country and collectively they controlled about three-quarters of the land in the country. The largest was about one-sixth the size of the bakufu territory, but most were quite tiny. Through the early 17th century the daimyō in western Japan had been active investors in trade. Had they been able to develop long-term profit from independent access to trade, they might have constituted a regional economic threat to the bakufu. That was one reason why the bakufu placed all trade under its own authority. After the Restoration in the 19th century the domains were reduced in number and converted into prefectures.

² Ronald Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu (Princeton University Press, 1984); Yasunori Arano, "The Entrenchment of the Concept of 'National Seclusion'," Acta Asiatica 67 (1994), 83-103.

³ I am utilizing definitions primarily from the introductory essay in this volume by Gelina Harlaftis and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou and from the conference's wrap-up discussion.

⁴ Quoted in Anthony Reid, "Entrepreneurial Minorities, Nationalism, and the State," in Daniel Chirot & Anthony Reid, eds. Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe (University of Washington Press, 1998), p. 36.

⁵ See the paper by Harlaftis and Minoglou in this volume.

⁶ Reid, "Entrepreneurial Minorities," p. 39.

⁷ For examples of this correspondence, see Leonard Blussé, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht, Foris, 1986).

⁸ Benjamin Z. Kedar, "Expulsion as an Issue of World History," Journal of World History 7:2 (Fall 1996), pp. 167-74.

⁹ Olivia Remie Constable, Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: The Commercial Realignment of the Iberian Peninsula, 900-1500 (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 256-57; Kedar, pp. 168-71.

¹⁰ I have discussed this matter through some examples in the “post-Seclusion” section of this paper. Robert Innes, “The Door Ajar: Japan’s Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century,” PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1980, pp. 146-47, 192.

¹¹ Robert H. Johnston, “New Mecca, New Babylon”: Paris and the Russian Exiles, 1920-1945 (Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988), pp. 1-5; Norman Stone, Europe Transformed, 1878-1919 (London, Fontana, 1983), p. 379.

¹² For example, around 1620 Christians constituted a majority of the residents of the Japan town in Manila and about half of the Japanese in Cambodia. That still means there were many non-Christian Japanese. Iwao Seiichi, Nan’yō Nihon-machi no kenkyū (Iwanami shoten, 1966), pp. 118-19, 299.

¹³ Reid, “Entrepreneurial Minorities,” p. 66.

¹⁴ Jūnana seiki ni okeru Nissha kankei (Gaimushō Chōsa-bu, 1934), pp. 548-49.

¹⁵ Derek Massarella, A World Elsewhere: Europe’s Encounter with Japan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990), p. 134.

¹⁶ Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, vol. 2: Expansion and Crisis (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993), p. 120; Iwao Seiichi, Shuinsen bōekishi no kenkyū, new edition (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1985), pp. 366-67.

¹⁷ Iwao, Nan’yō Nihon-machi, pp. 25-28. Japanese merchants also sometimes serviced Chinese ships.

¹⁸ Abe Chieko, “Jūnana seiki no Vietnam-Nihon bōeki: shuinsen bōeki o chūshin ni,” Tōyō shigaku ronshū 1 (January 1993), pp. 68-69. For more on Wada, see the section below on post-seclusion diaspora.

¹⁹ Ishii Yoneo & Yoshikawa Toshiharu, Nichi-Tai kōryū 600 nenshi (Kōdansha, 1987), pp. 46-51; Nissha kankei, pp. 537-78, 893; Iwao, Nan’yō Nihon-machi, pp. 175-78.

²⁰ See the paper in this volume by Ina Baghdiantz McCabe.

²¹ I have not included a separate discussion here on Korea. I do not view Japanese in Korea as part of the diaspora because their status there was primarily that of representatives of Japan rather than as a resident diaspora. This is because from the early 16th century the Korean government had prohibited actual residence by Japanese. See Etsuko Hae-Jin Kang, Diplomacy and Ideology in Japanese-Korean Relations: From the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century (London, Macmillan, 1997).

²² I am here excluding trade through Korea and the Ryukyu Islands from the definition of “overseas.”

²³ Ronald Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu (Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 71-72.

²⁴ Yōko Nagazumi, "From Company to Individual Company Servants: Dutch Trade in Eighteenth-century Japan," in Leonard Blussè & Femme Gaastra, eds. On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998), p. 170n2.

²⁵ "Maritime prohibitions" as a more concrete and accurate description of the policy is a term that is beginning to stick as a replacement for "seclusion," but it would be preferable to find a single word that would convey a broader meaning.

²⁶ Unusually close, one might say, for the younger sister of one such magistrate was the shōgun Ieyasu's favorite concubine. C.R. Boxer, Christian Century in Japan (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1951), p. 263.

²⁷ Innes, pp. 125-56; Yamamoto Hirobumi, Sakoku to kaikin no jidai (Kōkura Shobō, 1995), pp. 20-24; 26-67.

²⁸ Arne Kalland, Fishing Villages in Tokugawa Japan (Richmond, Curzon, Press), 1995, p. 216; Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan (Tokyo, Kodansha, 1983), vol. 7, p. 56; Herman Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructs, 1570-1680 (Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 44.

²⁹ Comments made in conference wrap-up session.

³⁰ This point does not apply to the Portuguese, for they were not expelled from Japan until 1639, four years after the end of the vermilion-seal voyages.

³¹ Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853 (Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 8, 58-69.

³² Kang, pp. 195-96.

³³ Innes, p. 114.

³⁴ On these issues, see my Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K., 1870-1914: Business Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry (Harvard University Press, 1984).

³⁵ In this view, one could include "information gathering" as part of trade. Also, see Innes, p. 208, which asserts the "fundamental continuity throughout the seventeenth century" of Japan's economic policy.

³⁶ Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History (New York, Longman, 1993), pp. 20-26.

³⁷ For background, see Jan de Vries & Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy:

Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 382-96, 429-36, esp. p. 396 which refers to the “exceptional” profitability of the 1630-50 period, and Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740 (Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 171-87, 244-58.

³⁸ Iwao Seiichi, Sakoku (Chūō Kōronsha, 1971), p. 391; Iwao Seiichi, “Japanese Foreign Trade in the 16th and 17th Centuries,” Acta Asiatica 30 (1976), 14-19.

³⁹ On the background to Chinese maritime expansion after the late 1680s, see Leonard Blussé, “No Boats to China: The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690,” Modern Asian Studies 30:1 (February 1996), 51-76.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 62-71; Peter W. Klein, “The China Seas and the World Economy between the Sixteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: The Changing Structures of Trade,” in Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, ed. Interactions in the World Economy (New York, New York University Press, 1989), pp. 80-81; Abe, p. 69.

⁴¹ Reid, Southeast Asia, p. 100; Richard von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700 (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996), pp. 136-37.

⁴² James C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Hapsburgs, 1580-1640 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 234-36, Innes, pp. 131-33, 162-63.

⁴³ Eiichi Kato, “The Japanese-Dutch Trade in the Formative Period of the Seclusion Policy: Particularly on the Raw Silk Trade by the Dutch Factory at Hirado, 1620-1640,” Acta Asiatica 30 (1976), 34-84; Nagazumi Yōko, Kinsei shoki no gaikō (Sōbunsha, 1990), pp. 5 (English summary), 167-73. Hirado was a port in northern Kyushu from which the Dutch could trade with relatively few restrictions. They were moved to Deshima, an artificial islet in Nagasaki, in 1641 where they were subject to tight control.

⁴⁴ Abe, pp. 68, 75-76; Iwao, Nan’yō Nihon machi, pp. 76-77; Innes, pp. 186-91.

⁴⁵ Abe, p. 77.

⁴⁶ Iwao, Shuinsen, pp. 355-56; Ishii & Yoshikawa, Nichi-Tai kōryū, p. 68; Iwao, Nan’yō Nihon-machi, pp. 202-06.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 79.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 289; Ishii & Yoshikawa, Nichi-Tai kōryū, p. 82..

⁴⁹ Iwao, Nan’yō Nihon-machi, pp. 246-56, 289, 303-04; W.L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York, 1939), 99-128.

⁵⁰ Nissha kankei, pp. 533, 561, 641-59; Ishii & Yoshikawa, Nichi-Tai kōryū, pp. 65-68; Iwao, Nan'yō Nihon-machi, 167-74.

⁵¹ Iwao, Nan'yō Nihon-machi, p. 335. Interestingly, mainly because of the alternate attendance system (under which daimyō and their retainers had to spent alternate periods in Edo), the male-female ratio in Edo in 1800 was 6-to-4, making the city “a predominately male society with an unquenchable thirst for pleasure and entertainment.” Nam-lin Hur, Prayer and Play in Late Tokugawa Japan: Asakusa Sensōji and Edo Society (Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 135.

⁵² Seiichi Iwao, "Japanese Emigrants in Batavia During the 17th Century," Acta Asiatica 18 (1970), pp. 1-25; Iwao, Nan'yō Nihon-machi, pp. 335-36; Iwao, Sakoku, p. 348.

⁵³ Blussé, Strange Company, p. 187; Iwao, “Batavia,” pp. 2-3, and p. 17, where Iwao notes that the highest frequency of marriage was in the decade following the prohibition against overseas voyages, probably reflecting the fact that emigrants no longer could hope to return to Japan.

⁵⁴ See the paper in this volume by Caroline Plüss. It is interesting to contrast the marriage patterns of the early 17th century Japanese overseas with those of the 1920s when Japanese male emigrants maintained the ethnicity of their community by importing “picture” brides.

⁵⁵ Boxer, pp. 305-06; Blussé, Strange Company, pp. 172-76.

⁵⁶ Nagazumi Yōko, “Saikō: Tonkin no Nihonjin tsūshi Urusura,” Nihon Rekishi no. 532 (September 1992), pp. 79-82. There is some question whether Ursula the translator and Ursula the financier were the same, or two separate people. Regardless, the roles performed illustrate the functions women performed.

⁵⁷ Nissha kankei, pp. 583-92; Iwao, Nan'yō Nihon-machi, p. 198; Reid, Southeast Asia, pp. 306-07.