Lee J. Alston, University of Illinois
Gary D. Libecap, University of Arizona
Bernardo Mueller, University of Brasilia

This paper compares frontier settlement in the 19th century American West with the 20th century Brazilian Amazon. Both frontiers are similar in that individual claimants were offered government land for private farms and ranches. In both cases as well, governments did not enforce the private property rights of some claimants for distributional reasons: the large land claims of ranchers in the West were not recognized and the large land holdings of ranchers and farmers in the Amazon were subject to redistribution if not placed into productive use. Both of these actions were designed to assist small claimants Ð homesteaders in the U.S. and squatters in Brazil. The conditions for violent conflict over land were established. Yet, there was comparatively less violence in the U.S. than in Brazil. We argue that this difference was due to the lack of funding for the General Land Office as an advocate of homesteaders in the U.S. Absent sufficient funds, the agency could not generally intervene on behalf of homesteaders. Because ranchers had advantages in the use of force for evictions, homesteaders avoided rancher claims, and thereby avoided violent conflict. In Brazil, however, the land reform agency, INCRA, responded to violence and its high political costs, by intervening to assist squatters. The expectation of INCRA intervention, however, encouraged squatters to invade and resist land owner evictions. Violent conflict resulted. Violence, however, helped to assure that the agency would respond. This study demonstrates the use of comparative analysis to better understand issues of both economic history and contemporary economic development.